fix(mobile): wire plugin catalog and session-scoped subagent controls

fix(mobile): route phone APIs to selected profile and unblock runtime readiness
ci(gitea): run the approval-gate tests on the Windows runner
2026-10-07 22:37:49 +03:00 · 2026-10-07 20:10:36 +03:00 · 2026-10-07 18:12:14 +03:00 · 2026-10-07 17:17:05 +03:00 · 2026-10-05 14:27:59 +03:00 · 2026-10-05 04:22:51 +03:00
58 changed files with 7065 additions and 329 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+# AITURK IDE ajan CI (kart turkservis-20261007-1421-2).
+#
+# Bu depo bir yukari akis catalidir; .github/workflows altindaki GitHub is akislari Gitea'da kosmaz. .gitea/workflows
+# klasoru var oldugu surece Gitea yalniz buradaki is akislarini okur.
+#
+# Ne kosar: korumali talimat dosyasi onay kapisinin testleri (insana sorulamayan kosuda aninda BLOCKED, gec onayin
+# uygulanmamasi, yolo ile kapinin acilmamasi) ve dosya yazma guvenligi testleri. Kosucu Windows'tur (etiket
+# windows-latest; 7 Ekim 2026'da cevrimici kosucu hermes-laptop-windows): urunun hedefi Windows x64'tur ve hata
+# Windows asama kosusunda gorulmustur.
+#
+# Ne sayilmaz (durustluk notu): tests/tools/test_file_write_safety.py icindeki 7 test Windows'ta bu degisiklikten
+# bagimsiz olarak gecemez; yukari akis bunlari POSIX icin yazmistir (/etc, /private/etc, /boot yollari; yonetici
+# ayricaligi isteyen symlink; POSIX stat alanlari). Asagida adlariyla deselect edilir; degismemis 58dbb4523b
+# commit'inde de ayni 7 test kaliyordu (7 Ekim 2026 olcumu). Tam yukari akis test takimi burada KOSMAZ.
+name: ci
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches:
+      - aiturk/main
+      - fix/ide-windows-vcruntime
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  mobile-link-windows:
+    runs-on: windows-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 15
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          github-server-url: https://gitea.twinpay.one
+      - name: Mobil TLS, profil ve baslatma regresyonlari
+        shell: powershell
+        run: |
+          $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
+          $deps = Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP "mobile-tests-$env:GITHUB_RUN_ID"
+          New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $deps | Out-Null
+          npm install --prefix $deps --no-save --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund --legacy-peer-deps vitest@4.1.10 ws@8.21.1
+          if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'Test bagimliliklari kurulamadi' }
+          New-Item -ItemType Junction -Path node_modules -Target (Join-Path $deps 'node_modules') | Out-Null
+          node node_modules/vitest/vitest.mjs run --root apps/desktop --config vitest.mobile.config.ts
+          exit $LASTEXITCODE
+
+  approval-gate-windows:
+    runs-on: windows-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 40
+    steps:
+      - name: Kaynagi al
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          github-server-url: https://gitea.twinpay.one
+
+      - name: Ortami kur
+        shell: powershell
+        run: |
+          $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
+          "kosucu: $env:COMPUTERNAME / $env:USERNAME"
+          "checkout SHA: $(git rev-parse HEAD) / beklenen: $env:GITHUB_SHA"
+          $py = $null
+          $launcher = Get-Command py -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+          if ($launcher) { $py = (& $launcher.Source -3 -c 'import sys; print(sys.executable)').Trim() }
+          if (-not $py) {
+            $cmd = Get-Command python -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+            if ($cmd -and $cmd.Source -notlike '*\WindowsApps\*') { $py = $cmd.Source }
+          }
+          if (-not $py) { throw 'Python bulunamadi' }
+          "onyukleme python: $py"
+          & $py -m pip install --quiet --disable-pip-version-check --target "$env:RUNNER_TEMP\uvboot" uv
+          if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'uv kurulamadi' }
+          $env:PYTHONPATH = "$env:RUNNER_TEMP\uvboot"
+          & $py -m uv venv --python 3.11 "$env:RUNNER_TEMP\ci-venv"
+          if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'venv olusturulamadi' }
+          & $py -m uv pip install --python "$env:RUNNER_TEMP\ci-venv\Scripts\python.exe" -e . pytest
+          if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'bagimliliklar kurulamadi' }
+          $env:PYTHONPATH = ''
+          & "$env:RUNNER_TEMP\ci-venv\Scripts\python.exe" --version
+
+      - name: Onay kapisi testleri
+        shell: powershell
+        run: |
+          $ErrorActionPreference = 'Continue'
+          $env:PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE = '1'
+          $env:PYTHONUTF8 = '1'
+          $venv = "$env:RUNNER_TEMP\ci-venv\Scripts\python.exe"
+          $f = 'tests/tools/test_file_write_safety.py'
+          $sayilmayan = @(
+            "${f}::TestCheckSensitivePathMacOSBypass::test_etc_hosts_blocked",
+            "${f}::TestCheckSensitivePathMacOSBypass::test_private_etc_hosts_blocked",
+            "${f}::TestCheckSensitivePathMacOSBypass::test_private_etc_ssh_config_blocked",
+            "${f}::TestCheckSensitivePathMacOSBypass::test_private_var_blocked",
+            "${f}::TestCheckSensitivePathMacOSBypass::test_boot_still_blocked",
+            "${f}::TestAtomicWrite::test_patch_routes_through_atomic_write",
+            "${f}::TestProtectedInstructionFiles::test_symlink_to_protected_file_is_gated"
+          )
+          $deselect = @()
+          foreach ($t in $sayilmayan) { $deselect += '--deselect'; $deselect += $t }
+          "CI OZETI: Windows'ta sayilmayan (deselect) test sayisi: $($sayilmayan.Count)"
+          $sayilmayan | ForEach-Object { "  sayilmadi: $_" }
+          & $venv -m pytest tests/tools/test_protected_instruction_unattended.py $f `
+            tests/tools/test_computer_use_approval_isolation.py tests/cli/test_cli_approval_ui.py `
+            tests/cli/test_single_query_session_finalize.py `
+            tests/hermes_cli/test_plugin_catalog.py tests/hermes_cli/test_aiturk_plugin_catalog.py `
+            tests/hermes_cli/test_plugin_install_ref.py `
+            tests/tui_gateway/test_mobile_subagents.py @deselect -q -p no:cacheprovider -rf
+          $kod = $LASTEXITCODE
+          "pytest cikis kodu: $kod"
+          exit $kod
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# Mobile connection repair — beta.19
+
+The paired phone previously resolved the desktop's active profile. If that
+profile's startup promise was waiting for first-run setup, every phone API
+request waited too, even while the default backend was already serving.
+
+REST and WebSocket requests now resolve the phone's explicit `profile` query
+(default when absent). Aggregate `profile=all` reaches the default process
+without rewriting the downstream query. Invalid profile identifiers, remote
+backends and a missing local runtime are refused; phone requests do not install
+software or silently fall back to a different profile. Resolution has an eight
+second deadline; this is not an agent, tool or scheduled-job execution deadline.
+
+Shared-runtime completion wakes only a waiting setup for the same runtime root.
+Primary startup then resolves its own profile again. This does not grant
+installation consent or substitute a sibling profile's backend connection.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- 94 mobile transport, certificate, relay, profile and startup regression tests.
+- Electron TypeScript type check.
+- Opt-in `mobile-live.test.ts`, with `AITURK_TEST_BACKEND_PORT`: real local
+  backend behind the production TLS proxy, pinned certificate, screen reads,
+  cron create/update/pause/resume/delete and chat WebSocket ping. Test-created
+  job is deleted; existing jobs are untouched. This test does not trigger an
+  agent job or claim physical-phone/cellular acceptance.
+- Public relay hello was separately exercised using Android's production
+  OkHttp/Conscrypt stack. A successful hello alone does not prove API readiness.
+
+Publication, installed beta.19 and physical-phone acceptance are separate gates.
+Existing phone security exclusions are unchanged. Unsupported methods and
+features are not claimed to be implemented by this connection repair.
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'

 import {
  AITURK_CLI_KEY_HOLD_MS,
+  AITURK_LOGIN_START_RETRY_DELAY_MS,
  type AiturkCliExit,
  AiturkLoginError,
  createAiturkCliRunner,
@@ -38,6 +39,8 @@ const approved = { state: 'approved', key: IDE_KEY, cliKey: CLI_KEY, account: 'a
 function harness(
  options: {
    start?: { status: number; body?: unknown }
+    /** Thrown by successive `device-auth/start` calls before any answer is given. */
+    startErrors?: Error[]
    polls?: ({ status: number; body?: unknown } | Error)[]
    cliExits?: AiturkCliExit[]
    validate?: unknown
@@ -47,6 +50,7 @@ function harness(
 ) {
  const calls: { url: string; init: any }[] = []
  const polls = [...(options.polls ?? [])]
+  const startErrors = [...(options.startErrors ?? [])]
  const cliExits = [...(options.cliExits ?? [0])]
  const clock = { now: 1_000_000 }
  const timers: { fn: () => void; ms: number; cleared: boolean }[] = []
@@ -55,6 +59,12 @@ function harness(
    calls.push({ url, init })

    if (url.endsWith('/start')) {
+      const failure = startErrors.shift()
+
+      if (failure) {
+        throw failure
+      }
+
      const r = options.start ?? { status: 201, body: startBody() }

      return { status: r.status, json: async () => r.body }
@@ -154,6 +164,47 @@ describe('aiturk login: start', () => {
    await expect(harness({ start: { status: 500 } }).login.start()).rejects.toThrow('aiturk-login:unavailable')
  })

+  it('tries start once more after a thrown network error (first request of a long-idle process)', async () => {
+    const h = harness({ startErrors: [new TypeError('fetch failed')] })
+    const pending = h.login.start()
+
+    await vi.waitFor(() => expect(h.timers.some(timer => timer.ms === AITURK_LOGIN_START_RETRY_DELAY_MS)).toBe(true))
+    expect(AITURK_LOGIN_START_RETRY_DELAY_MS).toBe(500)
+    expect(h.calls.filter(call => call.url.endsWith('/start'))).toHaveLength(1)
+    expect(h.openExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    h.timers.find(timer => timer.ms === AITURK_LOGIN_START_RETRY_DELAY_MS)!.fn()
+
+    expect(await pending).toEqual({ userCode: 'ABCD2345', verificationUri: URI, expiresAt: 1_000_000 + 600_000 })
+    expect(h.calls.filter(call => call.url.endsWith('/start'))).toHaveLength(2)
+    // One code only: the approval page is opened once.
+    expect(h.openExternal).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith(URI)
+  })
+
+  it('gives up after the second network error, and never retries an HTTP answer or a timeout', async () => {
+    const twice = harness({ startErrors: [new TypeError('fetch failed'), new TypeError('fetch failed')] })
+    const failing = twice.login.start().catch(e => e)
+
+    await vi.waitFor(() => expect(twice.timers.some(timer => timer.ms === AITURK_LOGIN_START_RETRY_DELAY_MS)).toBe(true))
+    twice.timers.find(timer => timer.ms === AITURK_LOGIN_START_RETRY_DELAY_MS)!.fn()
+    expect((await failing).message).toBe('aiturk-login:unavailable')
+    expect(twice.calls.filter(call => call.url.endsWith('/start'))).toHaveLength(2)
+    expect(twice.timers.filter(timer => timer.ms === AITURK_LOGIN_START_RETRY_DELAY_MS)).toHaveLength(1)
+
+    for (const status of [500, 503, 429, 422]) {
+      const answered = harness({ start: { status } })
+
+      await expect(answered.login.start()).rejects.toThrow(/^aiturk-login:(?:unavailable|rate-limited)$/)
+      expect(answered.calls.filter(call => call.url.endsWith('/start'))).toHaveLength(1)
+      expect(answered.timers).toHaveLength(0)
+    }
+
+    const timedOut = harness({ startErrors: [new DOMException('The operation was aborted due to timeout', 'TimeoutError')] })
+
+    await expect(timedOut.login.start()).rejects.toThrow('aiturk-login:unavailable')
+    expect(timedOut.calls.filter(call => call.url.endsWith('/start'))).toHaveLength(1)
+    expect(timedOut.timers).toHaveLength(0)
+  })
+
  it('rejects malformed codes', async () => {
    await expect(
      harness({ start: { status: 201, body: startBody({ userCode: 'abcd2345' }) } }).login.start()
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@

 export const AITURK_LOGIN_ORIGIN = 'https://turkservis.online'
 export const AITURK_LOGIN_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000
+/** Wait before the single second try of `device-auth/start` after a thrown network error. */
+export const AITURK_LOGIN_START_RETRY_DELAY_MS = 500
 export const AITURK_CLI_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000
 export const AITURK_CLI_KEY_HOLD_MS = 5 * 60_000

@@ -237,16 +239,29 @@ export function createAiturkLogin(deps: AiturkLoginDeps) {
      await cancelOnServer(previous.deviceCode)
    }

-    let response: AiturkFetchResponse
+    let response: AiturkFetchResponse | undefined

-    try {
-      response = await post('/v1/aiturk/device-auth/start', null, {
-        client: 'ide',
-        device_name: deviceName(deps.hostname()),
-        also_cli: true
-      })
-    } catch {
-      throw new AiturkLoginError('unavailable')
+    // A long-idle process can fail its first request on a dead pooled
+    // connection. Only a THROWN network error (no HTTP answer, so no code was
+    // handed to us) is tried once more; an HTTP answer is never retried, so
+    // one start cannot knowingly leave two codes behind. A timeout already
+    // used its whole budget and is not retried.
+    for (let attempt = 1; response === undefined; attempt++) {
+      try {
+        response = await post('/v1/aiturk/device-auth/start', null, {
+          client: 'ide',
+          device_name: deviceName(deps.hostname()),
+          also_cli: true
+        })
+      } catch (error) {
+        const name = (error as null | { name?: unknown })?.name
+
+        if (attempt >= 2 || name === 'TimeoutError' || name === 'AbortError') {
+          throw new AiturkLoginError('unavailable')
+        }
+
+        await new Promise<void>(resolve => void setTimer(resolve, AITURK_LOGIN_START_RETRY_DELAY_MS))
+      }
    }

    if (response.status === 429) {
@@ -131,3 +131,37 @@ test('remote apply without a waiter has no first-run side effects', async () =>
  assert.equal(hidden, 0)
  assert.equal(gate.isLocalBootstrapConfirmed(), true)
 })
+
+test('a completed shared runtime wakes only its own pending setup, without granting installation consent', async () => {
+  let hidden = 0
+  const gate = createFirstRunSetupGate({ hideChoice: () => hidden++, stuckAfterMs: 0 })
+  const pending = gate.wait(bootstrapBackend)
+  assert.equal(gate.runtimeAvailable('/tmp/unrelated-runtime'), false)
+  assert.equal(await settledState(pending), 'pending')
+  assert.equal(gate.runtimeAvailable(bootstrapBackend.activeRoot), true)
+  assert.equal(await pending, 'runtime-ready')
+  assert.equal(gate.isLocalBootstrapConfirmed(), false)
+  assert.equal(hidden, 1)
+  assert.equal(gate.runtimeAvailable(bootstrapBackend.activeRoot), false)
+})
+
+test('late runtime readiness does not revive a reset or remotely resolved waiter', async () => {
+  const gate = createFirstRunSetupGate({ stuckAfterMs: 0 })
+  const pending = gate.wait(bootstrapBackend)
+  gate.resetForRetry()
+  assert.equal(await pending, 'reset')
+  assert.equal(gate.runtimeAvailable(bootstrapBackend.activeRoot), false)
+})
+
+test('runtime completed before wait does not leave a stale setup prompt pending', async () => {
+  let prompts = 0
+  const gate = createFirstRunSetupGate({
+    isRuntimeAvailable: backend => backend.activeRoot === bootstrapBackend.activeRoot,
+    promptChoice: () => prompts++,
+    stuckAfterMs: 0
+  })
+  assert.equal(await gate.wait(bootstrapBackend), 'runtime-ready')
+  assert.equal(gate.hasWaiter(), false)
+  assert.equal(gate.isLocalBootstrapConfirmed(), false)
+  assert.equal(prompts, 0)
+})
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+import path from 'node:path'
+
 interface FirstRunSetupBackend {
  activeRoot?: string
  kind?: string
@@ -5,6 +7,7 @@ interface FirstRunSetupBackend {
 }

 interface FirstRunSetupGateOptions {
+  isRuntimeAvailable?: (backend: FirstRunSetupBackend) => boolean
  hideChoice?: () => void
  log?: (message: string) => void
  onStuck?: (backend: FirstRunSetupBackend, stuckAfterMs: number) => void
@@ -12,9 +15,10 @@ interface FirstRunSetupGateOptions {
  stuckAfterMs?: number
 }

-export type FirstRunSetupDecision = 'continue-local' | 'remote-applied' | 'reset'
+export type FirstRunSetupDecision = 'continue-local' | 'remote-applied' | 'reset' | 'runtime-ready'

 export function createFirstRunSetupGate({
+  isRuntimeAvailable,
  hideChoice,
  log,
  onStuck,
@@ -24,6 +28,7 @@ export function createFirstRunSetupGate({
  let localBootstrapConfirmed = false

  let waiter: {
+    activeRoot?: string
    promise: Promise<FirstRunSetupDecision>
    resolve: (decision: FirstRunSetupDecision) => void
  } | null = null
@@ -65,6 +70,13 @@ export function createFirstRunSetupGate({
      return 'continue-local' as const
    }

+    // Recheck synchronously before registering the waiter: another profile
+    // may have completed installation before this stale descriptor arrived.
+    if (backend && isRuntimeAvailable?.(backend)) {
+      if (backend.activeRoot) runtimeAvailable(backend.activeRoot)
+      return 'runtime-ready' as const
+    }
+
    if (waiter) {
      return waiter.promise
    }
@@ -78,7 +90,7 @@ export function createFirstRunSetupGate({
      resolveWaiter = resolve
    })

-    waiter = { promise, resolve: resolveWaiter }
+    waiter = { activeRoot: backend?.activeRoot, promise, resolve: resolveWaiter }

    return promise
  }
@@ -102,6 +114,21 @@ export function createFirstRunSetupGate({
    settleWaiter('continue-local')
  }

+  // A sibling profile may finish installing the SAME shared runtime while the
+  // primary boot is awaiting a setup choice. Re-resolve it; do not interpret
+  // this as permission for another installation, or reuse the sibling's
+  // profile/backend descriptor.
+  const runtimeAvailable = (root: string) => {
+    const canonical = (value: string) => {
+      const absolute = path.resolve(value)
+      return process.platform === 'win32' ? absolute.toLowerCase() : absolute
+    }
+    if (!waiter?.activeRoot || canonical(waiter.activeRoot) !== canonical(root)) return false
+    settleWaiter('runtime-ready')
+    hideChoice?.()
+    return true
+  }
+
  const resetForRetry = () => {
    // Reset paths are followed by a renderer reload / fresh startHermes() call.
    // Settle the old boot explicitly so it cannot fall through into local
@@ -140,6 +167,7 @@ export function createFirstRunSetupGate({
    isLocalBootstrapConfirmed,
    resetForRepair,
    resetForRetry,
+    runtimeAvailable,
    shouldGate,
    wait
  }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { execFileSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process'
+import { execFile, execFileSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process'
 import crypto from 'node:crypto'
 import fs from 'node:fs'
 import http from 'node:http'
@@ -32,9 +32,11 @@ import {
  shell,
  systemPreferences
 } from 'electron'
+import { WebSocket as RelayWebSocket } from 'ws'

 import { classifyActiveRuntime, needsPackagedRuntimeUpgrade } from './active-runtime-state'
 import { createAiturkCliRunner, createAiturkLogin } from './aiturk-login'
+import { createMobileBackendResolver } from './mobile-backend'
 import {
  createMobileLink,
  createMobileLinkFileStore,
@@ -2074,6 +2076,10 @@ function hideFirstRunSetupChoice() {
 function getFirstRunSetupGate() {
  if (!firstRunSetupGate) {
    firstRunSetupGate = createFirstRunSetupGate({
+      isRuntimeAvailable: backend =>
+        backend.activeRoot === ACTIVE_HERMES_ROOT &&
+        resolveHermesBackend(['--profile', primaryProfileKey(), 'serve', '--host', '127.0.0.1', '--port', '0']).kind !==
+          'bootstrap-needed',
      hideChoice: hideFirstRunSetupChoice,
      log: rememberLog,
      onStuck: (_backend, stuckAfterMs) => {
@@ -5258,6 +5264,11 @@ async function ensureRuntime(backend) {
    error: null
  })

+  // Runtime installation is shared; profile processes and their data are not.
+  // Wake only a setup waiter for this exact installed root, then let primary
+  // startup resolve its own profile again (never adopt a pool connection).
+  firstRunSetupGate?.runtimeAvailable(ACTIVE_HERMES_ROOT)
+
  return backend
 }

