feat(mobile): bind device identities and bound voice usage in 0.1.4 dev

apps/mobile/src/peer-identity.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+// Standard WebRTC identities; private key material stays inside RTCCertificate.
+// Pairing must persist the public fingerprint separately in its trusted record.
+const DATABASE = 'aiturk-mobile-peer-identities-v1'
+const STORE = 'certificates'
+const failure = () => new Error('Cihaz kimliği doğrulanamadı. Mevcut eşleşmeyi kullanmayın; yeniden açık eşleştirme gerekli.')
+
+function deviceKey(deviceId) {
+  if (typeof deviceId !== 'string' || !/^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i.test(deviceId)) throw failure()
+  return deviceId.toLowerCase()
+}
+
+export function normalizeFingerprint(value) {
+  if (typeof value !== 'string' || !/^(?:[0-9a-f]{2}:){31}[0-9a-f]{2}$/i.test(value)) throw failure()
+  return value.toUpperCase()
+}
+
+export function parsePhoneIdentity(raw, pairingId) {
+  if (typeof raw !== 'string' || raw.length > 700) throw failure()
+  let value
+  try { value = JSON.parse(raw) } catch { throw failure() }
+  if (value?.kind !== 'aiturk-phone-identity' || value.version !== 1 || value.pairingId !== pairingId) throw failure()
+  return { deviceId: deviceKey(value.deviceId), fingerprint: normalizeFingerprint(value.fingerprint) }
+}
+
+function identity(certificate) {
+  if (!(certificate instanceof RTCCertificate) || !Number.isFinite(certificate.expires) || certificate.expires <= Date.now()) throw failure()
+  const fingerprints = certificate.getFingerprints().filter(item => item.algorithm === 'sha-256')
+  if (fingerprints.length !== 1) throw failure()
+  return { certificate, fingerprint: normalizeFingerprint(fingerprints[0].value), expires: certificate.expires }
+}
+
+async function database() {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    let blocked = false
+    const request = indexedDB.open(DATABASE, 1)
+    request.onupgradeneeded = () => request.result.createObjectStore(STORE)
+    request.onerror = () => reject(failure())
+    request.onblocked = () => { blocked = true; reject(failure()) }
+    request.onsuccess = () => {
+      if (blocked) { request.result.close(); return }
+      request.result.onversionchange = () => request.result.close()
+      resolve(request.result)
+    }
+  })
+}
+
+// Call only during an explicit NEW device pairing, never to repair a missing key.
+// The read/write transaction chooses one winner across simultaneous windows.
+export async function createDeviceIdentity(deviceId) {
+  const key = deviceKey(deviceId)
+  const candidate = await RTCPeerConnection.generateCertificate({ name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' })
+  const db = await database()
+  try {
+    return await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      const tx = db.transaction(STORE, 'readwrite'), store = tx.objectStore(STORE)
+      let selected
+      const read = store.get(key)
+      read.onsuccess = () => {
+        try {
+          selected = identity(read.result === undefined ? candidate : read.result)
+          if (read.result === undefined) store.add(candidate, key)
+        } catch { tx.abort() }
+      }
+      tx.oncomplete = () => resolve(selected)
+      tx.onabort = tx.onerror = () => reject(failure())
+    })
+  } finally { db.close() }
+}
+
+// Never generates or replaces a certificate. A lost key or changed public pin
+// requires a new explicit pairing, not trust-on-first-use during reconnect.
+export async function loadDeviceIdentity(deviceId, expectedFingerprint) {
+  const key = deviceKey(deviceId), expected = normalizeFingerprint(expectedFingerprint)
+  const db = await database()
+  try {
+    const certificate = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      const tx = db.transaction(STORE), request = tx.objectStore(STORE).get(key)
+      tx.oncomplete = () => resolve(request.result)
+      tx.onabort = tx.onerror = () => reject(failure())
+    })
+    const result = identity(certificate)
+    if (result.fingerprint !== expected) throw failure()
+    return result
+  } finally { db.close() }
+}
+
+// Application data channels use a single bundled DTLS identity. Check every
+// advertised fingerprint before setRemoteDescription; native DTLS then verifies
+// that the actual peer possesses the matching private key.
+export function assertRemoteIdentity(sdp, trustedFingerprint) {
+  const expected = normalizeFingerprint(trustedFingerprint)
+  if (typeof sdp !== 'string' || sdp.length > 131072) throw failure()
+  const lines = sdp.split(/\r?\n/).filter(line => line.startsWith('a=fingerprint:'))
+  if (!lines.length) throw failure()
+  for (const line of lines) {
+    const match = /^a=fingerprint:sha-256 ((?:[0-9a-f]{2}:){31}[0-9a-f]{2})$/i.exec(line)
+    if (!match || normalizeFingerprint(match[1]) !== expected) throw failure()
+  }
+}