@@ -6794,7 +6805,7 @@ function buildApplicationMenu() {

  const checkForUpdatesItem = {
    label: 'Check for Updates…',
-    click: () => IS_PACKAGED ? void shell.openExternal(AITURK_PRODUCT.downloads) : sendOpenUpdatesRequested()
+    click: () => (IS_PACKAGED ? void shell.openExternal(AITURK_PRODUCT.downloads) : sendOpenUpdatesRequested())
  }

  if (IS_MAC) {
@@ -17645,8 +17656,11 @@ async function getUninstallSummary() {
 async function runDesktopUninstall(_mode) {
  // The upstream cleanup script removes Hermes-specific shortcuts, registry
  // entries and global launchers. AITURK is owned by its OS package manager.
-  return { ok: false, error: 'aiturk-os-uninstaller',
-    message: 'AITURK IDE işletim sisteminin uygulama yöneticisinden kaldırılır.' }
+  return {
+    ok: false,
+    error: 'aiturk-os-uninstaller',
+    message: 'AITURK IDE işletim sisteminin uygulama yöneticisinden kaldırılır.'
+  }
 }

 ipcMain.handle('hermes:uninstall:summary', async () => getUninstallSummary())
@@ -17852,30 +17866,50 @@ function getMobileLink(): MobileLink {
    // Same vault file as before (mobile-secrets.bin, safeStorage); older fields are kept.
    vault: new MobileVault(directory, safeStorage),
    store: createMobileLinkFileStore(directory, path.join(directory, 'lan-link.json'), fs.promises),
-    resolveBackend: async () => {
-      if (mobileLinkRemoteMode()) {
-        throw new Error('aiturk-mobile:remote_mode')
-      }
-
-      const connection = await ensureBackend(primaryProfileKey())
-
-      if (connection.mode !== 'local') {
-        throw new Error('aiturk-mobile:remote_mode')
-      }
-
-      return { baseUrl: connection.baseUrl, token: connection.token }
-    },
+    resolveBackend: createMobileBackendResolver({
+      isRemote: profile => mobileLinkRemoteMode() || profileHasRemoteOverride(profile),
+      runtimeNeedsInstall: profile =>
+        resolveHermesBackend(['--profile', profile, 'serve', '--host', '127.0.0.1', '--port', '0']).kind ===
+        'bootstrap-needed',
+      ensureBackend
+    }),
    isRemoteMode: mobileLinkRemoteMode,
-    firewall: createWindowsFirewall({ spawn, platform: process.platform, env: process.env }),
+    firewall: createWindowsFirewall({
+      spawn,
+      platform: process.platform,
+      env: process.env,
+      // Read-only rule query (fixed arguments, no shell, no elevation). netsh answers in the
+      // console code page; latin1 keeps every byte and the parser needs no translated word.
+      run: (file, args) =>
+        new Promise(resolve => {
+          execFile(
+            file,
+            args,
+            { windowsHide: true, timeout: 8000, encoding: 'latin1', maxBuffer: 256 * 1024 },
+            (error, stdout) => {
+              const code = error
+                ? typeof (error as { code?: unknown }).code === 'number'
+                  ? ((error as { code?: unknown }).code as number)
+                  : null
+                : 0
+
+              resolve({ code, stdout: String(stdout ?? '') })
+            }
+          )
+        })
+    }),
    fetch: (url, init) => fetch(url, init as RequestInit),
+    // Outbound relay socket (turkservis.online) and the pinned loopback sockets to our own proxy.
+    WebSocket: RelayWebSocket,
    addresses: async () => selectLanAddresses(os.networkInterfaces(), await defaultRouteAddress()),
    version: app.getVersion(),
    pcName: os.hostname(),
    platform: process.platform,
    // Method + path + status only (no token, code, query or body). Successful
-    // API traffic is not logged; pairing and refusals are, for diagnosis.
+    // API traffic is not logged; pairing and refusals are, for diagnosis. Relay
+    // lines are status changes only ("relay connected", "relay failed:<code>").
    log: line => {
-      if (/ \/aiturk\//.test(line) || / [45]\d\d$/.test(line)) {
+      if (/^(?:relay|pair) /.test(line) || / \/aiturk\//.test(line) || / [45]\d\d$/.test(line)) {
        rememberLog(`[mobile-lan] ${line}`)
      }
    }
@@ -17921,7 +17955,12 @@ app.whenReady().then(() => {
        }
        return ensureBackend(profile)
      }
-    }).then(stop => app.once('will-quit', () => { void stop() }))
+    })
+      .then(stop =>
+        app.once('will-quit', () => {
+          void stop()
+        })
+      )
      .catch(() => rememberLog('[chrome] Native bridge could not start.'))
  }
  // Warm the login-shell PATH resolution immediately so it usually completes
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+import { expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+
+import { createMobileBackendResolver } from './mobile-backend'
+
+const local = { mode: 'local', baseUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:12345', token: 'test-session' }
+
+it('uses the phone profile even while another desktop profile is awaiting setup', async () => {
+  const ensureBackend = vi.fn(async (profile: string) => {
+    if (profile === 'fusion-frontier') return new Promise<typeof local>(() => {})
+    return local
+  })
+  const resolve = createMobileBackendResolver({
+    isRemote: () => false,
+    runtimeNeedsInstall: () => false,
+    ensureBackend
+  })
+  expect(await resolve('default')).toEqual({ baseUrl: local.baseUrl, token: local.token })
+  expect(ensureBackend).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith('default')
+})
+
+it('never bootstraps an absent runtime or silently replaces a remote profile with default', async () => {
+  const ensureBackend = vi.fn(async () => local)
+  const resolve = createMobileBackendResolver({
+    isRemote: profile => profile === 'remote',
+    runtimeNeedsInstall: () => true,
+    ensureBackend
+  })
+  await expect(resolve('default')).rejects.toThrow('runtime_not_ready')
+  await expect(resolve('remote')).rejects.toThrow('remote_mode')
+  expect(ensureBackend).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+})
+
+it('preserves an explicitly selected local profile and rejects remote-mode changes during resolution', async () => {
+  let remote = false
+  const ensureBackend = vi.fn(async () => local)
+  const resolve = createMobileBackendResolver({
+    isRemote: () => remote,
+    runtimeNeedsInstall: () => false,
+    ensureBackend
+  })
+  await resolve('kodlama')
+  expect(ensureBackend).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith('kodlama')
+  ensureBackend.mockImplementationOnce(async () => {
+    remote = true
+    return local
+  })
+  await expect(resolve('kodlama')).rejects.toThrow('remote_mode')
+})
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/** Mobile routing is explicit and cannot start a first-run installer. */
+export function createMobileBackendResolver<Connection extends { mode: string; baseUrl: string; token: string }>({
+  isRemote,
+  runtimeNeedsInstall,
+  ensureBackend
+}: {
+  isRemote: (profile: string) => boolean
+  runtimeNeedsInstall: (profile: string) => boolean
+  ensureBackend: (profile: string) => Promise<Connection>
+}) {
+  return async (profile: string) => {
+    if (isRemote(profile)) throw new Error('aiturk-mobile:remote_mode')
+    if (runtimeNeedsInstall(profile)) throw new Error('aiturk-mobile:runtime_not_ready')
+    const connection = await ensureBackend(profile)
+    if (connection.mode !== 'local' || isRemote(profile)) throw new Error('aiturk-mobile:remote_mode')
+    return { baseUrl: connection.baseUrl, token: connection.token }
+  }
+}
@@ -6,56 +6,72 @@ import { drawQr } from './mobile/qr.mjs'
 const TEXT = {
  tr: {
    eyebrow: 'AITURK · BİLGİSAYAR', title: 'Telefon bağlantısı',
-    intro: 'AITURK Mobil uygulaması, aynı Wi-Fi ağındayken bu bilgisayardaki IDE konuşmalarınızı görür ve sohbet eder. Hesap girişi gerekmez.',
-    enabled: 'Telefon bağlantısı açık', disabled: 'Telefon bağlantısı kapalı',
+    intro: 'Telefonunuz internetin olduğu her yerden bu bilgisayardaki IDE’ye bağlanır; aynı Wi-Fi gerekmez. Bağlantı uçtan uca şifrelidir. Bilgisayar açık ve AITURK IDE çalışıyor olmalı.',
+    toggle: 'Telefon bağlantısını kullan',
    remote: 'IDE şu an uzak bir ağ geçidine bağlı. Telefon bağlantısı yalnız yerel IDE bağlantısıyla çalışır; Ayarlar’dan yerel bağlantıyı seçin.',
-    firewallNeeded: 'Windows Güvenlik Duvarı izni henüz verilmedi. İzin olmadan telefon bu bilgisayara ulaşamayabilir.',
-    firewallDenied: 'Windows izin penceresi reddedildi; Güvenlik Duvarı kuralı eklenemedi. İzin olmadan telefon bu bilgisayara ulaşamayabilir.',
-    firewallFailed: 'Windows Güvenlik Duvarı kuralı eklenemedi. İzin olmadan telefon bu bilgisayara ulaşamayabilir.',
-    retry: 'Yeniden dene', addPhone: 'Telefon ekle', cancel: 'Vazgeç',
+    relayLabel: 'İnternet üzerinden bağlantı', lanLabel: 'Aynı Wi-Fi’da doğrudan bağlantı',
+    relay: { connected: 'hazır', connecting: 'bağlanıyor…', failed: 'kurulamadı (yeniden denenecek)', idle: 'beklemede (telefon eklenince bağlanır)',
+      replaced: 'başka bir AITURK IDE aynı kaydı kullanıyor (30 sn sonra yeniden denenecek)', busy: 'servis dolu (yeniden denenecek)' },
+    lanOpen: port => `açık (bağlantı noktası ${port})`, lanOff: 'kapalı', lanIdle: 'izin verildi (telefon eklenince açılır)',
+    lanNoRule: 'Windows Güvenlik Duvarı izni yok', lanDenied: 'kapalı (Windows izin penceresi reddedildi)', lanFailed: 'kapalı (Güvenlik Duvarı kuralı eklenemedi)',
+    lanAllow: 'Aynı Wi-Fi’da doğrudan bağlantıya da izin ver', allow: 'İzin ver', lanDisallow: 'Doğrudan bağlantıyı kapat',
+    reissued: 'Röle kimliği yenilendi. Daha önce eklenen telefonları yeniden eşleştirin: telefonda bu bilgisayarı kaldırıp “Telefon ekle” ile yeniden bağlayın.',
+    addPhone: 'Telefon ekle', cancel: 'Vazgeç',
    scan: 'Telefonda AITURK Mobil → “Bilgisayara bağlan” → bu QR kodunu okutun.',
    orCode: 'ya da telefonda şu kodu yazın:',
    codePending: 'Kodla bağlanma hazırlanıyor…', codeReady: 'Kodla bağlanma hazır.',
-    codeUnavailable: 'Kodla bağlanma şu an kullanılamıyor; QR kodunu okutun.',
-    sameWifi: 'Telefon ve bilgisayar aynı Wi-Fi ağında olmalı.',
+    codeUnavailable: 'Kodla bağlanma şu an kullanılamıyor; QR kodunu okutun.', codeRetry: 'Yeniden dene',
+    securityCode: code => `Güvenlik kodu: ${code} (telefonda da aynı kod görünmeli)`,
+    anyNetwork: 'Telefon ve bilgisayar aynı ağda olmak zorunda değil.', sameWifi: 'Telefon ve bilgisayar aynı Wi-Fi ağında olmalı.',
    countdown: (m, s) => `Kod ${m}:${s} sonra geçersiz olur`, expired: 'Kodun süresi doldu. Yeniden “Telefon ekle” seçin.',
    devices: 'Bağlı telefonlar', noDevices: 'Henüz bağlı telefon yok.',
    added: 'Eklenme', lastSeen: 'Son görülme', online: 'şu an bağlı', remove: 'Kaldır',
    removed: name => `${name} kaldırıldı.`, paired: name => `${name} bağlandı.`,
-    footer: port => `Bağlantı noktası: ${port}`, removeRule: 'Güvenlik Duvarı kuralını kaldır', ruleRemoved: 'Güvenlik Duvarı kuralı kaldırıldı.',
+    removeRule: 'Güvenlik Duvarı kuralını kaldır', ruleRemoved: 'Güvenlik Duvarı kuralı kaldırıldı.',
+    renew: 'Röle kimliğini yenile', renewed: 'Röle kimliği yenilendi. Telefonları yeniden eşleştirin.',
+    renewConfirm: 'Röle kimliği yenilenirse bağlı telefonların hepsi kaldırılır ve yeniden eşleştirilmeleri gerekir. Devam edilsin mi?',
    errors: {
      remote_mode: 'IDE uzak ağ geçidine bağlıyken telefon bağlantısı açılamaz.',
      vault_unavailable: 'Windows güvenli anahtar kasası kullanılamıyor; telefon bağlantısı açılamadı.',
      not_enabled: 'Önce telefon bağlantısını açın.',
-      no_lan_address: 'Bu bilgisayar bir yerel ağa (Wi-Fi ya da kablo) bağlı görünmüyor.',
+      no_lan_address: 'Bu bilgisayar bir yerel ağa (Wi-Fi ya da kablo) bağlı görünmüyor ve internet üzerinden bağlantı da kurulamadı.',
+      relay_unavailable: 'İnternete ulaşılamıyor, yeniden deneyin.',
      port_unavailable: 'Boş bağlantı noktası bulunamadı (47321–47340 kullanımda).',
      failed: 'İşlem tamamlanamadı. Yeniden deneyin.',
    },
  },
  en: {
    eyebrow: 'AITURK · COMPUTER', title: 'Phone connection',
-    intro: 'The AITURK Mobile app can see and continue this computer’s IDE conversations while on the same Wi-Fi network. No account sign-in is needed.',
-    enabled: 'Phone connection is on', disabled: 'Phone connection is off',
+    intro: 'Your phone connects to the IDE on this computer from anywhere with internet access; the same Wi-Fi is not needed. The connection is end-to-end encrypted. The computer must be on and AITURK IDE must be running.',
+    toggle: 'Use phone connection',
    remote: 'The IDE is connected to a remote gateway. Phone connection only works with the local IDE connection; choose the local connection in Settings.',
-    firewallNeeded: 'Windows Firewall permission has not been granted yet. Without it the phone may not reach this computer.',
-    firewallDenied: 'The Windows permission prompt was declined, so the Firewall rule was not added. Without it the phone may not reach this computer.',
-    firewallFailed: 'The Windows Firewall rule could not be added. Without it the phone may not reach this computer.',
-    retry: 'Try again', addPhone: 'Add a phone', cancel: 'Cancel',
+    relayLabel: 'Connection over the internet', lanLabel: 'Direct connection on the same Wi-Fi',
+    relay: { connected: 'ready', connecting: 'connecting…', failed: 'could not be set up (will retry)', idle: 'waiting (connects once a phone is added)',
+      replaced: 'another AITURK IDE is using the same registration (will retry in 30 s)', busy: 'service is full (will retry)' },
+    lanOpen: port => `on (port ${port})`, lanOff: 'off', lanIdle: 'allowed (opens once a phone is added)',
+    lanNoRule: 'no Windows Firewall permission', lanDenied: 'off (the Windows permission prompt was declined)', lanFailed: 'off (the Firewall rule could not be added)',
+    lanAllow: 'Also allow a direct connection on the same Wi-Fi', allow: 'Allow', lanDisallow: 'Turn direct connection off',
+    reissued: 'The relay identity was renewed. Pair the phones added earlier again: remove this computer on the phone and connect with “Add a phone”.',
+    addPhone: 'Add a phone', cancel: 'Cancel',
    scan: 'On the phone: AITURK Mobile → “Connect to computer” → scan this QR code.',
    orCode: 'or type this code on the phone:',
    codePending: 'Preparing code sign-in…', codeReady: 'Connecting with the code is ready.',
-    codeUnavailable: 'Connecting with the code is unavailable right now; scan the QR code.',
-    sameWifi: 'The phone and the computer must be on the same Wi-Fi network.',
+    codeUnavailable: 'Connecting with the code is unavailable right now; scan the QR code.', codeRetry: 'Try again',
+    securityCode: code => `Security code: ${code} (the phone must show the same code)`,
+    anyNetwork: 'The phone and the computer do not have to be on the same network.', sameWifi: 'The phone and the computer must be on the same Wi-Fi network.',
    countdown: (m, s) => `The code expires in ${m}:${s}`, expired: 'The code expired. Choose “Add a phone” again.',
    devices: 'Connected phones', noDevices: 'No phone is connected yet.',
    added: 'Added', lastSeen: 'Last seen', online: 'connected now', remove: 'Remove',
    removed: name => `${name} was removed.`, paired: name => `${name} connected.`,
-    footer: port => `Port: ${port}`, removeRule: 'Remove the Firewall rule', ruleRemoved: 'The Firewall rule was removed.',
+    removeRule: 'Remove the Firewall rule', ruleRemoved: 'The Firewall rule was removed.',
+    renew: 'Renew the relay identity', renewed: 'The relay identity was renewed. Pair the phones again.',
+    renewConfirm: 'Renewing the relay identity removes every connected phone; they must be paired again. Continue?',
    errors: {
      remote_mode: 'Phone connection cannot be turned on while the IDE uses a remote gateway.',
      vault_unavailable: 'The Windows secure key store is unavailable; phone connection could not be turned on.',
      not_enabled: 'Turn phone connection on first.',
-      no_lan_address: 'This computer does not seem to be on a local network (Wi-Fi or cable).',
+      no_lan_address: 'This computer does not seem to be on a local network (Wi-Fi or cable) and the internet connection could not be set up either.',
+      relay_unavailable: 'The internet cannot be reached, try again.',
      port_unavailable: 'No free port was found (47321–47340 are in use).',
      failed: 'That did not work. Try again.',
    },
@@ -66,8 +82,9 @@ const t = TEXT[lang], host = window.mobileHost, $ = id => document.getElementByI
 const when = value => new Date(value).toLocaleString(lang === 'tr' ? 'tr-TR' : 'en-GB', { dateStyle: 'medium', timeStyle: 'short' })
 document.documentElement.lang = lang; document.title = `AITURK · ${t.title}`
 for (const [id, key] of [['t-eyebrow', 'eyebrow'], ['t-title', 'title'], ['t-intro', 'intro'], ['t-remote', 'remote'], ['t-scan', 'scan'],
-  ['t-or-code', 'orCode'], ['t-same-wifi', 'sameWifi'], ['t-devices', 'devices'], ['devices-empty', 'noDevices'], ['firewall-retry', 'retry'],
-  ['pair-begin', 'addPhone'], ['pair-cancel', 'cancel'], ['firewall-remove', 'removeRule']]) $(id).textContent = t[key]
+  ['t-or-code', 'orCode'], ['t-devices', 'devices'], ['devices-empty', 'noDevices'], ['t-enabled', 'toggle'], ['t-relay-label', 'relayLabel'],
+  ['t-lan-label', 'lanLabel'], ['t-reissued', 'reissued'], ['lan-disallow', 'lanDisallow'], ['relay-renew', 'renew'],
+  ['pair-begin', 'addPhone'], ['pair-cancel', 'cancel'], ['pair-republish', 'codeRetry'], ['firewall-remove', 'removeRule']]) $(id).textContent = t[key]

 let current = null, drawnQr = '', busy = false
 function notice(text) { $('notice').textContent = text || ''; $('notice').hidden = !text }
@@ -83,10 +100,20 @@ function tick() {

 function render(state) {
  current = state
-  $('enabled').checked = state.enabled; $('t-enabled').textContent = state.enabled ? t.enabled : t.disabled
+  $('enabled').checked = state.enabled
  $('remote-box').hidden = !state.remote
-  const firewall = { needed: t.firewallNeeded, denied: t.firewallDenied, failed: t.firewallFailed }[state.firewall]
-  $('firewall-box').hidden = !(state.enabled && firewall); $('firewall-text').textContent = firewall || ''
+  // Status rows say what is REALLY up right now: the relay socket, the LAN socket, the Windows rule as queried.
+  const relay = state.relay || { status: 'off' }, lan = state.lan || { direct: false, listening: false, port: null, firewall: 'unknown' }
+  $('status-box').hidden = !state.enabled || state.remote
+  const relayKind = relay.status === 'failed' && t.relay[relay.code] ? relay.code : relay.status === 'off' ? 'idle' : relay.status
+  $('relay-status').textContent = t.relay[relayKind]; $('relay-status').dataset.state = relay.status
+  $('reissued-box').hidden = !(state.enabled && relay.reissued)
+  const noRule = lan.direct && lan.firewall === 'missing'
+  $('lan-status').textContent = lan.listening ? t.lanOpen(lan.port) : noRule ? t.lanNoRule : lan.direct ? t.lanIdle
+    : state.firewall === 'denied' ? t.lanDenied : state.firewall === 'failed' ? t.lanFailed : t.lanOff
+  $('lan-status').dataset.state = lan.listening ? 'connected' : noRule ? 'failed' : 'off'
+  $('lan-allow').hidden = lan.direct && !noRule; $('lan-allow').textContent = noRule ? t.allow : t.lanAllow
+  $('lan-disallow').hidden = !lan.direct
  $('pair-section').hidden = !state.enabled || state.remote
  $('pair-begin').hidden = Boolean(state.pairing); $('pair-live').hidden = !state.pairing
  if (state.pairing) {
@@ -94,6 +121,10 @@ function render(state) {
    $('pair-qr').setAttribute('aria-label', t.scan)
    $('pair-code').textContent = `${state.pairing.code.slice(0, 4)}-${state.pairing.code.slice(4)}`
    $('pair-code-path').textContent = { pending: t.codePending, ready: t.codeReady, unavailable: t.codeUnavailable }[state.pairing.codePath]
+    // Offered only once every background try is over; while they run the line above says "hazırlanıyor…".
+    $('pair-republish').hidden = state.pairing.codePath !== 'unavailable'
+    $('pair-security').textContent = state.pairing.securityCode ? t.securityCode(state.pairing.securityCode) : ''
+    $('t-same-wifi').textContent = /[?&]r=/.test(state.pairing.qr) ? t.anyNetwork : t.sameWifi
    tick()
  } else { drawnQr = ''; $('pair-code').textContent = '' }
  $('devices-section').hidden = !state.enabled && state.devices.length === 0
@@ -109,9 +140,9 @@ function render(state) {
    label.append(name, added, seen); row.append(label, button)
    return row
  }))
-  $('footer').hidden = state.port === null
-  $('footer-info').textContent = state.port === null ? '' : t.footer(state.port)
-  $('firewall-remove').hidden = state.firewall !== 'ok'
+  $('footer').hidden = !state.enabled || state.remote
+  $('relay-renew').hidden = !relay.ready
+  $('firewall-remove').hidden = lan.firewall !== 'allowed' || state.firewall === 'not-needed'
 }

 async function run(work) {
@@ -126,7 +157,10 @@ async function refresh() { try { render(await host.call('state')) } catch (error
 $('enabled').onchange = () => { const on = $('enabled').checked; void run(async () => { notice(''); render(await host.call(on ? 'enable' : 'disable')) }) }
 $('pair-begin').onclick = () => run(async () => { notice(''); render(await host.call('pair.begin')) })
 $('pair-cancel').onclick = () => run(async () => { render(await host.call('pair.cancel')) })
-$('firewall-retry').onclick = () => run(async () => { notice(''); render(await host.call('firewall.retry')) })
+$('pair-republish').onclick = () => run(async () => { render(await host.call('pair.republish')) })
+$('lan-allow').onclick = () => run(async () => { notice(''); render(await host.call('lan.allow')) })
+$('lan-disallow').onclick = () => run(async () => { notice(''); render(await host.call('lan.disallow')) })
+$('relay-renew').onclick = () => { if (window.confirm(t.renewConfirm)) void run(async () => { render(await host.call('relay.renew')); notice(t.renewed) }) }
 $('firewall-remove').onclick = () => run(async () => { render(await host.call('firewall.remove')); notice(t.ruleRemoved) })
 host.onEvent(event => { if (!event?.state) return; render(event.state); if (event.type === 'paired') notice(t.paired(event.name)) })
 setInterval(tick, 1000)
@@ -14,3 +14,14 @@
 .device button { flex:none; margin:0 }
 footer { margin-top:34px }
 button.link { background:none; color:var(--accent); min-height:0; padding:0; margin:0; font-weight:600; text-decoration:underline }
+.status-row { display:flex; flex-wrap:wrap; align-items:baseline; justify-content:space-between; gap:4px 12px; border-bottom:1px solid var(--stroke); padding:10px 0 }
+.status-row strong { color:var(--text); overflow-wrap:anywhere }
+.status-row strong::before { content:''; display:inline-block; width:9px; height:9px; border-radius:50%; margin-right:8px; background:var(--stroke) }
+.status-row strong[data-state=connected]::before { background:var(--accent) }
+.status-row strong[data-state=failed]::before { background:var(--danger) }
+.status-actions { display:flex; flex-wrap:wrap; align-items:center; gap:12px; margin:12px 0 }
+.status-actions button { margin:0; min-height:44px }
+.security { font-family:ui-monospace,Consolas,monospace; color:var(--text); overflow-wrap:anywhere }
+footer { display:flex; flex-wrap:wrap; gap:8px 20px }
+footer button.link { min-height:44px }
+#pair-republish { display:block; min-height:44px; margin:0 auto; padding:0 12px }
@@ -6,7 +6,12 @@
 <label class="switch"><input id="enabled" type="checkbox"><span id="t-enabled"></span></label>
 <p id="notice" class="status" role="status" aria-live="polite" hidden></p>
 <section id="remote-box" class="warning" hidden><p id="t-remote"></p></section>
-<section id="firewall-box" class="warning" hidden><p id="firewall-text"></p><button id="firewall-retry" class="secondary"></button></section>
+<section id="status-box" hidden>
+<div class="status-row"><span id="t-relay-label"></span><strong id="relay-status" role="status" aria-live="polite"></strong></div>
+<div class="status-row"><span id="t-lan-label"></span><strong id="lan-status" role="status" aria-live="polite"></strong></div>
+<div class="status-actions"><button id="lan-allow" class="secondary"></button><button id="lan-disallow" class="link" hidden></button></div>
+</section>
+<section id="reissued-box" class="warning" hidden><p id="t-reissued"></p></section>
 <section id="pair-section" hidden>
 <button id="pair-begin"></button>
 <div id="pair-live" hidden>
@@ -15,7 +20,9 @@
 <p id="t-or-code"></p>
 <p id="pair-code" class="code" aria-live="off"></p>
 <p id="pair-code-path"></p>
+<button id="pair-republish" class="link" hidden></button>
 <p id="pair-countdown" class="countdown"></p>
+<p id="pair-security" class="security"></p>
 <p id="t-same-wifi" class="hint"></p>
 <button id="pair-cancel" class="secondary"></button>
 </div>
@@ -23,5 +30,5 @@
 <section id="devices-section" hidden>
 <h2 id="t-devices"></h2><p id="devices-empty"></p><div id="devices"></div>
 </section>
-<footer id="footer" hidden><small id="footer-info"></small> <button id="firewall-remove" class="link"></button></footer>
+<footer id="footer" hidden><button id="relay-renew" class="link" hidden></button> <button id="firewall-remove" class="link" hidden></button></footer>
 </main><script type="module" src="mobile-host-ui.mjs"></script></body></html>
@@ -20,9 +20,16 @@ export function createMobileWindow({ assets, link, show = true }) {
    disable: () => link.disable(),
    'pair.begin': () => link.pairBegin(),
    'pair.cancel': () => link.pairCancel(),
+    // Publishes the running pairing's rendezvous record again; the code and the QR stay as they are.
+    'pair.republish': () => link.pairRepublish(),
    devices: () => link.devices(),
    'device.revoke': params => link.deviceRevoke(params?.deviceId),
-    'firewall.retry': () => link.firewallRetry(),
+    // The only actions that may raise a UAC prompt; both are explicit button presses.
+    'lan.allow': () => link.lanAllow(),
+    'lan.disallow': () => link.lanDisallow(),
+    'firewall.allow': () => link.lanAllow(),
+    'firewall.retry': () => link.lanAllow(),
+    'relay.renew': () => link.relayRenew(),
    'firewall.remove': () => link.firewallRemove(),
  }
  const handler = async (event, action, params) => {
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+/** Opt-in acceptance against a running local IDE backend. No credentials on disk. */
+import https from 'node:https'
+import crypto from 'node:crypto'
+import type { PeerCertificate } from 'node:tls'
+import { expect, it } from 'vitest'
+import { WebSocket } from 'ws'
+import { createSelfSignedCertificate } from './mobile-lan-cert'
+import { createLanProxy } from './mobile-lan-proxy'
+
+it.skipIf(!process.env.AITURK_TEST_BACKEND_PORT)(
+  'real backend: pinned TLS, screens, cron lifecycle and chat socket',
+  async () => {
+    const port = Number(process.env.AITURK_TEST_BACKEND_PORT)
+    expect(Number.isInteger(port) && port > 0 && port < 65536).toBe(true)
+    const baseUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`
+    const root = await (await fetch(baseUrl)).text()
+    const session = root.match(/window\.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__\s*=\s*"([^"]+)"/)?.[1]
+    expect(Boolean(session)).toBe(true)
+    const identity = createSelfSignedCertificate()
+    const checkServerIdentity = (_host: string, cert: PeerCertificate) =>
+      crypto.createHash('sha256').update(cert.raw).digest('base64url') === identity.fingerprint
+        ? undefined
+        : new Error('Certificate pin mismatch')
+    const proxy = createLanProxy({
+      tls: identity,
+      version: 'acceptance',
+      pcName: 'acceptance',
+      resolveBackend: async profile => {
+        if (profile !== 'default') throw new Error('Acceptance may only use the default profile')
+        return { baseUrl, token: session! }
+      }
+    })
+    const proxyPort = await proxy.listen(0, '127.0.0.1')
+    let deviceToken = ''
+    let createdId: string | undefined
+    const call = (path: string, method = 'GET', body?: unknown): Promise<{ status: number; data: any }> =>
+      new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+        const req = https.request(
+          {
+            hostname: '127.0.0.1',
+            port: proxyPort,
+            path,
+            method,
+            ca: identity.cert,
+            checkServerIdentity,
+            headers: {
+              ...(deviceToken ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${deviceToken}` } : {}),
+              'Content-Type': 'application/json'
+            }
+          },
+          res => {
+            let value = ''
+            res.on('data', chunk => (value += chunk))
+            res.on('end', () => {
+              try {
+                resolve({ status: res.statusCode!, data: value ? JSON.parse(value) : null })
+              } catch {
+                reject(new Error(`Non-JSON response: ${path}`))
+              }
+            })
+          }
+        )
+        req.setTimeout(60000, () => req.destroy(new Error(`Timeout: ${path}`)))
+        req.on('error', reject)
+        req.end(body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body))
+      })
+    try {
+      const pair = await call('/aiturk/pair/claim', 'POST', {
+        code: proxy.beginPairing().code,
+        device_name: 'Acceptance ephemeral'
+      })
+      expect(pair.status).toBe(200)
+      deviceToken = pair.data.token
+      for (const endpoint of [
+        'health',
+        'profiles',
+        'sessions',
+        'cron/jobs',
+        'cron/blueprints',
+        'cron/delivery-targets',
+        'model/info',
+        'skills',
+        'tools/toolsets',
+        'mcp/servers',
+        'plugins/kanban/boards'
+      ]) {
+        const response = await call(`/api/${endpoint}?profile=default`)
+        expect(response.status, endpoint).toBe(200)
+      }
+      const created = await call('/api/cron/jobs?profile=default', 'POST', {
+        name: `AITURK mobile acceptance ${Date.now()}`,
+        schedule: '0 0 1 1 *',
+        prompt: 'Temporary acceptance record; deleted immediately without execution.',
+        deliver: 'local'
+      })
+      expect(created.status).toBe(200)
+      createdId = created.data.id
+      expect(typeof createdId).toBe('string')
+      const route = `/api/cron/jobs/${encodeURIComponent(createdId!)}`
+      expect((await call(`${route}/pause?profile=default`, 'POST')).status).toBe(200)
+      expect(
+        (await call(`${route}?profile=default`, 'PUT', { updates: { name: 'AITURK acceptance updated' } })).status
+      ).toBe(200)
+      expect((await call(`${route}/resume?profile=default`, 'POST')).status).toBe(200)
+      await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
+        const ws = new WebSocket(`wss://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}/api/ws?profile=default`, {
+          ca: identity.cert,
+          checkServerIdentity,
+          headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${deviceToken}` }
+        })
+        const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+          ws.terminate()
+          reject(new Error('Chat ping timed out'))
+        }, 15000)
+        ws.on('open', () => ws.send(JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 123, method: 'gateway.ping', params: {} })))
+        ws.on('message', raw => {
+          const message = JSON.parse(String(raw))
+          if (message.id === 123) {
+            clearTimeout(timer)
+            ws.close()
+            message.error ? reject(new Error('Chat ping rejected')) : resolve()
+          }
+        })
+        ws.on('error', error => {
+          clearTimeout(timer)
+          reject(error)
+        })
+      })
+    } finally {
+      if (createdId) {
+        const route = `/api/cron/jobs/${encodeURIComponent(createdId)}?profile=default`
+        expect((await call(route, 'DELETE')).status).toBe(200)
+        expect((await call(route)).status).toBe(404)
+      }
+      await proxy.stop()
+    }
+  },
+  180000
+)
@@ -0,0 +1,733 @@
+/**
+ * mobile-relay-client.ts
+ *
+ * "Telefon bağlantısı" through the turkservis.online tunnel (contract:
+ * workspace/aiturk-mobil-tunel-spec.md, v3). The IDE opens ONE outbound
+ * WebSocket to the gateway. For every phone stream the gateway announces
+ * (`open`), this client opens a PLAIN TCP connection to this IDE's own TLS
+ * proxy on loopback (electron/mobile-lan-proxy.ts) and copies bytes both ways.
+ *
+ * It never terminates TLS and never looks at a byte: the TLS session is
+ * between the phone (which pins the proxy's certificate) and the proxy. So the
+ * gateway — and this file — only ever carry ciphertext, and every rule (device
+ * token, forbidden list, root 404, WebSocket path list) stays in the proxy.
+ *
+ * Security contract (do not relax):
+ *   - `hostToken` (`tsmr_…`) lives only in the injected credential store (the
+ *     controller keeps it in the safeStorage vault). It is sent in the
+ *     `Authorization` header of the host WebSocket and nowhere else: not in a
+ *     log line, a status object or an error message.
+ *   - Log lines are status changes only.
+ *   - Errors are fixed codes.
+ *
+ * Everything that touches the outside is injected (WebSocket connector, fetch,
+ * local TCP dial, timers, credential store) so the tests run against a fake
+ * relay on 127.0.0.1 and a fake clock.
+ */
+
+export const MOBILE_RELAY_ORIGIN = 'https://turkservis.online'
+export const MOBILE_RELAY_PATH = '/v1/aiturk/mobile-relay'
+export const MOBILE_RELAY_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000
+/** Largest payload of one binary frame, either direction (contract §1). */
+export const RELAY_CHUNK_BYTES = 64 * 1024
+/** Stream id prefix of a binary frame: big-endian uint32. */
+export const RELAY_FRAME_HEADER_BYTES = 4
+/** Pending bytes allowed per direction of one stream (contract §1 / §2). */
+export const RELAY_BUFFER_LIMIT_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
+/** Reconnect delays: 2 s, then growing to 30 s. */
+export const RELAY_BACKOFF_MS: readonly number[] = [2000, 4000, 8000, 16_000, 30_000]
+/** The gateway pings every 20 s and drops a silent host after 60 s; we give up a little later. */
+export const RELAY_SILENCE_MS = 75_000
+/** Concurrent phone streams (the gateway allows 16 per relay). */
+export const RELAY_MAX_STREAMS = 16
+/** Upper bound for one frame on the host socket; a data frame is at most 64 KiB + 4. */
+export const RELAY_MAX_FRAME_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
+
+const BUFFER_RESUME_BYTES = 256 * 1024
+const BUFFER_POLL_MS = 25
+
+const UUID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/
+const HOST_TOKEN_RE = /^tsmr_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/
+
+export const relayHostUrl = (relayId: string) => `wss://turkservis.online${MOBILE_RELAY_PATH}/host/${relayId}`
+
+/** The `r` of the QR and the `relay` of the rendezvous record: a lower-case uuid, nothing else. */
+export function isRelayId(value: unknown): value is string {
+  return typeof value === 'string' && UUID_RE.test(value)
+}
+
+export interface RelayCredentials {
+  relayId: string
+  hostToken: string
+}
+
+export function isRelayCredentials(value: unknown): value is RelayCredentials {
+  const row = value as null | RelayCredentials
+
+  return Boolean(row) && isRelayId(row.relayId) && typeof row.hostToken === 'string' && HOST_TOKEN_RE.test(row.hostToken)
+}
+
+/** Validates the `POST /sessions` answer: `{relayId, hostToken}` and nothing we would follow. */
+export function parseRelaySession(data: unknown): null | RelayCredentials {
+  const row = (data && typeof data === 'object' ? data : {}) as Record<string, unknown>
+  const candidate = { relayId: typeof row.relayId === 'string' ? row.relayId.toLowerCase() : row.relayId, hostToken: row.hostToken }
+
+  return isRelayCredentials(candidate) ? { relayId: candidate.relayId, hostToken: candidate.hostToken } : null
+}
+
+export interface RelayFetchResponse {
+  status: number
+  json: () => Promise<unknown>
+}
+
+export type RelayFetch = (url: string, init: Record<string, unknown>) => Promise<RelayFetchResponse>
+
+export type RelayFailureCode =
+  | 'register_failed'
+  | 'rate_limited'
+  | 'vault_unavailable'
+  | 'connect_failed'
+  | 'token_rejected'
+  | 'replaced'
+  | 'busy'
+  | 'timeout'
+
+/** Wait before the single second try of a request whose first try never got an answer. */
+export const MOBILE_NETWORK_RETRY_DELAY_MS = 500
+
+/** An aborted / timed-out request already used its whole budget: it is not tried again. */
+export function isTimeoutError(error: unknown): boolean {
+  const name = (error as null | { name?: unknown })?.name
+
+  return name === 'TimeoutError' || name === 'AbortError'
+}
+
+export interface NetworkRetryOptions {
+  /** Injected wait (tests: fake clock). Default: a real timer. */
+  sleep?: (ms: number) => Promise<void>
+  retryDelayMs?: number
+}
+
+const realSleep = (ms: number) => new Promise<void>(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, ms))
+
+/**
+ * `POST /sessions`; a fixed failure code instead of any upstream text.
+ *
+ * A process that sat idle for a long time can fail its first request on a dead
+ * pooled keep-alive connection. So a THROWN network error (no HTTP answer at
+ * all) is tried once more after ~0.5 s. Any HTTP answer is final: no retry.
+ */
+export async function registerRelaySession(
+  fetcher: RelayFetch,
+  options: NetworkRetryOptions = {}
+): Promise<RelayCredentials | { error: RelayFailureCode }> {
+  const sleep = options.sleep ?? realSleep
+
+  for (let attempt = 1; ; attempt++) {
+    let response: RelayFetchResponse
+
+    try {
+      response = await fetcher(`${MOBILE_RELAY_ORIGIN}${MOBILE_RELAY_PATH}/sessions`, {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Accept: 'application/json' },
+        body: '{}',
+        redirect: 'error',
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(MOBILE_RELAY_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS)
+      })
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (attempt >= 2 || isTimeoutError(error)) {
+        return { error: 'register_failed' }
+      }
+
+      await sleep(options.retryDelayMs ?? MOBILE_NETWORK_RETRY_DELAY_MS)
+
+      continue
+    }
+
+    try {
+      if (response.status !== 201) {
+        return { error: response.status === 429 ? 'rate_limited' : 'register_failed' }
+      }
+
+      return parseRelaySession(await response.json()) ?? { error: 'register_failed' }
+    } catch {
+      return { error: 'register_failed' }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// ── What the client needs from the outside ──────────────────────────────────
+
+/** Host WebSocket (the `ws` package fits: it can send request headers). */
+export interface RelaySocket {
+  on: (event: string, listener: (...args: any[]) => void) => unknown
+  /** A string is a text frame, a Buffer a binary frame. */
+  send: (data: Buffer | string) => unknown
+  close: (code?: number) => unknown
+  terminate?: () => unknown
+  /** Stop / continue reading from the gateway (back-pressure towards a slow local connection). */
+  pause?: () => unknown
+  resume?: () => unknown
+  readonly bufferedAmount?: number
+}
+
+export type RelayConnect = (url: string, headers: Record<string, string>) => RelaySocket
+
+export interface RelayWebSocketCtor {
+  new (url: string, options?: Record<string, unknown>): any
+}
+
+/** Plain TCP connection to the local proxy (`net.Socket` fits). */
+export interface RelayLocalSocket {
+  on: (event: string, listener: (...args: any[]) => void) => unknown
+  write: (data: Buffer) => boolean
+  destroy: () => unknown
+  pause: () => unknown
+  resume: () => unknown
+  readonly writableLength?: number
+}
+
+/** null = the proxy is not listening right now. */
+export type RelayDial = () => null | RelayLocalSocket
+
+/** One binary frame: stream id (big-endian uint32) + payload. */
+export function encodeRelayFrame(id: number, payload: Buffer): Buffer {
+  const frame = Buffer.allocUnsafe(RELAY_FRAME_HEADER_BYTES + payload.length)
+
+  frame.writeUInt32BE(id, 0)
+  payload.copy(frame, RELAY_FRAME_HEADER_BYTES)
+
+  return frame
+}
+
+/** Pieces of at most `size` bytes, in order, without copying. */
+export function splitRelayChunks(chunk: Buffer, size = RELAY_CHUNK_BYTES): Buffer[] {
+  const parts: Buffer[] = []
+
+  for (let offset = 0; offset < chunk.length; offset += size) {
+    parts.push(chunk.subarray(offset, offset + size))
+  }
+
+  return parts
+}
+
+const validStreamId = (value: unknown): value is number => Number.isInteger(value) && (value as number) >= 0 && (value as number) <= 0xffffffff
+
+// ── The client ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+export type RelayStatus = 'off' | 'connecting' | 'connected' | 'failed'
+
+export interface RelayState {
+  status: RelayStatus
+  /** Fixed code while `failed` (a retry is always scheduled), otherwise null. */
+  code: null | RelayFailureCode
+}
+
+export interface RelayCredentialStore {
+  /** null when there is no registration yet. Throwing = the vault is unusable. */
+  load: () => Promise<null | RelayCredentials>
+  /** `reissued` = this replaces a registration (rejected by the gateway, or renewed by the user). */
+  save: (credentials: RelayCredentials, info: { reissued: boolean }) => Promise<void>
+  clear: () => Promise<void>
+}
+
+export interface RelayClientDeps {
+  connect: RelayConnect
+  fetch: RelayFetch
+  dial: RelayDial
+  credentials: RelayCredentialStore
+  setTimer?: (fn: () => void, ms: number) => unknown
+  clearTimer?: (handle: unknown) => void
+  /** Status changes only. */
+  log?: (line: string) => void
+  onState?: (state: RelayState) => void
+}
+
+interface Stream {
+  local: RelayLocalSocket
+  paused: boolean
+}
+
+export function createRelayClient(deps: RelayClientDeps) {
+  const setTimer = deps.setTimer ?? ((fn, ms) => setTimeout(fn, ms))
+  const clearTimer = deps.clearTimer ?? (handle => clearTimeout(handle as NodeJS.Timeout))
+
+  let state: RelayState = { status: 'off', code: null }
+  let wanted = false
+  let generation = 0
+  let attempt = 0
+  let socket: null | RelaySocket = null
+  let credentials: null | RelayCredentials = null
+  /** The gateway rejected the stored registration; the next one replaces it. */
+  let rejected = false
+  let registering: null | Promise<RelayCredentials | { error: RelayFailureCode }> = null
+  let retryTimer: unknown = null
+  let silenceTimer: unknown = null
+  const streams = new Map<number, Stream>()
+  /** Same (injectable) clock as every other wait of this client. */
+  const sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise<void>(resolve => void setTimer(resolve, ms))
+
+  function setState(status: RelayStatus, code: null | RelayFailureCode = null) {
+    if (state.status === status && state.code === code) {
+      return
+    }
+
+    state = { status, code }
+    deps.log?.(`relay ${status}${code ? `:${code}` : ''}`)
+
+    try {
+      deps.onState?.(state)
+    } catch {
+      // a broken listener must not break the relay
+    }
+  }
+
+  function clearTimers() {
+    if (retryTimer !== null) {
+      clearTimer(retryTimer)
+      retryTimer = null
+    }
+
+    if (silenceTimer !== null) {
+      clearTimer(silenceTimer)
+      silenceTimer = null
+    }
+  }
+
+  /** Stored registration, or a new one. One request at a time. */
+  function register(): Promise<RelayCredentials | { error: RelayFailureCode }> {
+    if (credentials) {
+      return Promise.resolve(credentials)
+    }
+
+    registering ??= (async (): Promise<RelayCredentials | { error: RelayFailureCode }> => {
+      let stored: null | RelayCredentials
+
+      try {
+        stored = await deps.credentials.load()
+      } catch {
+        return { error: 'vault_unavailable' }
+      }
+
+      if (isRelayCredentials(stored)) {
+        credentials = stored
+
+        return stored
+      }
+
+      const fresh = await registerRelaySession(deps.fetch, { sleep })
+
+      if ('error' in fresh) {
+        return fresh
+      }
+
+      try {
+        await deps.credentials.save(fresh, { reissued: rejected })
+      } catch {
+        return { error: 'vault_unavailable' }
+      }
+
+      rejected = false
+      credentials = fresh
+
+      return fresh
+    })().finally(() => {
+      registering = null
+    })
+
+    return registering
+  }
+
+  function dropStreams() {
+    for (const stream of streams.values()) {
+      stream.local.destroy()
+    }
+
+    streams.clear()
+  }
+
+  function retry(code: RelayFailureCode, delay?: number) {
+    const wait = delay ?? RELAY_BACKOFF_MS[Math.min(attempt, RELAY_BACKOFF_MS.length - 1)]
+
+    attempt++
+    setState('failed', code)
+    retryTimer = setTimer(() => {
+      retryTimer = null
+      void connect()
+    }, wait)
+  }
+
+  async function connect() {
+    if (!wanted || socket) {
+      return
+    }
+
+    const mine = ++generation
+
+    clearTimers()
+    setState('connecting')
+
+    const current = await register()
+
+    if (!wanted || mine !== generation) {
+      return
+    }
+
+    if ('error' in current) {
+      retry(current.error)
+
+      return
+    }
+
+    let ws: RelaySocket
+
+    try {
+      ws = deps.connect(relayHostUrl(current.relayId), { Authorization: `Bearer ${current.hostToken}` })
+    } catch {
+      retry('connect_failed')
+
+      return
+    }
+
+    socket = ws
+
+    const send = (data: Buffer | string) => {
+      if (socket === ws) {
+        try {
+          ws.send(data)
+        } catch {
+          // the close event follows
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    const control = (value: Record<string, unknown>) => send(JSON.stringify(value))
+
+    const watch = () => {
+      if (silenceTimer !== null) {
+        clearTimer(silenceTimer)
+      }
+
+      silenceTimer = setTimer(() => {
+        silenceTimer = null
+
+        if (socket === ws) {
+          try {
+            ;(ws.terminate ?? ws.close).call(ws)
+          } catch {
+            // already gone
+          }
+
+          down(1006, 'timeout')
+        }
+      }, RELAY_SILENCE_MS)
+    }
+
+    const down = (code: number, reason?: RelayFailureCode) => {
+      if (socket !== ws) {
+        return
+      }
+
+      socket = null
+      clearTimers()
+      dropStreams()
+
+      if (!wanted) {
+        setState('off')
+
+        return
+      }
+
+      // 4401: the token was refused. 4404 / HTTP 404: the gateway no longer knows this relay
+      // (unused for 30 days). Either way the registration is dead: take a new one.
+      if (code === 4401 || code === 4404) {
+        credentials = null
+        rejected = true
+        void deps.credentials
+          .clear()
+          .catch(() => undefined)
+          .then(() => {
+            if (wanted && socket === null && retryTimer === null && mine === generation) {
+              retry('token_rejected')
+            }
+          })
+
+        return
+      }
+
+      if (code === 4409) {
+        // Another IDE instance holds this registration: wait 30 s instead of fighting it.
+        retry('replaced', RELAY_BACKOFF_MS[RELAY_BACKOFF_MS.length - 1])
+
+        return
+      }
+
+      // 4429: the relay service is full; the normal growing delay applies.
+      retry(reason ?? (code === 4429 ? 'busy' : 'connect_failed'))
+    }
+
+    // Gateway → local back-pressure: while any local connection is behind, stop reading the host socket.
+    const stalled = new Set<Stream>()
+
+    const unstall = (stream: Stream) => {
+      if (stalled.delete(stream) && stalled.size === 0 && socket === ws) {
+        ws.resume?.()
+      }
+    }
+
+    /** Ends one stream on both sides. `tell` = the gateway does not know yet. */
+    const endStream = (id: number, stream: Stream, code: number, tell: boolean) => {
+      if (streams.get(id) !== stream) {
+        return
+      }
+
+      streams.delete(id)
+      unstall(stream)
+      stream.local.destroy()
+
+      if (tell) {
+        control({ t: 'close', id, code })
+      }
+    }
+
+    const openStream = (id: number) => {
+      if (streams.has(id)) {
+        return
+      }
+
+      if (streams.size >= RELAY_MAX_STREAMS) {
+        return control({ t: 'close', id, code: 4429 })
+      }
+
+      let local: null | RelayLocalSocket
+
+      try {
+        local = deps.dial()
+      } catch {
+        local = null
+      }
+
+      if (!local) {
+        return control({ t: 'close', id, code: 4503 })
+      }
+
+      const stream: Stream = { local, paused: false }
+      let failed = false
+
+      const live = () => streams.get(id) === stream
+
+      // Local → gateway back-pressure: stop reading the proxy while the host socket is behind.
+      const drain = () => {
+        if (!live() || socket !== ws) {
+          return
+        }
+
+        if ((ws.bufferedAmount ?? 0) > BUFFER_RESUME_BYTES) {
+          setTimer(drain, BUFFER_POLL_MS)
+
+          return
+        }
+
+        stream.paused = false
+        local.resume()
+      }
+
+      streams.set(id, stream)
+      local.on('connect', () => {
+        if (live()) {
+          control({ t: 'opened', id })
+        }
+      })
+      local.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {
+        if (!live()) {
+          return
+        }
+
+        // Bytes are forwarded exactly as read: no parsing, no TLS here.
+        for (const part of splitRelayChunks(chunk)) {
+          send(encodeRelayFrame(id, part))
+        }
+
+        if (!stream.paused && (ws.bufferedAmount ?? 0) > RELAY_BUFFER_LIMIT_BYTES) {
+          stream.paused = true
+          local.pause()
+          setTimer(drain, BUFFER_POLL_MS)
+        }
+      })
+      local.on('drain', () => unstall(stream))
+      local.on('error', () => {
+        failed = true
+      })
+      local.on('close', () => endStream(id, stream, failed ? 1011 : 1000, true))
+    }
+
+    ws.on('open', () => {
+      if (socket === ws) {
+        attempt = 0
+        setState('connected')
+        watch()
+      }
+    })
+    ws.on('close', (code: number) => down(Number(code) || 1006))
+    ws.on('error', () => down(1006))
+    // A refusal at the HTTP level (before the WebSocket exists) means the same as the close codes.
+    ws.on('unexpected-response', (req: { destroy?: () => void }, res: { statusCode?: number; resume?: () => void }) => {
+      const status = Number(res?.statusCode)
+
+      res?.resume?.()
+      req?.destroy?.()
+      down(status === 401 || status === 403 ? 4401 : status === 404 ? 4404 : status === 429 ? 4429 : 1006)
+    })
+    ws.on('message', (data: unknown, isBinary?: boolean) => {
+      if (socket !== ws) {
+        return
+      }
+
+      watch()
+
+      if (isBinary) {
+        const frame = Buffer.isBuffer(data) ? data : Array.isArray(data) ? Buffer.concat(data) : Buffer.from(data as ArrayBuffer)
+
+        if (frame.length <= RELAY_FRAME_HEADER_BYTES) {
+          return
+        }
+
+        const id = frame.readUInt32BE(0)
+        const stream = streams.get(id)
+
+        // Late or unknown ids are ignored.
+        if (!stream) {
+          return
+        }
+
+        stream.local.write(frame.subarray(RELAY_FRAME_HEADER_BYTES))
+
+        const pending = stream.local.writableLength ?? 0
+
+        // Gateway → local: a proxy that does not read must not make this process hold the data.
+        // First stop reading the gateway; if the backlog still reaches 1 MiB, give the stream up.
+        if (pending > RELAY_BUFFER_LIMIT_BYTES) {
+          endStream(id, stream, 4408, true)
+        } else if (pending > BUFFER_RESUME_BYTES && ws.pause && !stalled.has(stream)) {
+          stalled.add(stream)
+          ws.pause()
+        }
+
+        return
+      }
+
+      let message: any
+
+      try {
+        message = JSON.parse(typeof data === 'string' ? data : Buffer.isBuffer(data) ? data.toString('utf8') : String(data))
+      } catch {
+        return
+      }
+
+      if (!message || typeof message !== 'object') {
+        return
+      }
+
+      if (message.t === 'ping') {
+        return control({ t: 'pong' })
+      }
+
+      if (!validStreamId(message.id)) {
+        return
+      }
+
+      if (message.t === 'open') {
+        return openStream(message.id)
+      }
+
+      if (message.t === 'close') {
+        const stream = streams.get(message.id)
+
+        if (stream) {
+          endStream(message.id, stream, 1000, false)
+        }
+      }
+    })
+  }
+
+  const api = {
+    state: (): RelayState => state,
+
+    /** Open phone streams right now. */
+    streams: (): number => streams.size,
+
+    /**
+     * Makes sure a registration exists (stored or new) and returns its id; null
+     * when the gateway or the vault is unavailable. Does not open the socket.
+     */
+    async ensureRegistered(): Promise<null | string> {
+      const current = await register()
+
+      return 'error' in current ? null : current.relayId
+    },
+
+    /**
+     * "Röle kimliğini yenile": take a NEW registration. The old one is replaced
+     * only once the new one is stored; false = nothing changed.
+     */
+    async renew(): Promise<boolean> {
+      const fresh = await registerRelaySession(deps.fetch, { sleep })
+
+      if ('error' in fresh) {
+        return false
+      }
+
+      try {
+        await deps.credentials.save(fresh, { reissued: true })
+      } catch {
+        return false
+      }
+
+      credentials = fresh
+      rejected = false
+
+      if (wanted) {
+        // Drop the socket that was authenticated with the old token and come back with the new one.
+        api.stop()
+        api.start()
+      }
+
+      return true
+    },
+
+    start() {
+      if (wanted) {
+        return
+      }
+
+      wanted = true
+      attempt = 0
+      void connect()
+    },
+
+    stop() {
+      wanted = false
+      generation++
+      clearTimers()
+
+      const ws = socket
+
+      socket = null
+      dropStreams()
+
+      if (ws) {
+        try {
+          ws.close(1000)
+        } catch {
+          // already gone
+        }
+      }
+
+      setState('off')
+    }
+  }
+
+  return api
+}
+
+export type RelayClient = ReturnType<typeof createRelayClient>
@@ -173,3 +173,21 @@ test('reset rejects with a typed error and never enters either backend', async (
  assert.equal(options.connectRemote.mock.calls.length, 0)
  assert.equal(options.ensureLocalRuntime.mock.calls.length, 0)
 })
+
+test('a sibling runtime completion re-resolves the primary profile without re-running the stale installer', async () => {
+  const gate = createFirstRunSetupGate({ stuckAfterMs: 0 })
+  const installed = { kind: 'python', activeRoot: bootstrapBackend.activeRoot, args: ['--profile', 'fusion-frontier'] }
+  const prepareLocalBackend = vi.fn().mockResolvedValueOnce(bootstrapBackend).mockResolvedValue(installed)
+  const options = startupOptions({ waitForDecision: gate.wait, prepareLocalBackend })
+  const pending = runPrimaryBackendStartup(options)
+  await vi.waitFor(() => assert.equal(gate.hasWaiter(), true))
+  gate.runtimeAvailable(bootstrapBackend.activeRoot)
+  await pending
+  assert.deepEqual(options.ensureLocalRuntime.mock.calls, [[installed]])
+})
+
+test('a runtime that disappeared after readiness cannot silently trigger another installation', async () => {
+  const options = startupOptions({ waitForDecision: async () => 'runtime-ready' as const })
+  await assert.rejects(runPrimaryBackendStartup(options), /no longer available/)
+  assert.equal(options.ensureLocalRuntime.mock.calls.length, 0)
+})
@@ -109,5 +109,13 @@ export async function runPrimaryBackendStartup<Backend, RuntimeBackend, Remote,
    throw new FirstRunSetupResetError()
  }

+  if (decision === 'runtime-ready') {
+    const current = await prepareLocalBackend()
+    if ((current as { kind?: string }).kind === 'bootstrap-needed') {
+      throw new Error('The completed local runtime is no longer available. Retry setup.')
+    }
+    return { kind: 'local', backend: await ensureLocalRuntime(current) }
+  }
+
  return { kind: 'local', backend: await ensureLocalRuntime(backend) }
 }
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  "name": "aiturk-ide",
  "productName": "AITURK IDE",
  "private": true,
-  "version": "1.0.0-beta.15",
+  "version": "1.0.0-beta.20",
  "description": "TurkServis resmi yapay zekâ geliştirme ortamı. Hermes Agent tabanlıdır.",
  "author": "AITURK / TurkServis",
  "repository": {
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+import { defineConfig } from 'vitest/config'
+
+export default defineConfig({
+  test: {
+    environment: 'node',
+    include: [
+      'electron/mobile-*.test.ts',
+      'electron/first-run-setup*.test.ts',
+      'electron/primary-backend-startup.test.ts'
+    ]
+  }
+})
@@ -1470,6 +1470,34 @@ def _wait_for_oneshot_background_completions(cli) -> None:
        )


+def _emit_approval_required(session_id) -> None:
+    """Report approvals a one-shot run could not put in front of a human.
+
+    One ``approval_required: <json>`` line per blocked request on stderr,
+    next to ``session_id:``, so the process that launched this run can tell
+    "blocked, needs a human" from "still working" without parsing prose.
+    Nothing was applied for these requests; resuming the same session in an
+    interactive surface is the way to get them approved.
+    """
+    try:
+        from tools.approval import drain_human_approval_required
+        records = drain_human_approval_required()
+    except Exception:
+        return
+    for record in records:
+        try:
+            if not record.get("session_id"):
+                record["session_id"] = session_id or ""
+            record["resume"] = "interactive"
+            print(
+                "approval_required: "
+                + json.dumps(record, ensure_ascii=True, sort_keys=True),
+                file=sys.stderr,
+            )
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+
+
 def _finalize_single_query(cli) -> None:
    """Close one-shot CLI resources before releasing the active session lease."""
    try:
@@ -22360,6 +22388,7 @@ def main(

                        # Session ID goes to stderr so piped stdout is clean.
                        print(f"\nsession_id: {cli.session_id}", file=sys.stderr)
+                        _emit_approval_required(cli.session_id)

                        # Ensure proper exit code for automation wrappers.
                        #
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# AITURK IDE beta.20 mobile adapter
+
+The mobile catalog now uses the official live Hermes catalog, its cache and
+removed-entry list. Parser and nine official offline seed entries are ported
+from NousResearch/hermes-agent ad12263a5ed43109d3942a8af04d4cef210fa6ae.
+Only PyYAML import compatibility differs in the parser. The existing installer
+checks out the catalog's exact commit; client URLs cannot override catalog names.
+Version/platform incompatibility is reported before installation.
+
+Mobile subagent roster/tail RPCs are connected to the existing live registry.
+Roster supports durable conversation lineage after reconnect, like upstream.
+Tail and interrupt retain exact live-session/transport authority. Transcript
+reads are bounded and confined to the profile's delegation log directory.
+The existing mobile fork fallback already uses session.branch only for -32601;
+it was not a missing feature and is unchanged.
+
+No new model, team, cron job, permission, or account is installed by these changes.
+The mobile Keys/Files/Vault/Connectors exclusions remain as before; this release
+does not claim those unsupported remote screens are implemented. Android beta.5
+can use the new endpoints without a new APK. Physical-phone acceptance is separate.
@@ -769,7 +769,10 @@ def bounded_git_probe(argv: Sequence[str], *, timeout: float) -> str:
    openai/codex#36793). ``process_group`` only changes which group the child
    belongs to; it does not detach the terminal or alter the fast path.
    """
-    result = bounded_probe_run(argv, timeout=timeout, env=noninteractive_git_env())
+    env = noninteractive_git_env()
+    # Read-only probes must not fetch missing trees in partial clones.
+    env["GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH"] = "1"
+    result = bounded_probe_run(argv, timeout=timeout, env=env)
    if result is None or result.returncode != 0:
        return ""
    return (result.stdout or "").strip()
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+"""AITURK adapter for the upstream catalog and existing pinned installer.
+
+Catalog parsing/cache comes from NousResearch/hermes-agent ad12263a5ed4.
+The catalog supplies the repository and immutable revision, never the client.
+"""
+from dataclasses import asdict
+import sys
+
+from hermes_cli import plugin_catalog as catalog
+
+
+def catalog_payload():
+    from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import _discover_all_plugins, _read_install_metadata
+
+    installed = {row[0] for row in _discover_all_plugins()}
+    metadata = _read_install_metadata()
+    removed = catalog.resolved_removed_entries()
+    entries = []
+    for entry in catalog.load_catalog_live():
+        if catalog.match_removed(entry.name, removed) or catalog.match_removed(entry.repo, removed):
+            continue
+        row = entry.to_dict()
+        record = metadata.get(entry.name, {})
+        revision = record.get("revision")
+        row.update(installed=entry.name in installed, installed_sha=revision,
+                   update_available=bool(revision and revision != entry.sha),
+                   sha_short=entry.sha[:12], capability_summary=catalog.entry_capability_summary(entry))
+        entries.append(row)
+    return {"entries": entries, "removed": [asdict(row) for row in removed]}
+
+
+def install_catalog_plugin(name, *, force=False, enable=True):
+    from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import dashboard_install_plugin
+
+    entry = catalog.get_live_catalog_entry(name)
+    if entry is None:
+        return {"ok": False, "error": "Eklenti katalogda bulunamadı."}
+    removed = catalog.resolved_removed_entries()
+    if catalog.match_removed(name, removed) or catalog.match_removed(entry.repo, removed):
+        return {"ok": False, "error": "Bu eklenti katalogdan kaldırılmış."}
+    platform = {"win32": "windows", "darwin": "macos"}.get(sys.platform, sys.platform)
+    supported = {"win": "windows", "win32": "windows", "darwin": "macos", "mac": "macos"}
+    if entry.platforms and platform not in {supported.get(p.lower(), p.lower()) for p in entry.platforms}:
+        return {"ok": False, "error": "Bu eklenti bilgisayarın işletim sistemini desteklemiyor."}
+    if entry.requires_hermes:
+        from packaging.specifiers import InvalidSpecifier, SpecifierSet
+        from hermes_cli import __version__
+        try:
+            compatible = __version__ in SpecifierSet(entry.requires_hermes)
+        except InvalidSpecifier:
+            return {"ok": False, "error": "Katalogdaki sürüm koşulu geçersiz; eklenti kurulmadı."}
+        if not compatible:
+            return {"ok": False, "error": f"Bu eklenti Hermes {entry.requires_hermes} gerektiriyor."}
+    return dashboard_install_plugin(entry.install_identifier, force=force, enable=enable, ref=entry.sha)
@@ -0,0 +1,533 @@
+"""Plugin catalog — curated, Nous-approved Hermes plugins shipped with the repo.
+
+Mirrors the ``optional-mcps/`` MCP-catalog pattern: one YAML file per entry under the in-tree
+``plugin-catalog/`` directory, pinned to an exact 40-character commit SHA. Presence in the directory IS
+the human-merged approval gate; SHA bumps are new, re-reviewed PRs; ``removed.yaml`` is the kill list
+(installs of a removed name/repo are refused with the recorded reason). Full policy:
+``plugin-catalog/README.md``.
+
+Live refresh: the docs build publishes the same data as ONE JSON document
+(``website/scripts/extract-plugins.py`` → ``/docs/api/plugin-catalog.json``, like the skills index), so
+an installed Hermes sees new entries and removals without updating. A fetch failure reuses the last valid
+cached copy regardless of age, then falls back to the in-tree copy when no valid cache exists.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import dataclasses
+import json
+import logging
+import re
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
+
+import yaml
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+CATALOG_TIERS = ("official", "community")
+# Browse taxonomy for the catalog page / picker. Entries without one land on the Desktop shelf
+# (the common case for community submissions); "general" is for plugins that fit no shelf.
+CATALOG_CATEGORIES = ("desktop", "memory", "platform", "web", "tools", "voice", "automation", "models", "general")
+LIVE_CATALOG_URL = "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/api/plugin-catalog.json"
+LIVE_CATALOG_TTL_SECONDS = 6 * 60 * 60
+# Offline pins expire, but cached removals remain a permanent kill list.
+LIVE_CATALOG_MAX_STALE_SECONDS = 24 * 60 * 60
+LIVE_CATALOG_FAILURE_TTL_SECONDS = 60.0
+_REQUEST_TIMEOUT = 5.0
+_MAX_LIVE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
+
+_SHA_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+_VERSION_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._+-]{0,31}$")
+# Catalog images may only come from GitHub: the Desktop catalog browser never fans out to
+# third-party hosts, and a raw URL pinned to the entry's commit is as immutable as the sha.
+IMAGE_HOSTS = ("raw.githubusercontent.com", "github.com")
+IMAGE_HOST_SUFFIX = ".githubusercontent.com"
+
+
+def is_allowed_image_url(url: str) -> bool:
+    from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+    parts = urlsplit(url)
+    host = (parts.hostname or "").lower()
+    return parts.scheme == "https" and bool(host) and (host in IMAGE_HOSTS or host.endswith(IMAGE_HOST_SUFFIX))
+_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9_-]{1,64}$")
+
+
+@dataclass
+class RemovedEntry:
+    name: str
+    repo: str = ""
+    reason: str = ""
+    date: str = ""
+
+
+@dataclass
+class CatalogCapabilities:
+    provides_tools: List[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    provides_hooks: List[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    provides_middleware: List[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    requires_env: List[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class PluginCatalogEntry:
+    name: str                 # catalog key, [a-z0-9_-]{1,64}
+    repo: str                 # https:// git URL
+    sha: str                  # 40-hex pinned commit — mandatory
+    description: str
+    maintainer: str
+    tier: str = "community"
+    category: str = "desktop"
+    requires_hermes: str = ""
+    subdir: str = ""
+    docs_url: str = ""
+    version: str = ""            # human label for the pinned sha ("1.4.0"); cosmetic, never parsed
+    image: str = ""              # https image URL on a GitHub host; shown on catalog cards
+    screenshots: List[str] = field(default_factory=list)  # GitHub-hosted https URLs; gallery on /docs/plugins/<name>
+    readme: bool = False         # docs site renders the README from the pinned commit on the entry's page
+    platforms: List[str] = field(default_factory=list)  # empty = all OSes
+    title: str = ""              # human name ("NVIDIA App"); empty = derived from ``name``
+    onboarding: bool = False     # curated: offered on the desktop onboarding card
+    capabilities: CatalogCapabilities = field(default_factory=CatalogCapabilities)
+    known_issues: List[str] = field(default_factory=list)  # #124058: informational; drivers come from plugin-catalog/*.yaml
+
+    @property
+    def install_identifier(self) -> str:
+        """``_install_plugin_core`` identifier (``repo#subdir`` for monorepo entries)."""
+        return f"{self.repo}#{self.subdir}" if self.subdir else self.repo
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        caps = self.capabilities
+        return {
+            "name": self.name, "repo": self.repo, "sha": self.sha, "description": self.description,
+            "maintainer": self.maintainer, "tier": self.tier, "category": self.category,
+            "requires_hermes": self.requires_hermes,
+            "subdir": self.subdir, "docs_url": self.docs_url, "version": self.version, "image": self.image,
+            "screenshots": list(self.screenshots), "readme": self.readme,
+            "platforms": list(self.platforms), "title": self.title, "onboarding": self.onboarding,
+            "capabilities": {
+                "provides_tools": list(caps.provides_tools), "provides_hooks": list(caps.provides_hooks),
+                "provides_middleware": list(caps.provides_middleware), "requires_env": list(caps.requires_env),
+            },
+            "known_issues": list(self.known_issues),
+        }
+
+
+def get_catalog_dir() -> Path:
+    """The ``plugin-catalog/`` directory shipped with this checkout."""
+    return Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "plugin-catalog"
+
+
+# ── Parsing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _str_list(raw: Any) -> List[str]:
+    return [str(x) for x in raw if isinstance(x, (str, int, float))] if isinstance(raw, list) else []
+
+
+def entry_from_mapping(data: Any, label: str) -> Optional[PluginCatalogEntry]:
+    """Validate one entry mapping (YAML file or live-JSON element); ``None`` + warning on any failure."""
+    if not isinstance(data, dict):
+        logger.warning("Plugin catalog: %s: entry must be a mapping", label)
+        return None
+    name = str(data.get("name") or "")
+    repo = str(data.get("repo") or "")
+    sha = str(data.get("sha") or "").strip().lower()
+    tier = str(data.get("tier") or "community")
+    category = str(data.get("category") or "desktop")
+    problem = (
+        f"invalid name {name!r} (must match [a-z0-9_-]{{1,64}})" if not _NAME_RE.match(name)
+        else f"repo must be an https:// URL (got {repo!r})" if not repo.startswith("https://")
+        else f"sha must be a full 40-character hex commit SHA (got {data.get('sha')!r})" if not _SHA_RE.match(sha)
+        else f"tier must be one of {'/'.join(CATALOG_TIERS)} (got {tier!r})" if tier not in CATALOG_TIERS
+        else f"category must be one of {'/'.join(CATALOG_CATEGORIES)} (got {category!r})"
+        if category not in CATALOG_CATEGORIES
+        else None)
+    if problem:
+        logger.warning("Plugin catalog: %s: %s", label, problem)
+        return None
+    caps_raw = data.get("capabilities")
+    caps: Dict[str, Any] = caps_raw if isinstance(caps_raw, dict) else {}
+    version = str(data.get("version") or "").strip()
+    if version and not _VERSION_RE.match(version):
+        logger.warning("Plugin catalog: %s: ignoring version %r (max 32 chars of [A-Za-z0-9._+-])", label, version)
+        version = ""
+    image = str(data.get("image") or "").strip()
+    if image and not is_allowed_image_url(image):
+        logger.warning("Plugin catalog: %s: ignoring image %r (must be https on a GitHub host)", label, image)
+        image = ""
+    screenshots = [s for s in _str_list(data.get("screenshots")) if is_allowed_image_url(s)]
+    if len(screenshots) != len(_str_list(data.get("screenshots"))):
+        logger.warning("Plugin catalog: %s: ignoring screenshots off GitHub hosts", label)
+    return PluginCatalogEntry(
+        name=name, repo=repo, sha=sha,
+        description=str(data.get("description") or "").strip(),
+        maintainer=str(data.get("maintainer") or "").strip(), tier=tier, category=category,
+        requires_hermes=str(data.get("requires_hermes") or "").strip(),
+        subdir=str(data.get("subdir") or "").strip(), docs_url=str(data.get("docs_url") or "").strip(),
+        version=version, image=image, screenshots=screenshots, readme=data.get("readme") is not False,
+        platforms=_str_list(data.get("platforms")),
+        title=str(data.get("title") or "").strip(), onboarding=data.get("onboarding") is True,
+        known_issues=_str_list(data.get("known_issues")),
+        capabilities=CatalogCapabilities(
+            provides_tools=_str_list(caps.get("provides_tools")), provides_hooks=_str_list(caps.get("provides_hooks")),
+            provides_middleware=_str_list(caps.get("provides_middleware")),
+            requires_env=_str_list(caps.get("requires_env"))),
+    )
+
+
+def _read_yaml(path: Path) -> Any:
+    try:
+        return yaml.safe_load(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8-sig")) or {}
+    except Exception as exc:
+        logger.warning("Plugin catalog: failed to read %s: %s", path, exc)
+        return None
+
+
+def _removed_from_list(raw_list: Any) -> List[RemovedEntry]:
+    if not isinstance(raw_list, list):
+        return []
+    return [
+        RemovedEntry(name=str(r["name"]), repo=str(r.get("repo") or ""), reason=str(r.get("reason") or ""),
+                     date=str(r.get("date") or ""))
+        for r in raw_list if isinstance(r, dict) and r.get("name")]
+
+
+# ── In-tree catalog ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def load_catalog(catalog_dir: Optional[Path] = None) -> List[PluginCatalogEntry]:
+    """Every valid ``*.yaml`` entry in the catalog dir (``removed.yaml`` excluded), sorted by file name.
+    Malformed entries are skipped with a warning — never raises."""
+    root = catalog_dir or get_catalog_dir()
+    if not root.is_dir():
+        return []
+    entries = []
+    for path in sorted(root.glob("*.yaml")):
+        if path.name == "removed.yaml":
+            continue
+        data = _read_yaml(path)
+        entry = entry_from_mapping(data, str(path)) if data is not None else None
+        if entry is not None:
+            entries.append(entry)
+    return entries
+
+
+def load_removed_list(catalog_dir: Optional[Path] = None) -> List[RemovedEntry]:
+    """``removed.yaml``'s ``removed:`` list; missing/malformed → empty."""
+    path = (catalog_dir or get_catalog_dir()) / "removed.yaml"
+    data = _read_yaml(path) if path.is_file() else None
+    return _removed_from_list(data.get("removed")) if isinstance(data, dict) else []
+
+
+def get_catalog_entry(name: str, catalog_dir: Optional[Path] = None) -> Optional[PluginCatalogEntry]:
+    return next((e for e in load_catalog(catalog_dir) if e.name == name), None)
+
+
+def filter_entries(entries: List[PluginCatalogEntry], query: str) -> List[PluginCatalogEntry]:
+    """Case-insensitive substring match over name, description and declared tools; empty query = all."""
+    q = (query or "").strip().lower()
+    if not q:
+        return entries
+    return [e for e in entries
+            if any(q in h.lower() for h in (e.name, e.description, *e.capabilities.provides_tools))]
+
+
+def search_catalog(query: str) -> List[PluginCatalogEntry]:
+    return filter_entries(load_catalog(), query)
+
+
+# ── Removed / blocklist ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+_SCP_URL_RE = re.compile(r"^(?:[^@/\s]+@)?([^:/\s]+):(?!//)(.+)$")  # git@host:owner/repo
+
+
+def _normalize_repo(url: str) -> str:
+    """Canonical ``host/path`` for a repo URL: scheme, user, ``www.``, ``.git`` and trailing slashes are
+    spelling, not identity — the kill list must match ``git@github.com:Evil/Bad.git`` when it names
+    ``https://github.com/evil/bad``."""
+    from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+    text = url.strip()
+    scp = _SCP_URL_RE.match(text)
+    if scp:
+        host, path = scp.group(1), scp.group(2)
+    elif "://" in text:
+        parts = urlsplit(text)
+        host, path = parts.hostname or "", parts.path
+    else:
+        host, path = "", text
+    host = host.lower().removeprefix("www.")
+    path = path.strip("/").removesuffix(".git").rstrip("/").lower()
+    return f"{host}/{path}" if host else path
+
+
+def find_removed(name_or_repo: str, catalog_dir: Optional[Path] = None) -> Optional[RemovedEntry]:
+    """Match a catalog name or repo URL (``.git``/trailing-slash insensitive) against the kill list.
+
+    The in-tree list and the live-fetched list are UNIONED: a removal published after this checkout
+    shipped must still block, and a stale live cache must not un-block an in-tree removal.
+    """
+    if not name_or_repo:
+        return None
+    entries = load_removed_list(catalog_dir)
+    if catalog_dir is None:
+        entries = entries + live_removed_list()
+    return match_removed(name_or_repo, entries)
+
+
+def resolved_removed_entries() -> List[RemovedEntry]:
+    """The full kill list (in-tree UNION live) in one resolution. Callers that match many candidates
+    — e.g. a plugins-hub rebuild annotating every installed plugin — resolve the list once instead
+    of paying a live-catalog fetch per candidate."""
+    return load_removed_list() + live_removed_list()
+
+
+def cached_removed_entries() -> List[RemovedEntry]:
+    """In-tree list UNION the last fetched live copy, with NO network round-trip — for the load-time and
+    ``enable`` checks that run in every process and must never block on a dead catalog host."""
+    cached = _stale_live_cache(_live_cache_path()) or {}
+    return load_removed_list() + _removed_from_list(cached.get("removed"))
+
+
+def match_removed(
+    candidate: str, entries: List[RemovedEntry]
+) -> Optional[RemovedEntry]:
+    """One candidate against a pre-resolved kill list: exact name or normalized repo URL match."""
+    if not candidate:
+        return None
+    text = candidate.strip()
+    text_repo = _normalize_repo(text)
+    for entry in entries:
+        if text == entry.name or (
+            entry.repo and text_repo == _normalize_repo(entry.repo)
+        ):
+            return entry
+    return None
+
+
+# ── Live catalog ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _live_cache_path() -> Path:
+    from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
+    return get_hermes_home() / "cache" / "plugin-catalog.json"
+
+
+def invalidate_live_cache_for_home(home: Path) -> None:
+    """Best-effort removal of the cached live catalog under *home* (any profile's home).
+
+    ``hermes update`` drops it for every profile after the checkout changes: a snapshot fetched
+    before the bump would otherwise out-vote the newer in-tree catalog (pins the update just
+    changed, entries it just added) for the rest of :data:`LIVE_CATALOG_TTL_SECONDS` (#119340).
+    The next :func:`fetch_live_catalog` re-fetches the published doc, or falls back to the
+    in-tree catalog while the network is down — both newer than what was deleted. Safe when the
+    cache is absent (first run, other profiles that never opened the plugins hub).
+    """
+    try:
+        (Path(home) / "cache" / "plugin-catalog.json").unlink(missing_ok=True)
+    except Exception as exc:
+        logger.debug("Plugin catalog: could not drop the live cache under %s: %s", home, exc)
+
+
+# Wall-clock deadline of the last failed live fetch. Without it a dead catalog host costs one
+# full request timeout PER CALL (the plugins hub and ``plugins list`` used to ask once per
+# installed plugin), so the dashboard event loop stalled for minutes.
+_live_fetch_failed_until = 0.0
+
+
+def _stale_live_cache(cache: Path) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
+    """A previously fetched copy still beats the in-tree one when the network is down — for
+    :data:`LIVE_CATALOG_MAX_STALE_SECONDS`. Past that its pins may trail the checkout's own catalog
+    (a 90-day-old cache outranked a freshly updated in-tree pin), so the entries are dropped and the
+    caller falls back to in-tree; the removals are kept."""
+    try:
+        if not cache.is_file():
+            return None
+        data = json.loads(cache.read_text(encoding="utf-8-sig"))
+        if time.time() - cache.stat().st_mtime > LIVE_CATALOG_MAX_STALE_SECONDS:
+            data = {**data, "entries": []}
+        return data
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+
+
+def fetch_live_catalog(*, force: bool = False) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
+    """The published ``plugin-catalog.json`` (``{"entries": [...], "removed": [...]}``), cached under
+    ``HERMES_HOME/cache`` for :data:`LIVE_CATALOG_TTL_SECONDS`. ``None`` on ANY failure — callers fall
+    back to the in-tree catalog. A failed network attempt is remembered for
+    :data:`LIVE_CATALOG_FAILURE_TTL_SECONDS` so a dead host costs one timeout per TTL window, not one
+    per call (``force`` bypasses both caches)."""
+    global _live_fetch_failed_until
+    cache = _live_cache_path()
+    try:
+        if not force and cache.is_file() and time.time() - cache.stat().st_mtime < LIVE_CATALOG_TTL_SECONDS:
+            return json.loads(cache.read_text(encoding="utf-8-sig"))
+    except Exception as exc:
+        logger.debug("Plugin catalog: unreadable live cache %s: %s", cache, exc)
+    if not force and time.time() < _live_fetch_failed_until:
+        return _stale_live_cache(cache)
+    try:
+        import httpx
+        from hermes_constants import mkdir_under_hermes_home
+        from utils import atomic_write_text
+
+        resp = httpx.get(LIVE_CATALOG_URL, timeout=_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, follow_redirects=True)
+        resp.raise_for_status()
+        if len(resp.content) > _MAX_LIVE_BYTES:
+            raise ValueError("live catalog payload too large")
+        data = resp.json()
+        if not isinstance(data, dict) or not isinstance(data.get("entries"), list):
+            raise ValueError("unexpected live catalog payload")
+        mkdir_under_hermes_home(cache.parent)
+        # Atomic: a concurrent reader (gateway, TUI, a second CLI) must never see a half-written
+        # document, which would read as a fetch failure and start its own 60 s failure window.
+        atomic_write_text(cache, json.dumps(data), tmp_prefix=f"{cache.name}.tmp-")
+        return data
+    except Exception as exc:
+        logger.debug("Plugin catalog: live fetch failed: %s", exc)
+        _live_fetch_failed_until = time.time() + LIVE_CATALOG_FAILURE_TTL_SECONDS
+        return _stale_live_cache(cache)
+
+
+_in_tree_catalog_time: Optional[float] = -1.0  # -1 = not resolved yet; None = no usable in-tree time
+
+
+def in_tree_catalog_time() -> Optional[float]:
+    """Commit time (epoch) of the last change to this checkout's ``plugin-catalog/``, or ``None`` when
+    the install is not a git checkout (a release/pip install cannot be newer than the published doc).
+    On a git checkout whose path history is unreadable without network — the treeless ``tree:0`` layout
+    ``hermes update`` produces — the newest checked-out catalog file's mtime stands in for it, so a
+    freshly updated checkout still outranks a doc fetched before the bump. Resolved once per process."""
+    global _in_tree_catalog_time
+    if _in_tree_catalog_time != -1.0:
+        return _in_tree_catalog_time
+    root = get_catalog_dir().parent
+    resolved: Optional[float] = None
+    if (root / ".git").exists():
+        try:
+            from hermes_cli._subprocess_compat import bounded_git_probe
+
+            # Path history needs missing trees on tree:0 clones. The shared probe disables
+            # lazy fetch only for its child and bounds timeout cleanup on every platform.
+            out = bounded_git_probe(
+                ["git", "-C", str(root), "log", "-1", "--format=%ct", "--", "plugin-catalog"],
+                timeout=10,
+            )
+            resolved = float(out) if out else None
+        except Exception as exc:
+            logger.debug("Plugin catalog: could not date the in-tree catalog: %s", exc)
+        if resolved is None:
+            # "History unreadable without network" must not collapse into "not a git checkout":
+            # ``None`` feeds the frozen-copy rule that defers to the live doc, which would let a
+            # cache fetched before ``hermes update`` re-pin the old sha on exactly the installs
+            # that just bumped it. A treeless clone still has its checked-out files — only the
+            # historical trees are missing — and their mtime dates the checkout that wrote them.
+            resolved = _catalog_worktree_mtime()
+    _in_tree_catalog_time = resolved
+    return resolved
+
+
+def _catalog_worktree_mtime() -> Optional[float]:
+    """Newest mtime under the checkout's ``plugin-catalog/``: a no-network freshness signal for clones
+    whose path history is unreachable (treeless or offline). ``None`` when nothing is checked out."""
+    try:
+        times = [p.stat().st_mtime for p in get_catalog_dir().rglob("*") if p.is_file()]
+    except OSError:
+        return None
+    return max(times) if times else None
+
+
+def _live_generated_time(data: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[float]:
+    raw = data.get("generated_at")
+    if not isinstance(raw, str) or not raw:
+        return None
+    try:
+        from datetime import datetime, timezone
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(raw.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+        return (parsed if parsed.tzinfo else parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)).timestamp()
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+
+
+def _prefer_in_tree_entry(tree: PluginCatalogEntry, live: PluginCatalogEntry, tree_is_newer: Optional[bool]) -> bool:
+    """For one entry present in both sources with a different pin: the newer catalog wins. Newer is
+    decided by the checkout's catalog commit time vs the doc's ``generated_at`` when both resolve;
+    otherwise by the entries' ``version`` labels when both parse; otherwise the live doc wins (a release
+    install's in-tree copy is frozen at release time)."""
+    if tree.sha == live.sha:
+        return False
+    if tree_is_newer is not None:
+        return tree_is_newer
+    if tree.version and live.version:
+        try:
+            from packaging.version import Version
+            return Version(tree.version) > Version(live.version)
+        except Exception:
+            return False
+    return False
+
+
+def load_catalog_live() -> List[PluginCatalogEntry]:
+    """Entries from the live (or cached) catalog, else the in-tree catalog. When both name an entry at
+    different pins the NEWER source supplies it — right after ``hermes update`` bumps an in-tree pin,
+    a cache fetched before the bump must not re-install the old one (see :func:`_prefer_in_tree_entry`)."""
+    data = fetch_live_catalog()
+    if data is None:
+        return load_catalog()
+    entries = [e for i, raw in enumerate(data["entries"])
+               if (e := entry_from_mapping(raw, f"{LIVE_CATALOG_URL}#{i}")) is not None]
+    if not entries:
+        return load_catalog()
+    in_tree = {e.name: e for e in load_catalog()}
+    live_t, tree_t = _live_generated_time(data), in_tree_catalog_time()
+    tree_is_newer = (tree_t > live_t) if (live_t is not None and tree_t is not None) else None
+    raw_by_name = {str(raw.get("name")): raw for raw in data["entries"] if isinstance(raw, dict)}
+    return [in_tree[e.name] if e.name in in_tree and _prefer_in_tree_entry(in_tree[e.name], e, tree_is_newer)
+            else _with_curated_fields(e, in_tree.get(e.name), raw_by_name.get(e.name) or {})
+            for e in entries]
+
+
+# Curated display fields a published doc older than the field does not carry. ``generated_at`` is the
+# docs build time, not the content time, so a rebuild of an older catalog outranks a checkout that added
+# the field; a doc that has the key (even ``false``) decides.
+_CURATED_FIELDS = ("onboarding", "title")
+
+
+def _with_curated_fields(live: PluginCatalogEntry, tree: Optional[PluginCatalogEntry], raw: Dict[str, Any]
+                         ) -> PluginCatalogEntry:
+    if tree is None or tree.sha != live.sha:
+        return live
+    missing = {key: getattr(tree, key) for key in _CURATED_FIELDS if key not in raw}
+    return dataclasses.replace(live, **missing) if missing else live
+
+
+def live_removed_list() -> List[RemovedEntry]:
+    data = fetch_live_catalog()
+    return _removed_from_list(data.get("removed")) if data else []
+
+
+def get_live_catalog_entry(name: str) -> Optional[PluginCatalogEntry]:
+    return next((e for e in load_catalog_live() if e.name == name), None)
+
+
+# ── Human summaries ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def entry_capability_summary(entry: PluginCatalogEntry) -> str:
+    """One paragraph shown at install/enable prompts: what the user is granting."""
+    caps = entry.capabilities
+    parts = [f"{label} {', '.join(items)}" for label, items in (
+        ("registers tool(s):", caps.provides_tools), ("hook(s):", caps.provides_hooks),
+        ("middleware:", caps.provides_middleware), ("requires env var(s):", caps.requires_env)) if items]
+    bits = [f"{entry.name} ({entry.tier}, maintained by {entry.maintainer})"]
+    if entry.description:
+        bits.append(entry.description)
+    bits.append(f"This plugin {'; '.join(parts) if parts else 'declares no tools, hooks, middleware, or env vars'}.")
+    if entry.platforms:
+        bits.append(f"Platforms: {', '.join(entry.platforms)}.")
+    if entry.requires_hermes:
+        bits.append(f"Requires Hermes {entry.requires_hermes}.")
+    if entry.known_issues:
+        # #124058: informational — the catalog documents traps (unsupported
+        # install-method/mode combinations); surface them at install prompts
+        # without blocking the install.
+        bits.append(f"Known issues: {'; '.join(entry.known_issues)}.")
+    return " ".join(bits)
@@ -564,6 +564,22 @@ def _install_metadata_path() -> Path:
    return get_hermes_home() / "plugins" / _INSTALL_METADATA_FILE


+def _remove_plugin_tree(path: Path) -> None:
+    """Remove one validated plugin tree, including read-only Git objects on Windows."""
+    import stat
+    target = path.resolve()
+    if _plugins_dir().resolve() not in target.parents:
+        raise ValueError("Plugin cleanup must stay strictly inside the plugin directory")
+
+    def retry_readonly(function, failed_path, exc_info):
+        if os.name != "nt" or not isinstance(exc_info[1], PermissionError):
+            raise exc_info[1]
+        os.chmod(failed_path, stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IWUSR)
+        function(failed_path)
+
+    shutil.rmtree(path, onerror=retry_readonly)
+
+
 def _read_install_metadata() -> dict[str, dict[str, object]]:
    """Read profile-local, non-secret plugin source metadata from disk."""
    path = _install_metadata_path()
@@ -867,7 +883,7 @@ def _install_plugin_core(
            _write_install_metadata(new_metadata)
        except Exception:
            if target.exists():
-                shutil.rmtree(target)
+                _remove_plugin_tree(target)
            if replaced_existing and backup.exists():
                os.replace(backup, target)
            if old_metadata:
@@ -1208,7 +1224,7 @@ def _remove_plugin_core(target: Path) -> None:
    """Remove one plugin and its metadata without splitting their state."""
    metadata = _read_install_metadata()
    if target.name not in metadata:
-        shutil.rmtree(target)
+        _remove_plugin_tree(target)
        return

    updated = dict(metadata)
@@ -1230,7 +1246,7 @@ def _remove_plugin_core(target: Path) -> None:
            ) from restore_exc
        shutil.rmtree(staging, ignore_errors=True)
        raise
-    shutil.rmtree(staging)
+    _remove_plugin_tree(staging)


 def cmd_remove(name: str) -> None:
@@ -2641,6 +2657,7 @@ def dashboard_install_plugin(
    *,
    force: bool,
    enable: bool,
+    ref: Optional[str] = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
    """Non-interactive install for the web dashboard. Returns a JSON-serializable dict."""
    warnings: list[str] = []
@@ -2657,6 +2674,7 @@ def dashboard_install_plugin(
        target, installed_manifest, installed_name = _install_plugin_core(
            identifier,
            force=force,
+            ref=ref,
        )
    except PluginScanBlocked as exc:
        findings = []
@@ -747,9 +747,11 @@ class FontSetBody(BaseModel):
 # --- from web_server.py (originally lines 19681-19684) ---

 class _AgentPluginInstallBody(BaseModel):
-    identifier: str
+    identifier: str = ""
    force: bool = False
    enable: bool = True
+    catalog_name: Optional[str] = None
+    ref: Optional[str] = None


 # --- from web_server.py (originally lines 19896-19898) ---
@@ -763,4 +765,3 @@ class _PluginProvidersPutBody(BaseModel):

 class _PluginVisibilityBody(BaseModel):
    hidden: bool
-
@@ -19070,16 +19070,28 @@ async def get_plugins_hub(request: Request):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to build plugins hub.") from exc


+@app.get("/api/dashboard/plugins/catalog")
+async def get_plugins_catalog(request: Request):
+    _require_token(request)
+    from hermes_cli.aiturk_plugin_catalog import catalog_payload
+    return await asyncio.to_thread(catalog_payload)
+
+
@app.post("/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/install")
 async def post_agent_plugin_install(request: Request, body: _AgentPluginInstallBody):
    _require_token(request)
    from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import dashboard_install_plugin

-    result = dashboard_install_plugin(
-        body.identifier.strip(),
-        force=body.force,
-        enable=body.enable,
-    )
+    if body.catalog_name:
+        from hermes_cli.aiturk_plugin_catalog import install_catalog_plugin
+        result = await asyncio.to_thread(
+            install_catalog_plugin, body.catalog_name, force=body.force, enable=body.enable,
+        )
+    else:
+        result = await asyncio.to_thread(
+            dashboard_install_plugin, body.identifier.strip(), force=body.force,
+            enable=body.enable, ref=body.ref,
+        )
    if not result.get("ok"):
        raise HTTPException(
            status_code=400,
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
    },
    "apps/desktop": {
      "name": "aiturk-ide",
-      "version": "1.0.0-beta.15",
+      "version": "1.0.0-beta.20",
      "license": "MIT",
      "dependencies": {
        "@assistant-ui/core": "0.2.23",
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+# Hermes Plugin Catalog
+
+Curated, Nous-approved Hermes plugins. Each YAML file in this directory
+(except `removed.yaml`) is one catalog entry, discoverable via
+`hermes plugins catalog` / `hermes plugins search` and installable with
+`hermes plugins install <name>`.
+
+## Admission policy
+
+Presence in this directory **is** the trust signal. The rules that keep it
+meaningful:
+
+<!-- admission-rules:start (mirrored in website/docs/developer-guide/plugins/catalog-submission.md; tests/website/test_catalog_rules_mirror.py keeps them identical) -->
+1. **Human-merged gate.** Entries are added *only* via a PR to the
+   `hermes-agent` repository, reviewed and merged by a maintainer. There is
+   no self-serve registry, no automated ingestion.
+2. **Exact SHA pins are mandatory.** Every entry pins a full 40-character
+   commit SHA. Branches, tags, and short SHAs are rejected by the loader.
+   Installs clone the repository and check out exactly that commit.
+3. **No self-updating code.** A listed plugin must not fetch and replace
+   its own files (in-app "check for updates", signed release downloaders,
+   remote `plugin.js` loaders). The exact SHA pin *is* the trust model; a
+   self-updater lets an installed copy move to a commit nobody reviewed.
+   Updates reach users only through a SHA-bump PR here plus
+   `hermes plugins update <name>`. Keep the updater in the standalone
+   distribution if you want one; strip it from the catalog build.
+4. **SHA bumps are new PRs.** Updating an entry's pin is a new PR whose diff
+   (old SHA → new SHA) is re-reviewed like any other change — reviewers are
+   expected to look at the upstream commit range being adopted.
+5. **Owner-or-major-contributor submissions, or a maintainer-curated sweep.**
+   An entry may be submitted by the plugin repository's owner or a major
+   contributor to it; drive-by submissions of third-party repos are declined.
+   Hermes maintainers may also add entries in batches from a reviewed sweep
+   of community plugins (every pin validated and scanned at the pinned
+   commit, self-updater and credential-store checks run, English-first UI).
+   Authors of swept-in entries keep control: a PR from the owner adjusting
+   or removing their entry is accepted on request, and SHA bumps stay
+   owner-or-maintainer PRs under rule 4.
+6. **Declared capabilities must match reality.** The `capabilities:` block
+   (tools, hooks, middleware, env vars) must match what the plugin actually
+   registers at the pinned commit. Validation fails the entry otherwise —
+   undeclared capability creep is treated as a security issue.
+7. **The install scanner runs at admission.** `hermes plugins validate` includes
+   the `security scan` check: `dangerous` fails the entry; `caution` findings
+   appear as warnings in the CI log and the reviewer reads them before merging.
+   In exchange, installs at the pinned SHA accept `caution` without a prompt
+   (`dangerous` still blocks). Review the warnings; do not merge past them.
+8. **Desktop plugins stay inside the SDK surface.** A `desktop/plugin.js` runs
+   in the Desktop renderer with the app's full authority (the loader isolates
+   errors, not capabilities), so a listed one may only use the plugin SDK:
+   no prototype patching (`X.prototype.y =`, `Object.defineProperty(...prototype`),
+   no `eval`/`new Function`, no `import()` of anything but `@hermes/plugin-sdk`
+   / `react` (app bundle chunks, blob or http URLs included), no script-tag
+   injection, no reaching into the app's internal stores or its own markup
+   (querying `data-slot` / `data-tour` / `data-sidebar` / `data-testid`
+   elements from `document`, or a `document.body` MutationObserver, to restyle,
+   hide, click or rewrite core UI). `hermes plugins validate` refuses these at
+   admission (`desktop surface` check); a plugin that needs a capability the
+   SDK lacks asks for an SDK hook instead of patching around it.
+9. **No runtime overrides of Hermes core.** A listed plugin extends Hermes only
+   through public surfaces: hooks, middleware, provider profiles and the
+   other `register_*` APIs, and Desktop SDK slots and routes. It must not
+   replace, wrap or rebind core functions, methods, module attributes or
+   private dicts in place (`AIAgent.<method> = ...`, `setattr(server, ...)`,
+   `sys.modules[...]`, writes into a core module's tables). Two plugins
+   patching the same seam silently break each other, and every core release
+   can break both. `hermes plugins validate` refuses these at admission (`no
+   core override` check). If the hook you need does not exist, open an issue
+   describing it: we would rather add the seam than list a patch.
+10. **Dependency security policy is the plugin's.** Hermes's 14-day
+   `exclude-newer` quarantine covers Hermes's own dependencies only; a plugin's
+   `python_dependencies` / `pyproject.toml` install under the plugin's policy
+   (no quarantine, still inside Hermes's core constraints). Reviewers read the
+   dependency list at the pinned SHA: bare floors (`>=X` with no upper bound)
+   and floors on the newest release get a request for the oldest
+   API-compatible floor plus an upper bound, and authors are strongly
+   recommended to run their own release quarantine (`uv --exclude-newer` in
+   their CI) — see the developer guide's *Dependency security policy*. A
+   recent floor alone is not grounds to hold an entry.
+
+11. **Credentials stay with their owner.** A plugin reads the credentials it is
+   configured with: the env vars in `requires_env` and its own `config_schema`
+   secrets. Reading another tool's login (a vendor CLI's token file, a browser
+   profile) must be disclosed in the PR and is a trust-tier call for a
+   maintainer. Refreshing, rotating or writing another client's OAuth tokens, or
+   presenting itself as another vendor's client, is not admitted without an
+   explicit maintainer ruling; a read-only build is the usual way through.
+12. **Approvals and unattended runs are respected.** A plugin never routes around
+   Hermes's approval system: no auto-approving, no disabling guards, and no
+   spawning Hermes or shell children that inherit YOLO or non-interactive mode
+   to run commands nobody approved. Anything that waits for a person (a prompt,
+   an OAuth browser flow) fails cleanly or times out under cron, the messaging
+   gateway and other unattended runs instead of hanging the agent.
+13. **Risky behaviour is disclosed.** What a user would want to know before
+   installing goes in the PR description and the plugin's README: network calls
+   to third-party services, reads outside the plugin's own data, shell commands,
+   long-running background processes, stored credentials. Telemetry and usage
+   reporting are opt-in. Reviewers summarise these as disclosure lines on the
+   entry PR; undisclosed behaviour found in review is a request for changes.
+14. **Compatibility metadata is truthful.** `requires_hermes` is a SemVer floor
+   (`">=0.21.5"`), never a CalVer date, and never newer than the current release
+   (the loader skips the plugin otherwise). `version` matches the pinned code,
+   and Python dependencies resolve under Hermes's core constraints
+   (`hermes plugins validate --install-deps` is what CI runs).
+15. **No skins or forks of bundled plugins.** A change to a bundled plugin is a
+   PR against `hermes-agent`, not a competing listing, and vendor-lookalike skins
+   are not listed under Nous branding.
+16. **One listing per plugin lineage.** A fork of a listed community plugin is
+   listed only when it is materially different from the original: a different
+   transport or architecture, or capability the original lacks and its author
+   declined or has not answered a PR for 30 days. Improvements to a listed plugin
+   go upstream as a PR to its author. A fork that renames, rebrands or adds small
+   changes is declined in favour of the original. A listed fork names its origin
+   in its disclosure line (`Derived from <entry>`).
+<!-- admission-rules:end -->
+
+The step-by-step submission guide, with the same rules and what reviewers check,
+lives at
+[Submitting to the plugin catalog](https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/developer-guide/plugins/catalog-submission).
+
+## Entry schema
+
+```yaml
+name: example-plugin        # [a-z0-9_-]{1,64}, the catalog key
+repo: https://github.com/owner/repo   # https:// only
+sha: <40-hex commit sha>    # mandatory exact pin
+subdir: ""                  # optional; plain relative path inside the repo
+                            # ([A-Za-z0-9._/-]+ only: no '..', '.', empty
+                            # segments, absolute, or backslash forms)
+description: One-line description.
+maintainer: OwnerName
+tier: official              # official | community (default community)
+category: memory            # desktop | memory | platform | web | tools | voice | automation | models | general
+                            # (default desktop) — the shelf the entry sits on at /docs/plugins
+requires_hermes: ">=0.19"   # optional
+docs_url: ""                # optional
+version: "1.4.0"            # optional human label for the sha (quote it); shown as "1.4.0 @ abcd1234"
+image: ""                   # optional https image on a GitHub host, 2:1 (e.g. 1200x600), e.g.
+                            # https://raw.githubusercontent.com/owner/repo/<sha>/docs/banner.png
+screenshots: []             # optional, up to 6 https images on a GitHub host; gallery on /docs/plugins/<name>
+readme: true                # optional, default true; the README at the PINNED SHA renders on /docs/plugins/<name>
+platforms: []               # optional, e.g. [linux, macos]; empty = all
+title: ""                   # optional human name on cards ("NVIDIA App"); default = name
+onboarding: false           # optional; offered on the Desktop onboarding card (official entries only)
+known_issues: []            # optional strings shown at the install prompt; informational, never blocks
+capabilities:
+  provides_tools: []
+  provides_hooks: []
+  provides_middleware: []
+  requires_env: []
+```
+
+`version`, `image`, `screenshots` and `readme` are cosmetic: none is parsed or
+used to pick what installs. The sha stays the release; bump `version` in the
+same PR that bumps `sha` so the label on the card matches the code. Images must
+live on `raw.githubusercontent.com`, `github.com` or `*.githubusercontent.com`
+so the Desktop catalog and the docs site never fetch from third-party hosts;
+pin the raw URL to the entry's commit and the picture is as immutable as the
+code.
+
+Every entry gets a page at `https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/plugins/<name>`
+and every maintainer a page at `/docs/plugins/by/<maintainer>`, both generated
+from these files at docs build time. `screenshots:` fills the page's gallery;
+the build fetches the README (from `subdir` if set, else the repo root) **at the
+pinned sha** — GitHub and GitLab repos, on by default, `readme: false` opts out — and renders it
+through an allowlist (raw HTML dropped, links and images resolved against the
+pinned tree). The page therefore shows the README the reviewer read, and it
+changes only when a reviewed re-pin lands.
+
+## removed.yaml — the blocklist
+
+When an entry is pulled from the catalog for security or policy reasons, it
+is recorded in `removed.yaml` with a reason and date. The installer refuses
+to install anything matching a removed entry's name or repo URL, so a
+malicious plugin cannot be re-installed from a stale identifier after
+removal. A plugin that lands on the list after a user installed it stops
+updating, cannot be enabled and is refused at load time. Removals, like
+additions, land via reviewed PRs.
+
+Delisting is different from removal: an entry that is unmaintained, superseded, squatting a
+name it is not affiliated with, or no longer meets a rule is deleted from the catalog (plain
+file removal, users who already installed it are unaffected). It is welcome back once the
+problem is fixed; a name squatter comes back under a distinct name. When a new rule affects
+entries that are already listed, their authors get an issue on their repository explaining
+the change and time to update before anything is delisted.
+
+## Names
+
+The catalog key and the manifest `name:` are what users search, install, and — for memory
+providers — put in `memory.provider`. A `memory` / `exclusive` entry must not reuse the name of
+another provider or of a well-known upstream project it is not affiliated with: two providers
+registering the same `register_memory_provider` name make `memory.provider` ambiguous
+(whichever loads last wins). Reviewers check the registered provider name, not just the file
+name, and the affiliated project gets the bare key.
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+name: blender
+repo: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-plugin-blender
+sha: d1929b593bddd2241a8939fb355e0a69b8e077af
+version: "0.1.0"
+description: >-
+  Official Blender Lab MCP server over stdio, pinned to upstream v1.0.3,
+  with a Blender workflow skill. Requires Blender 5.1+, its separately
+  installed MCP add-on, Git and uv. First startup downloads Python dependencies;
+  prepare the uv environment before connecting. Disclosure: tools execute
+  arbitrary Python in Blender with the user's privileges. No automatic
+  application/version/liveness gate; server discovery does not prove scene readiness.
+title: Blender
+maintainer: NousResearch
+tier: official
+category: tools
+docs_url: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-plugin-blender#readme
+platforms: [windows, macos, linux]
+onboarding: true
+capabilities:
+  provides_tools: []
+  provides_hooks: []
+  provides_middleware: []
+  requires_env: []
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+name: claude-subscription-directsdk
+repo: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-plugin-claude-subscription-directsdk
+sha: 31b591fd04737a7807183f3d7f3d389b19f94687
+description: Experimental model provider that runs Hermes turns on a Claude Pro/Max subscription through
+  the official Claude Code CLI (the Agent SDK path), so no separate API key or per-token bill. Requires
+  the claude CLI installed and logged in; the plugin checks for it at load, in hermes model, in the pickers
+  and before every request, and refuses cleanly with the install hint when it is missing. Disclosure — every
+  turn is billed against your Claude subscription's Agent SDK allowance, and the provider inherits whatever
+  account claude is logged into.
+maintainer: NousResearch
+tier: official
+category: models
+requires_hermes: ">=0.21.4"
+docs_url: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-plugin-claude-subscription-directsdk#readme
+version: "0.3.2"
+platforms: []
+image: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NousResearch/hermes-plugin-claude-subscription-directsdk/31b591fd04737a7807183f3d7f3d389b19f94687/assets/card.png
+capabilities:
+  provides_tools: []
+  provides_hooks: []
+  provides_middleware: []
+  requires_env: []
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+name: hermes-memory-wiki
+repo: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-memory-wiki
+sha: 9bc3913b8474eaf4d7eec32e97af4d77957c36df
+description: 'Memory Wiki dashboard tab: browsable subject pages and daily logs derived from local session
+  history, plus a read-only Persistent Memory (MEMORY.md / USER.md) audit panel.'
+maintainer: NousResearch
+tier: official
+requires_hermes: ">=0.21"
+docs_url: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-memory-wiki#readme
+platforms: []
+capabilities:
+  provides_tools: []
+  provides_hooks: []
+  provides_middleware: []
+  requires_env: []
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+name: hermes-telegram-business
+repo: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-telegram-business
+sha: e905f3bc5eeaa5a9dab9bc5155601b3ebec75757
+description: 'Observe-with-approval Telegram Business Mode (secretary bot): every drafted customer reply
+  needs owner approval before it is sent.'
+maintainer: NousResearch
+tier: official
+category: platform
+docs_url: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-telegram-business
+platforms: []
+capabilities:
+  provides_tools: []
+  provides_hooks: []
+  provides_middleware: []
+  requires_env: []
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+name: homeassistant
+repo: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-homeassistant
+sha: ba30cb0cf86c52bdb5cde98974bc062e97966529
+description: 'Home Assistant gateway platform (state-change events in, persistent notifications and cron notify
+  delivery out) plus the homeassistant toolset (ha_list_entities, ha_get_state, ha_list_services, ha_call_service).
+  Formerly built into Hermes core; existing users are migrated automatically.'
+maintainer: NousResearch
+tier: official
+category: platform
+requires_hermes: ">=0.21.5"
+version: "2.0.1"
+docs_url: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-homeassistant
+platforms: []
+capabilities:
+  provides_tools:
+    - ha_list_entities
+    - ha_get_state
+    - ha_list_services
+    - ha_call_service
+  provides_hooks: []
+  provides_middleware: []
+  requires_env:
+    - HASS_TOKEN
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+name: nvidia-app
+repo: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-nvidia
+sha: 65bb8d89263f920e8599432823d2d4e05cc113e3
+subdir: nvidia-app
+description: "NVIDIA App control through its local MCP server: overlay capture and state, driver status
+  and release notes, game optimization, and app launch. Requires NVIDIA App 11.0 or newer on Windows;
+  the install is refused when the app is absent, and the tools appear while the app's service is running.
+  The plugin reads the endpoint and token NVIDIA App publishes in its own McpServer server.json on every
+  connection, so a changed port or token needs no reconfiguration. Disclosure: the tools read and change
+  NVIDIA App settings on this machine; nothing leaves loopback."
+title: NVIDIA App
+maintainer: NousResearch
+tier: official
+category: tools
+requires_hermes: ">=0.21.4"
+docs_url: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-nvidia/tree/main/nvidia-app
+version: "0.1.0"
+platforms: [windows]
+onboarding: true
+capabilities:
+  provides_tools: []
+  provides_hooks: []
+  provides_middleware: []
+  requires_env: []
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+name: nvidia-broadcast
+repo: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-nvidia
+sha: 65bb8d89263f920e8599432823d2d4e05cc113e3
+subdir: nvidia-broadcast
+description: "NVIDIA Broadcast control through its local MCP gateway: camera, microphone and speaker
+  effects, Studio Voice profiles, device selection, camera resolution, and effects on local media files.
+  Requires NVIDIA Broadcast 2.3 or newer on Windows (2.2 and older have no gateway); the install is
+  refused when the app is absent, and the tools appear while NVIDIA Broadcast is running in the user's
+  desktop session. Disclosure: the tools change live audio and video effects on this machine; nothing
+  leaves loopback."
+title: NVIDIA Broadcast
+maintainer: NousResearch
+tier: official
+category: tools
+requires_hermes: ">=0.21.4"
+docs_url: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-nvidia/tree/main/nvidia-broadcast
+version: "0.1.0"
+platforms: [windows]
+onboarding: true
+capabilities:
+  provides_tools: []
+  provides_hooks: []
+  provides_middleware: []
+  requires_env: []
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Blocklist for plugins pulled from the catalog for security or policy
+# reasons. The installer refuses to install anything whose name or repo URL
+# matches an entry here (unless the caller explicitly bypasses the check).
+# Each entry: {name, repo, reason, date}. Removals land via reviewed PRs,
+# same as additions.
+#
+# Name only. Do not set repo: the replacement entry is the same repository,
+# and a repo match would refuse that install too.
+removed:
+- name: or-picker
+  reason: "Folded into openrouter-picker. Installing the provider alone left the picker broken. Install openrouter-picker."
+  date: "2026-09-28"
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+name: snyk
+repo: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-plugin-snyk
+sha: 2a41a07f81e45125bf82a19af1b13396ace4b81f
+description: 'Scan code (SAST), dependencies, container images, IaC and SBOMs with Snyk through its
+  first-party MCP server (pinned snyk@1.1306.0 over npx stdio, CLI analytics disabled), with the
+  snyk-security-scan workflow skill bundled. Portable Agent Plugins v1 package (mcp.json + skills/);
+  needs Node.js/npm on PATH and a free Snyk account (browser login via the snyk_auth tool).'
+maintainer: NousResearch
+tier: official
+category: tools
+docs_url: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-plugin-snyk
+platforms: []
+capabilities:
+  provides_tools: []
+  provides_hooks: []
+  provides_middleware: []
+  requires_env: []
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+name: touchdesigner
+repo: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-plugin-touchdesigner
+sha: 88a7a7884e5eda33cfe4b1dd5e69df7cb15d5898
+description: 'Drive a live TouchDesigner session through the twozero MCP server (Streamable HTTP on
+  127.0.0.1:40404), with the touchdesigner-mcp workflow skill bundled. Portable Agent Plugins v1 package
+  (mcp.json + skills/); TouchDesigner itself runs on macOS/Windows.'
+maintainer: NousResearch
+tier: official
+category: tools
+docs_url: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-plugin-touchdesigner
+platforms: []
+capabilities:
+  provides_tools: []
+  provides_hooks: []
+  provides_middleware: []
+  requires_env: []
@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ _HERMES_BEHAVIORAL_VARS = frozenset({
    "HERMES_REAL_HOME",
    "TERMINAL_HOME_MODE",
    "HERMES_INTERACTIVE",
+    "HERMES_SINGLE_QUERY_SESSION",
    "HERMES_QUIET",
    "HERMES_TOOL_PROGRESS",
    "HERMES_TOOL_PROGRESS_MODE",
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+from hermes_cli import aiturk_plugin_catalog as adapter
+from hermes_cli import plugin_catalog as catalog
+from hermes_cli import plugins_cmd
+
+SHA = "a" * 40
+
+
+def entry(**extra):
+    return catalog.entry_from_mapping(dict(name="demo", repo="https://github.com/owner/demo",
+        sha=SHA, description="test", maintainer="owner", tier="community", **extra), "test")
+
+
+def test_install_uses_catalog_pin(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(catalog, "get_live_catalog_entry", lambda name: entry())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(catalog, "resolved_removed_entries", lambda: [])
+    seen = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(plugins_cmd, "dashboard_install_plugin", lambda *args, **kwargs: seen.append((args, kwargs)) or {"ok": True})
+    assert adapter.install_catalog_plugin("demo")["ok"]
+    assert seen == [(("https://github.com/owner/demo",), {"force": False, "enable": True, "ref": SHA})]
+
+
+def test_missing_or_incompatible_catalog_entry_is_rejected(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(catalog, "get_live_catalog_entry", lambda name: None)
+    assert not adapter.install_catalog_plugin("missing")["ok"]
+    monkeypatch.setattr(catalog, "resolved_removed_entries", lambda: [])
+    monkeypatch.setattr(catalog, "get_live_catalog_entry", lambda name: entry(requires_hermes=">=999.0"))
+    assert not adapter.install_catalog_plugin("demo")["ok"]
+    monkeypatch.setattr(catalog, "get_live_catalog_entry", lambda name: entry(platforms=["nonexistent"]))
+    assert not adapter.install_catalog_plugin("demo")["ok"]
+
+
+def test_payload_tracks_installed_revision(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(catalog, "load_catalog_live", lambda: [entry()])
+    monkeypatch.setattr(catalog, "resolved_removed_entries", lambda: [])
+    monkeypatch.setattr(plugins_cmd, "_discover_all_plugins", lambda: [("demo",)])
+    monkeypatch.setattr(plugins_cmd, "_read_install_metadata", lambda: {"demo": {"revision": "b" * 40}})
+    row = adapter.catalog_payload()["entries"][0]
+    assert row["installed"] and row["update_available"] and row["sha"] == SHA
+
+
+def test_catalog_http_auth_and_install_contract(monkeypatch):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from hermes_cli import web_server as web
+    client = TestClient(web.app)
+    assert client.get("/api/dashboard/plugins/catalog").status_code in (401, 403)
+    client.headers[web._SESSION_HEADER_NAME] = web._SESSION_TOKEN
+    monkeypatch.setattr(adapter, "catalog_payload", lambda: {"entries": [entry().to_dict()], "removed": []})
+    response = client.get("/api/dashboard/plugins/catalog")
+    assert response.status_code == 200 and response.json()["entries"][0]["sha"] == SHA
+    seen = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(adapter, "install_catalog_plugin", lambda name, **kwargs: seen.append(name) or {"ok": True, "after_install_path": "private"})
+    monkeypatch.setattr(web, "_get_dashboard_plugins", lambda **kwargs: [])
+    monkeypatch.setattr(web, "_invalidate_plugins_hub_cache", lambda: None)
+    response = client.post("/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/install", json={"catalog_name": "demo", "identifier": "https://untrusted.invalid/repo"})
+    assert response.status_code == 200 and seen == ["demo"]
+    assert "after_install_path" not in response.json()
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+"""Plugin catalog contracts (hermes_cli/plugin_catalog.py): the in-tree seed is valid, bad entries are
+skipped not raised, kill-list matching is name-or-repo, and the live catalog degrades to in-tree."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+
+import pytest
+
+import yaml
+
+from hermes_cli import plugin_catalog as pc
+
+SHA = "38fe0fb53eff98d477f807432e965429e665ca33"
+
+
+def _entry(name="good-plugin", **over):
+    data = {"name": name, "repo": "https://github.com/owner/repo", "sha": SHA, "description": "d",
+            "maintainer": "owner", "tier": "community", "capabilities": {"provides_tools": ["t1"]}}
+    data.update(over)
+    return data
+
+
+def test_shipped_catalog_entries_are_all_valid_and_pinned():
+    """Every file in plugin-catalog/ (minus removed.yaml) must parse — a dropped entry is a silent
+    shipping regression the admission CI only catches on changed files."""
+    root = pc.get_catalog_dir()
+    files = [p for p in root.glob("*.yaml") if p.name != "removed.yaml"]
+    entries = pc.load_catalog()
+    assert len(entries) == len(files) >= 1
+    assert all(pc._SHA_RE.match(e.sha) and e.repo.startswith("https://") for e in entries)
+    assert all(e.install_identifier.startswith(e.repo) for e in entries)
+
+
+def test_category_defaults_to_other_and_unknown_category_is_rejected(tmp_path):
+    """``category`` is the browse shelf: absent → ``desktop``; a value outside CATALOG_CATEGORIES is an
+    invalid entry (skipped with a warning) so a typo cannot create a phantom shelf on the site."""
+    (tmp_path / "a.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(_entry("no-cat")))
+    (tmp_path / "b.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(_entry("mem", category="memory")))
+    (tmp_path / "c.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(_entry("typo", category="memmory")))
+    entries = {e.name: e for e in pc.load_catalog(tmp_path)}
+    assert set(entries) == {"no-cat", "mem"}
+    assert entries["no-cat"].category == "desktop" and entries["mem"].category == "memory"
+    assert entries["mem"].to_dict()["category"] == "memory"
+
+
+def test_version_and_image_are_cosmetic_and_offhost_images_are_dropped(tmp_path):
+    """``version``/``image`` label the pin, they never gate it: a bad value is dropped with a warning and
+    the entry survives; an image off GitHub is dropped because the Desktop browser must never fetch
+    from third-party hosts."""
+    (tmp_path / "a.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(_entry("labelled", version="1.4.0", image="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/owner/repo/38fe0fb53eff98d477f807432e965429e665ca33/banner.png")))
+    (tmp_path / "b.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(_entry("offhost", version="1.4.0 beta", image="https://evil.example/x.png")))
+    entries = {e.name: e for e in pc.load_catalog(tmp_path)}
+    assert set(entries) == {"labelled", "offhost"}
+    assert entries["labelled"].version == "1.4.0" and entries["labelled"].image == "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/owner/repo/38fe0fb53eff98d477f807432e965429e665ca33/banner.png"
+    assert entries["offhost"].version == "" and entries["offhost"].image == ""
+    assert entries["labelled"].to_dict()["version"] == "1.4.0"
+
+
+def test_screenshots_and_readme_are_parsed_and_readme_defaults_on(tmp_path):
+    shot = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/owner/repo/38fe0fb53eff98d477f807432e965429e665ca33/docs/1.png"
+    (tmp_path / "a.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(_entry("paged", screenshots=[shot, "https://evil.example/x.png"], readme=True)))
+    (tmp_path / "b.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(_entry("plain", readme=False)))
+    (tmp_path / "c.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(_entry("bare")))
+    entries = {e.name: e for e in pc.load_catalog(tmp_path)}
+    assert entries["paged"].screenshots == [shot] and entries["paged"].readme is True
+    assert entries["plain"].screenshots == [] and entries["plain"].readme is False
+    assert entries["bare"].readme is True
+    assert entries["paged"].to_dict()["screenshots"] == [shot] and entries["paged"].to_dict()["readme"] is True
+
+
+def test_invalid_entries_are_skipped_not_raised(tmp_path):
+    (tmp_path / "a.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(_entry("ok", description="café")), encoding="utf-8-sig")
+    (tmp_path / "b.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(_entry("short-sha", sha="abc123")))
+    (tmp_path / "c.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(_entry("http-repo", repo="http://x/y")))
+    (tmp_path / "d.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(_entry("Bad Name")))
+    (tmp_path / "e.yaml").write_text("- not\n- a mapping\n")
+    entries = pc.load_catalog(tmp_path)
+    assert [e.name for e in entries] == ["ok"]
+    assert entries[0].description == "café"
+
+
+def test_find_removed_matches_name_or_normalized_repo(tmp_path):
+    (tmp_path / "removed.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump({"removed": [
+        {"name": "evil", "repo": "https://github.com/x/evil.git", "reason": "malware", "date": "2026-01-01"}]}))
+    assert pc.find_removed("evil", tmp_path).reason == "malware"
+    assert pc.find_removed("https://github.com/x/EVIL/", tmp_path) is not None
+    assert pc.find_removed("https://github.com/x/fine", tmp_path) is None
+    # Scheme/host/user spellings are not identity: every git way of naming the repo is blocked.
+    for spelling in ("git@github.com:x/evil.git", "ssh://git@github.com/x/evil", "http://github.com/x/evil",
+                     "https://www.github.com/x/evil/", "git://github.com/x/evil.git"):
+        assert pc.find_removed(spelling, tmp_path) is not None, spelling
+    assert pc.find_removed("git@gitlab.com:x/evil.git", tmp_path) is None  # different host stays distinct
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("stale", [False, True])
+def test_live_catalog_falls_back_to_in_tree_and_unions_removals(tmp_path, monkeypatch, stale):
+    """Offline live pins expire, but a cached removal keeps blocking installs."""
+    import httpx
+
+    requests = []
+    get = httpx.get
+
+    def record_get(*args, **kwargs):
+        requests.append(args)
+        return get(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(httpx, "get", record_get)
+    cache = tmp_path / "cache" / "plugin-catalog.json"
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "_live_cache_path", lambda: cache)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "LIVE_CATALOG_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:9/nope")  # unreachable
+    assert [e.name for e in pc.load_catalog_live()] == [e.name for e in pc.load_catalog()]
+
+    cache.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+    cache.write_text(json.dumps({"entries": [_entry("live-only", description="café")],
+                                 "removed": [{"name": "pulled-live", "reason": "cve"}]},
+                                ensure_ascii=False), encoding="utf-8-sig")
+    if stale:
+        os.utime(cache, (1, 1))
+    requests.clear()
+    # The unreachable fetch above armed the failure window; a stale cache must still
+    # trigger a real retry once that window has passed.
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "_live_fetch_failed_until", 0.0)
+    entries = pc.load_catalog_live()
+    if stale:
+        assert [e.name for e in entries] == [e.name for e in pc.load_catalog()]
+    else:
+        assert [e.name for e in entries] == ["live-only"]
+        assert entries[0].description == "café"
+    assert bool(requests) is stale
+    assert pc.find_removed("pulled-live").reason == "cve"
+    cache.write_text("{", encoding="utf-8-sig")
+    assert [e.name for e in pc.load_catalog_live()] == [e.name for e in pc.load_catalog()]
+
+
+def _fresh_cache(tmp_path, monkeypatch, doc: dict):
+    cache = tmp_path / "cache" / "plugin-catalog.json"
+    cache.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    cache.write_text(json.dumps(doc))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "_live_cache_path", lambda: cache)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "LIVE_CATALOG_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:9/nope")  # never reached / unreachable
+    return cache
+
+
+def test_newer_in_tree_pin_outranks_a_fresh_live_cache(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """Right after `hermes update` bumps an in-tree pin, a live cache fetched BEFORE the bump must not
+    re-install the old sha: for the same entry the newer catalog wins (checkout catalog commit time vs
+    the doc's generated_at). Live-only entries survive; an older checkout still defers to the doc."""
+    old, new = SHA, "a" * 40
+    _fresh_cache(tmp_path, monkeypatch, {"generated_at": "2026-09-22T10:00:00Z",
+                                         "entries": [_entry("shared", sha=old), _entry("live-only")], "removed": []})
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "load_catalog", lambda catalog_dir=None: [pc.entry_from_mapping(_entry("shared", sha=new), "t")])
+    bump_time = pc._live_generated_time({"generated_at": "2026-09-22T10:00:00Z"}) + 3600
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "in_tree_catalog_time", lambda: bump_time)
+    by_name = {e.name: e for e in pc.load_catalog_live()}
+    assert by_name["shared"].sha == new and "live-only" in by_name
+    # Control: a checkout whose catalog predates the doc takes the live pin.
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "in_tree_catalog_time", lambda: bump_time - 7200)
+    assert {e.name: e.sha for e in pc.load_catalog_live()}["shared"] == old
+
+
+def test_live_cache_write_never_truncates_the_previous_copy(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """The cache is replaced atomically: a reader racing the writer (or a write that dies half-way)
+    sees the whole previous document, never a truncated one."""
+    cache = _fresh_cache(tmp_path, monkeypatch, {"entries": [_entry("previous")], "removed": []})
+    previous = cache.read_text()
+
+    class _Resp:
+        content = json.dumps({"entries": [_entry("fresh")], "removed": []}).encode()
+        def raise_for_status(self): pass
+        def json(self): return json.loads(self.content)
+
+    import httpx
+    import utils
+    monkeypatch.setattr(httpx, "get", lambda *a, **k: _Resp())
+    pc._live_fetch_failed_until = 0.0
+
+    def _dies(*_a, **_k):
+        raise OSError("disk full")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(utils, "atomic_replace", _dies)
+    pc.fetch_live_catalog(force=True)  # the failed write is swallowed like any other fetch failure
+    assert cache.read_text() == previous
+    assert not list(cache.parent.glob("*.tmp*"))  # no leftover temp file either
+
+
+def test_curated_fields_the_published_doc_lacks_come_from_the_checkout(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """The docs build stamps generated_at at build time, so a doc rebuilt from an older catalog is "newer"
+    than a checkout that just added `onboarding`. At the same pin, a curated field the doc does not carry
+    comes from the checkout; a doc that carries it (even false) decides, and a different pin never merges."""
+    live = [_entry("same"), {**_entry("says-no"), "onboarding": False}, _entry("repinned", sha="b" * 40)]
+    _fresh_cache(tmp_path, monkeypatch, {"generated_at": "2026-09-22T10:00:00Z", "entries": live, "removed": []})
+    tree = [pc.entry_from_mapping({**_entry(n), "onboarding": True, "title": "T"}, n) for n in ("same", "says-no", "repinned")]
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "load_catalog", lambda catalog_dir=None: tree)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "in_tree_catalog_time", lambda: 0.0)  # checkout older than the doc
+    by_name = {e.name: e for e in pc.load_catalog_live()}
+    assert (by_name["same"].onboarding, by_name["same"].title) == (True, "T")
+    assert by_name["says-no"].onboarding is False and by_name["says-no"].title == "T"
+    assert by_name["repinned"].onboarding is False and by_name["repinned"].sha == "b" * 40
+
+
+def test_in_tree_catalog_time_does_not_lazy_fetch_on_treeless_clones(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """``in_tree_catalog_time`` dates the checkout with a pathspec'd ``git log``; the pathspec makes git
+    open every commit's tree. On a treeless (``tree:0``) partial clone — the layout ``hermes update``
+    produces — none of those trees exist locally, so an unrestricted probe lazy-fetches each one against
+    the remote: measured 40-80 s per inventory request, past the desktop's 30s RPC limit (#125683).
+    The probe must scope ``GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH`` to itself so missing objects fail fast into the
+    worktree-mtime fallback — never into network work — while a full checkout keeps resolving its time.
+    This clone is never checked out, so there is no mtime to fall back to either: ``None`` all the way."""
+    import shutil
+    import subprocess as sp
+    if shutil.which("git") is None:
+        pytest.skip("git not available")
+    src = tmp_path / "src"
+    (src / "plugin-catalog").mkdir(parents=True)
+    (src / "plugin-catalog" / "a.yaml").write_text("name: a\n")
+    env = {**os.environ, "GIT_AUTHOR_NAME": "t", "GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL": "t@t",
+           "GIT_COMMITTER_NAME": "t", "GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL": "t@t"}
+    sp.run(["git", "init", "-q"], cwd=src, check=True, env=env)
+    sp.run(["git", "add", "-A"], cwd=src, check=True, env=env)
+    sp.run(["git", "commit", "-qm", "seed"], cwd=src, check=True, env=env)
+    sp.run(["git", "config", "uploadpack.allowFilter", "true"], cwd=src, check=True, env=env)
+
+    def local_object_types(repo):
+        out = sp.run(["git", "cat-file", "--batch-all-objects", "--batch-check"], cwd=repo,
+                     capture_output=True, text=True, env=env)
+        return {line.split()[1] for line in out.stdout.splitlines() if line}
+
+    dst = tmp_path / "treeless"
+    # file:// (not a plain path) so the clone goes through upload-pack and honors the filter.
+    sp.run(["git", "clone", "-q", "--filter=tree:0", "--no-checkout", src.as_uri(), str(dst)],
+           check=True, env=env)
+    if "tree" in local_object_types(dst):  # transport ignored the filter: no missing objects to protect
+        pytest.skip("file:// transport did not honor --filter=tree:0")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "get_catalog_dir", lambda: dst / "plugin-catalog")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "_in_tree_catalog_time", -1.0)  # resolve afresh in this test
+    assert pc.in_tree_catalog_time() is None
+    assert "tree" not in local_object_types(dst)  # the probe lazy-fetched nothing
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "get_catalog_dir", lambda: src / "plugin-catalog")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "_in_tree_catalog_time", -1.0)
+    assert pc.in_tree_catalog_time() is not None  # a full checkout still resolves its commit time
+
+
+def test_treeless_checkout_still_outranks_a_doc_fetched_before_the_bump(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """On the treeless layout the history probe fails fast, and ``None`` would feed the frozen-copy
+    rule that lets the live doc win — re-pinning the old sha on exactly the checkouts ``hermes
+    update`` just bumped. The checked-out files' mtime must stand in for the unreadable commit time
+    (fresh checkout ⇒ in-tree pin wins; catalog files older than the doc ⇒ live pin wins), with no
+    tree lazy-fetch anywhere (#125716 review)."""
+    import shutil
+    import subprocess as sp
+    if shutil.which("git") is None:
+        pytest.skip("git not available")
+    src = tmp_path / "src"
+    (src / "plugin-catalog").mkdir(parents=True)
+    (src / "plugin-catalog" / "a.yaml").write_text("name: a\n")
+    env = {**os.environ, "GIT_AUTHOR_NAME": "t", "GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL": "t@t",
+           "GIT_COMMITTER_NAME": "t", "GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL": "t@t"}
+    sp.run(["git", "init", "-q"], cwd=src, check=True, env=env)
+    sp.run(["git", "add", "-A"], cwd=src, check=True, env=env)
+    sp.run(["git", "commit", "-qm", "seed"], cwd=src, check=True, env=env)
+    (src / "plugin-catalog" / "a.yaml").write_text("name: a2\n")
+    sp.run(["git", "add", "-A"], cwd=src, check=True, env=env)
+    sp.run(["git", "commit", "-qm", "bump"], cwd=src, check=True, env=env)
+    sp.run(["git", "config", "uploadpack.allowFilter", "true"], cwd=src, check=True, env=env)
+
+    def local_object_types(repo):
+        out = sp.run(["git", "cat-file", "--batch-all-objects", "--batch-check"], cwd=repo,
+                     capture_output=True, text=True, env=env)
+        return {line.split()[1] for line in out.stdout.splitlines() if line}
+
+    dst = tmp_path / "treeless"
+    # file:// (not a plain path) so the clone goes through upload-pack and honors the filter.
+    sp.run(["git", "clone", "-q", "--filter=tree:0", "--no-checkout", src.as_uri(), str(dst)],
+           check=True, env=env)
+    if "tree" in local_object_types(dst):  # transport ignored the filter: no missing objects to protect
+        pytest.skip("file:// transport did not honor --filter=tree:0")
+    # Checking out only fetches HEAD's trees; the seed commit's tree stays missing, so the
+    # pathspec'd probe keeps failing — while the worktree files (and their mtimes) land.
+    sp.run(["git", "-C", str(dst), "checkout", "-q"], check=True, env=env)
+    probe = sp.run(["git", "-C", str(dst), "log", "-1", "--format=%ct", "--", "plugin-catalog"],
+                   capture_output=True, env={**env, "GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH": "1"})
+    assert probe.returncode != 0  # the probe really is blind on this layout, like a real update
+
+    old, new = SHA, "a" * 40
+    _fresh_cache(tmp_path, monkeypatch, {"generated_at": "2026-09-22T10:00:00Z",
+                                         "entries": [_entry("shared", sha=old)], "removed": []})
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "load_catalog", lambda catalog_dir=None: [pc.entry_from_mapping(_entry("shared", sha=new), "t")])
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "get_catalog_dir", lambda: dst / "plugin-catalog")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "_in_tree_catalog_time", -1.0)  # resolve afresh: probe fails, mtime stands in
+    assert {e.name: e.sha for e in pc.load_catalog_live()}["shared"] == new
+
+    # Control: catalog files older than the doc mean the checkout is the stale side — live pin wins.
+    for p in (dst / "plugin-catalog").rglob("*"):
+        os.utime(p, (0, 0))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(pc, "_in_tree_catalog_time", -1.0)
+    assert {e.name: e.sha for e in pc.load_catalog_live()}["shared"] == old
@@ -358,7 +358,8 @@ def test_reinstall_after_manual_directory_removal_retains_pin(monkeypatch, tmp_p
    target, _manifest, _name = _install_plugin_core(
        repo.as_uri(), force=False, ref=old_sha
    )
-    shutil.rmtree(target)
+    from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import _remove_plugin_tree
+    _remove_plugin_tree(target)

    target, _manifest, _name = _install_plugin_core(repo.as_uri(), force=False)

@@ -0,0 +1,578 @@
+"""Protected instruction-file gate when no human can be reached.
+
+A one-shot run (``chat -q`` / ``--query-file``) installs the CLI approval
+callback but never starts the prompt UI. The gate used to treat the
+registered callback as a reachable human and wait out ``approvals.timeout``
+on a panel nobody could see. These tests pin the fixed contract:
+
+* no reachable human -> BLOCKED at once, nothing written, the outcome is
+  recorded for the launching process;
+* the gate itself is unchanged: still asks a real human every time, still
+  ignores yolo and ``approvals.single_query_mode``;
+* an approval that arrives after the calling execute_code script stopped
+  waiting is not applied.
+"""
+
+import json
+import time
+
+import pytest
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _gate_on(monkeypatch):
+    import tools.approval as A
+    import tools.file_tools as ft
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ft, "_protected_instruction_config", lambda: (True, []))
+    monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_SINGLE_QUERY_SESSION", raising=False)
+    A.drain_human_approval_required()
+    A.set_approval_reply_deadline(None)
+    yield
+    A.drain_human_approval_required()
+    A.set_approval_reply_deadline(None)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def approvals():
+    """CLI approval callback that records calls and gives a scripted answer."""
+    from tools.terminal_tool import set_approval_callback
+
+    state = {"calls": [], "answer": "deny"}
+
+    def cb(command, description, **kwargs):
+        state["calls"].append({"command": command, **kwargs})
+        answer = state["answer"]
+        if callable(answer):
+            return answer()
+        return answer
+
+    set_approval_callback(cb)
+    yield state
+    set_approval_callback(None)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def one_shot(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_SINGLE_QUERY_SESSION", "1")
+
+
+def _write(path, content="injected"):
+    from tools.file_tools import write_file_tool
+
+    return json.loads(write_file_tool(str(path), content))
+
+
+def _records():
+    import tools.approval as A
+
+    return A.drain_human_approval_required()
+
+
+# ---- one-shot run: callback registered, nobody to answer ------------------
+
+
+class TestOneShotRun:
+    def test_blocks_at_once_without_prompting(self, tmp_path, approvals, one_shot):
+        target = tmp_path / "AGENTS.md"
+        target.write_text("rules\n", encoding="utf-8")
+        approvals["answer"] = "once"  # would be honored if anyone were asked
+
+        started = time.monotonic()
+        res = _write(target)
+        elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
+
+        assert res.get("error") and "BLOCKED" in res["error"]
+        assert "APPROVAL REQUIRED" in res["error"]
+        assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "rules\n"
+        assert approvals["calls"] == [], "prompted on a surface nobody can see"
+        assert elapsed < 5
+
+    def test_outcome_is_recorded_for_the_launcher(self, tmp_path, approvals, one_shot):
+        import tools.approval as A
+
+        target = tmp_path / "CLAUDE.md"
+        sid = A._approval_session_id.set("sess-123")
+        tcid = A._approval_tool_call_id.set("call-9")
+        try:
+            _write(target)
+        finally:
+            A._approval_tool_call_id.reset(tcid)
+            A._approval_session_id.reset(sid)
+
+        records = _records()
+        assert len(records) == 1
+        rec = records[0]
+        assert rec["kind"] == "protected_instruction_file"
+        assert rec["reason"] == "no_interactive_user"
+        assert rec["applied"] is False
+        assert rec["session_id"] == "sess-123"
+        assert rec["tool_call_id"] == "call-9"
+        assert rec["request_id"]
+        assert any("CLAUDE.md" in t for t in rec["targets"])
+        assert _records() == [], "drain must clear"
+
+    def test_yolo_does_not_open_the_gate(self, tmp_path, approvals, one_shot, monkeypatch):
+        import tools.approval as A
+
+        monkeypatch.setattr(A, "_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN", True)
+        target = tmp_path / "AGENTS.md"
+        res = _write(target)
+        assert res.get("error") and "BLOCKED" in res["error"]
+        assert not target.exists()
+
+    def test_single_query_mode_approve_does_not_open_the_gate(
+        self, tmp_path, approvals, one_shot, monkeypatch
+    ):
+        import tools.approval as A
+
+        real_cfg_get = A.cfg_get
+
+        def fake_cfg_get(config, *keys, default=None):
+            if keys == ("approvals", "single_query_mode"):
+                return "approve"
+            return real_cfg_get(config, *keys, default=default)
+
+        monkeypatch.setattr(A, "cfg_get", fake_cfg_get)
+        target = tmp_path / "SOUL.md"
+        res = _write(target)
+        assert res.get("error") and "BLOCKED" in res["error"]
+        assert not target.exists()
+
+    def test_regular_file_still_writes(self, tmp_path, approvals, one_shot):
+        target = tmp_path / "notes.md"
+        res = _write(target, "hello")
+        assert not res.get("error"), res
+        assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "hello"
+        assert _records() == []
+
+    def test_multi_file_patch_applies_nothing(self, tmp_path, approvals, one_shot):
+        from tools.file_tools import patch_tool
+
+        agents = tmp_path / "AGENTS.md"
+        agents.write_text("rules\n", encoding="utf-8")
+        plain = tmp_path / "plain.txt"
+        plain.write_text("hello\n", encoding="utf-8")
+        patch = (
+            "*** Begin Patch\n"
+            f"*** Update File: {plain}\n"
+            "@@\n"
+            "-hello\n"
+            "+world\n"
+            f"*** Update File: {agents}\n"
+            "@@\n"
+            "-rules\n"
+            "+injected\n"
+            "*** End Patch"
+        )
+        res = json.loads(patch_tool(mode="patch", patch=patch))
+        assert res.get("error") and "BLOCKED" in res["error"]
+        assert plain.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "hello\n"
+        assert agents.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "rules\n"
+        assert approvals["calls"] == []
+
+    def test_retry_in_same_run_blocks_again(self, tmp_path, approvals, one_shot):
+        target = tmp_path / "AGENTS.md"
+        _write(target)
+        res = _write(target)
+        assert res.get("error") and "BLOCKED" in res["error"]
+        assert not target.exists()
+        assert len(_records()) == 2
+
+
+# ---- no channel at all ----------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_no_channel_fails_closed_and_is_recorded(tmp_path):
+    target = tmp_path / "AGENTS.md"
+    res = _write(target)
+    assert res.get("error") and "BLOCKED" in res["error"]
+    assert not target.exists()
+    records = _records()
+    assert [r["reason"] for r in records] == ["no_approval_channel"]
+
+
+def test_undeliverable_gateway_request_is_recorded(tmp_path):
+    import tools.approval as A
+
+    session_key = "protected-unattended-undelivered"
+    token = A.set_current_session_key(session_key)
+    try:
+        def notify(approval_data):
+            raise RuntimeError("client went away")
+
+        A.register_gateway_notify(session_key, notify)
+        try:
+            target = tmp_path / "AGENTS.md"
+            res = _write(target)
+        finally:
+            A.unregister_gateway_notify(session_key)
+    finally:
+        A.reset_current_session_key(token)
+
+    assert res.get("error") and "BLOCKED" in res["error"]
+    assert not target.exists()
+    assert [r["reason"] for r in _records()] == ["approval_not_delivered"]
+
+
+# ---- a reachable human: the gate behaves exactly as before -----------------
+
+
+class TestReachableHuman:
+    def test_allow_writes(self, tmp_path, approvals):
+        target = tmp_path / "AGENTS.md"
+        approvals["answer"] = "once"
+        res = _write(target, "approved")
+        assert not res.get("error"), res
+        assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "approved"
+        assert len(approvals["calls"]) == 1
+        assert _records() == []
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("answer", ["deny", "timeout"])
+    def test_deny_and_silence_block(self, tmp_path, approvals, answer):
+        target = tmp_path / "AGENTS.md"
+        approvals["answer"] = answer
+        res = _write(target)
+        assert res.get("error") and "BLOCKED" in res["error"]
+        assert not target.exists()
+        assert len(approvals["calls"]) == 1
+        # A human was asked and did not consent: not an "unattended" outcome.
+        assert _records() == []
+
+    def test_prompt_that_dies_blocks(self, tmp_path, approvals):
+        """Cancel / lost surface: the prompt raising is not consent."""
+        def boom():
+            raise RuntimeError("prompt surface lost")
+
+        target = tmp_path / "AGENTS.md"
+        approvals["answer"] = boom
+        res = _write(target)
+        assert res.get("error") and "BLOCKED" in res["error"]
+        assert not target.exists()
+
+
+# ---- approval that arrives after the caller stopped waiting ----------------
+
+
+class TestLateApproval:
+    def test_late_cli_approval_is_not_applied(self, tmp_path, approvals):
+        import tools.approval as A
+
+        target = tmp_path / "AGENTS.md"
+        target.write_text("rules\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+        def answer_after_deadline():
+            # The human says yes, but only once the execute_code script that
+            # asked for this write has already timed out.
+            A.set_approval_reply_deadline(time.monotonic() - 1)
+            return "once"
+
+        A.set_approval_reply_deadline(time.monotonic() + 300)
+        approvals["answer"] = answer_after_deadline
+        res = _write(target)
+
+        assert res.get("error") and "BLOCKED" in res["error"]
+        assert "NOT applied" in res["error"]
+        assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "rules\n"
+
+    def test_late_approval_does_not_carry_to_the_next_request(self, tmp_path, approvals):
+        import tools.approval as A
+
+        target = tmp_path / "AGENTS.md"
+        A.set_approval_reply_deadline(time.monotonic() - 1)
+        approvals["answer"] = "once"
+        assert "BLOCKED" in _write(target).get("error", "")
+        assert not target.exists()
+
+        # A fresh call (new deadline) asks again; the old yes is not reused.
+        A.set_approval_reply_deadline(time.monotonic() + 300)
+        approvals["answer"] = "deny"
+        assert "BLOCKED" in _write(target).get("error", "")
+        assert not target.exists()
+        assert len(approvals["calls"]) == 2
+
+    def test_in_time_approval_is_applied(self, tmp_path, approvals):
+        import tools.approval as A
+
+        target = tmp_path / "AGENTS.md"
+        A.set_approval_reply_deadline(time.monotonic() + 300)
+        approvals["answer"] = "once"
+        res = _write(target, "approved")
+        assert not res.get("error"), res
+        assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "approved"
+
+    def test_late_gateway_approval_is_not_applied(self, tmp_path):
+        import tools.approval as A
+
+        session_key = "protected-unattended-late"
+        token = A.set_current_session_key(session_key)
+        try:
+            def notify(approval_data):
+                A.resolve_gateway_approval(session_key, "once")
+
+            A.register_gateway_notify(session_key, notify)
+            try:
+                A.set_approval_reply_deadline(time.monotonic() - 1)
+                target = tmp_path / "AGENTS.md"
+                res = _write(target)
+            finally:
+                A.unregister_gateway_notify(session_key)
+        finally:
+            A.reset_current_session_key(token)
+
+        assert res.get("error") and "NOT applied" in res["error"]
+        assert not target.exists()
+
+    def test_no_deadline_outside_execute_code(self):
+        import tools.approval as A
+
+        assert A.approval_reply_window_remaining() is None
+        assert A.approval_arrived_too_late() is False
+
+    def test_rpc_dispatch_binds_and_restores_the_deadline(self):
+        import tools.approval as A
+        import tools.code_execution_tool as cet
+
+        start = time.monotonic()
+        previous = cet._bind_rpc_reply_deadline(start)
+        try:
+            remaining = A.approval_reply_window_remaining()
+            assert remaining is not None
+            assert 0 < remaining <= cet._RPC_REPLY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+        finally:
+            cet._restore_rpc_reply_deadline(previous)
+        assert A.approval_reply_window_remaining() is None
+
+    def test_deadline_is_per_thread(self):
+        import threading
+
+        import tools.approval as A
+
+        A.set_approval_reply_deadline(time.monotonic() - 1)
+        seen = {}
+
+        def other():
+            seen["late"] = A.approval_arrived_too_late()
+
+        worker = threading.Thread(target=other)
+        worker.start()
+        worker.join()
+        assert seen["late"] is False
+        assert A.approval_arrived_too_late() is True
+
+
+# ---- what the launching process sees ---------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_recorded_outcomes_are_bounded():
+    import tools.approval as A
+
+    for i in range(A._HUMAN_APPROVAL_REQUIRED_MAX + 20):
+        A.note_human_approval_required("protected_instruction_file", [f"f{i}"], "x")
+    records = A.drain_human_approval_required()
+    assert len(records) == A._HUMAN_APPROVAL_REQUIRED_MAX
+    assert records[-1]["targets"] == [f"f{A._HUMAN_APPROVAL_REQUIRED_MAX + 19}"]
+
+
+def test_one_shot_exit_reports_approval_required_on_stderr(capsys):
+    import cli as cli_module
+    import tools.approval as A
+
+    A.note_human_approval_required(
+        "protected_instruction_file", ["AGENTS.md"], "no_interactive_user"
+    )
+    cli_module._emit_approval_required("sess-42")
+
+    err = capsys.readouterr().err
+    lines = [l for l in err.splitlines() if l.startswith("approval_required: ")]
+    assert len(lines) == 1
+    payload = json.loads(lines[0].split(": ", 1)[1])
+    assert payload["session_id"] == "sess-42"
+    assert payload["applied"] is False
+    assert payload["reason"] == "no_interactive_user"
+    assert payload["resume"] == "interactive"
+    assert payload["targets"] == ["AGENTS.md"]
+
+    cli_module._emit_approval_required("sess-42")
+    assert "approval_required" not in capsys.readouterr().err
+
+
+# ---- execute_code RPC: the dispatcher really binds the window ---------------
+
+
+def _drive_rpc_once(dispatch, stop_event=None):
+    """Send one tool call through the real RPC server loop; return its reply."""
+    import socket
+    import threading
+
+    import tools.code_execution_tool as cet
+
+    server = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    server.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+    server.listen(1)
+    stop_event = stop_event or threading.Event()
+    worker = threading.Thread(
+        target=cet._rpc_server_loop,
+        args=(server, "task", [], [0], 5, frozenset({"patch"}), stop_event, "tok", dispatch),
+        daemon=True,
+    )
+    worker.start()
+    client = socket.create_connection(server.getsockname(), timeout=10)
+    try:
+        client.sendall(
+            (json.dumps({"tool": "patch", "args": {}, "token": "tok"}) + "\n").encode()
+        )
+        buf = b""
+        while not buf.endswith(b"\n"):
+            chunk = client.recv(65536)
+            if not chunk:
+                break
+            buf += chunk
+    finally:
+        client.close()
+        stop_event.set()
+        worker.join(timeout=10)
+        server.close()
+    return buf.decode().strip()
+
+
+def test_rpc_server_loop_binds_reply_window_around_dispatch():
+    import tools.approval as A
+    import tools.code_execution_tool as cet
+
+    seen = {}
+
+    def dispatch(tool_name, tool_args):
+        seen["remaining"] = A.approval_reply_window_remaining()
+        seen["late"] = A.approval_arrived_too_late()
+        return json.dumps({"ok": True})
+
+    reply = _drive_rpc_once(dispatch)
+    assert json.loads(reply) == {"ok": True}
+    assert seen["late"] is False
+    assert 0 < seen["remaining"] <= cet._RPC_REPLY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+
+
+def test_rpc_approval_after_script_ended_is_late():
+    """Script killed by its own run timeout while the prompt is still open."""
+    import threading
+
+    import tools.approval as A
+
+    stop_event = threading.Event()
+    seen = {}
+
+    def dispatch(tool_name, tool_args):
+        seen["before"] = A.approval_arrived_too_late()
+        stop_event.set()  # the script ended while a human was deciding
+        seen["after"] = A.approval_arrived_too_late()
+        return json.dumps({"ok": True})
+
+    _drive_rpc_once(dispatch, stop_event)
+    assert seen == {"before": False, "after": True}
+
+
+def test_protected_write_through_rpc_is_dropped_when_script_ended(tmp_path, approvals):
+    """End to end through the RPC loop: late yes -> BLOCKED, file untouched."""
+    import threading
+
+    from tools.file_tools import write_file_tool
+    from tools.terminal_tool import _get_approval_callback, set_approval_callback
+
+    target = tmp_path / "AGENTS.md"
+    target.write_text("rules\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    stop_event = threading.Event()
+    callback = _get_approval_callback()
+
+    def answer_after_script_died():
+        stop_event.set()
+        return "once"
+
+    approvals["answer"] = answer_after_script_died
+
+    def dispatch(tool_name, tool_args):
+        set_approval_callback(callback)  # the RPC thread carries the cell's callback
+        try:
+            return write_file_tool(str(target), "injected")
+        finally:
+            set_approval_callback(None)
+
+    reply = json.loads(_drive_rpc_once(dispatch, stop_event))
+    assert "NOT applied" in reply.get("error", "")
+    assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "rules\n"
+    assert len(approvals["calls"]) == 1
+
+
+def test_retired_kernel_cell_counts_as_gone():
+    import tools.approval as A
+
+    cell = {"active": True}
+    previous = A.also_gone_when(lambda: not cell["active"])
+    try:
+        assert A.approval_arrived_too_late() is False
+        cell["active"] = False
+        assert A.approval_arrived_too_late() is True
+    finally:
+        A.restore_approval_reply_deadline(previous)
+    assert A.approval_arrived_too_late() is False
+
+
+# ---- an automatic approver is not a person ----------------------------------
+
+
+def test_subagent_auto_approve_cannot_open_the_gate(tmp_path):
+    from tools.delegate_tool import _subagent_auto_approve
+    from tools.terminal_tool import set_approval_callback
+
+    target = tmp_path / "AGENTS.md"
+    set_approval_callback(_subagent_auto_approve)
+    try:
+        res = _write(target)
+    finally:
+        set_approval_callback(None)
+    assert res.get("error") and "BLOCKED" in res["error"]
+    assert not target.exists()
+    assert [r["reason"] for r in _records()] == ["no_interactive_user"]
+
+
+def test_blocked_message_survives_braces_in_target(tmp_path):
+    import tools.file_tools as ft
+
+    res = ft._request_protected_instruction_approval(["{be}/AGENTS.md"])
+    assert res.startswith("BLOCKED") and "{be}/AGENTS.md" in res
+
+
+# ---- sibling gates in a one-shot run ----------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_computer_use_does_not_wait_in_one_shot_run(one_shot, monkeypatch):
+    import tools.computer_use.tool as cu
+
+    calls = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cu, "_approval_callback", lambda *a, **k: calls.append(a) or "approve_once")
+    res = cu._request_approval("click", {}, session_id="unattended-test")
+    assert res is not None and "one-shot run" in json.loads(res)["error"]
+    assert calls == []
+
+
+def test_computer_use_still_asks_when_interactive(monkeypatch):
+    import tools.computer_use.tool as cu
+
+    calls = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cu, "_approval_callback", lambda *a, **k: calls.append(a) or "approve_once")
+    assert cu._request_approval("click", {}, session_id="attended-test") is None
+    assert len(calls) == 1
+
+
+def test_memory_write_prompt_unavailable_in_one_shot_run(approvals, monkeypatch):
+    import tools.write_approval as wa
+
+    assert wa._interactive_approval_available() is True
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_SINGLE_QUERY_SESSION", "1")
+    assert wa._interactive_approval_available() is False
+
+
+def test_one_shot_marker_is_not_inherited_by_child_processes(one_shot):
+    from tools.environments.local import _make_run_env
+
+    assert "HERMES_SINGLE_QUERY_SESSION" not in _make_run_env({})
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+from tui_gateway import mobile_subagents as mobile
+
+
+def test_roster_is_session_and_transport_scoped(monkeypatch):
+    from tools import delegate_tool as delegate
+    transport, session = object(), {}
+    own = dict(subagent_id="own", owner_session_id="s", owner_transport=transport,
+               owner_session_record=session, agent=object(), goal="test", started_at=1)
+    other = {**own, "subagent_id": "other", "owner_transport": object()}
+    reused = {**own, "subagent_id": "reused", "owner_session_record": {}}
+    monkeypatch.setattr(delegate, "_active_subagents", {"own": own, "other": other, "reused": reused})
+    rows = mobile.owned_records("s", transport, session)
+    assert [row["subagent_id"] for row in rows] == ["own"]
+    assert mobile.owned_records("s", None, session) == []
+    assert mobile.owned_records("wrong", transport, session) == []
+    public = mobile.roster(rows)["subagents"][0]
+    assert public["elapsed_seconds"] > 0
+    assert "agent" not in public and "owner_session_record" not in public
+
+
+def test_tail_is_bounded_and_unknown_child_is_unavailable(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    from tools import delegation_live_log
+    monkeypatch.setattr(delegation_live_log, "live_transcript_root", lambda: tmp_path)
+    path = tmp_path / "transcript.jsonl"
+    path.write_bytes(b"x" * 20000 + b"end")
+    rows = [dict(subagent_id="own", agent=SimpleNamespace(_live_transcript_path=str(path)))]
+    result = mobile.transcript_tail(rows, "own")
+    assert result["available"] and result["truncated"]
+    assert result["bytes_read"] == 16384 and result["text"].endswith("end")
+    assert not mobile.transcript_tail(rows, "other")["available"]
+    path.unlink()
+    assert not mobile.transcript_tail(rows, "own")["available"]
+
+
+def test_tail_rejects_outside_log_root(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    from tools import delegation_live_log
+    monkeypatch.setattr(delegation_live_log, "live_transcript_root", lambda: tmp_path / "logs")
+    secret = tmp_path / "private.txt"
+    secret.write_text("not a transcript")
+    rows = [dict(subagent_id="own", agent=SimpleNamespace(_live_transcript_path=str(secret)))]
+    assert not mobile.transcript_tail(rows, "own")["available"]
+
+
+def test_roster_survives_resume_but_tail_keeps_exact_authority(monkeypatch):
+    from tools import delegate_tool as delegate
+    parent = SimpleNamespace(session_id="conversation")
+    record = dict(subagent_id="child", owner_session_id="old-runtime",
+                  owner_agent_session_id="conversation", agent=None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(delegate, "_active_subagents", {"child": record})
+    session = {"agent": parent}
+    assert mobile.owned_records("new-runtime", object(), session) == []
+    assert len(mobile.owned_records("new-runtime", object(), session, include_lineage=True)) == 1
+
+
+def test_registered_rpcs_reject_wrong_transport(monkeypatch):
+    from tui_gateway import server
+    monkeypatch.setattr(server, "_sess_nowait", lambda params, rid: ({"session_key": "s"}, None))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(server, "_current_session_steer_authority", lambda sid: (None, None))
+    for name in ("subagent.list", "subagent.tail", "subagent.interrupt"):
+        response = server._methods[name](1, {"session_id": "s", "subagent_id": "child"})
+        assert response["error"]["code"] == 4001
+
+
+def test_registered_list_returns_owned_children(monkeypatch):
+    from tui_gateway import server
+    from tools import delegate_tool as delegate
+    transport, session = object(), {"session_key": "s"}
+    record = dict(subagent_id="child", owner_session_id="s", owner_transport=transport,
+                  owner_session_record=session, goal="test")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(delegate, "_active_subagents", {"child": record})
+    monkeypatch.setattr(server, "_sess_nowait", lambda params, rid: (session, None))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(server, "_current_session_steer_authority", lambda sid: (transport, session))
+    response = server._methods["subagent.list"](1, {"session_id": "s"})
+    assert response["result"]["subagents"][0]["subagent_id"] == "child"
@@ -78,6 +78,115 @@ _hermes_interactive_ctx: contextvars.ContextVar[Optional[str]] = contextvars.Con
 )


+# Absolute ``time.monotonic()`` instant after which whoever issued the
+# current tool call has stopped waiting for its result. Set by the
+# execute_code RPC dispatchers, whose sandbox client gives up after a fixed
+# reply timeout. An approval that resolves after this instant must NOT be
+# acted on: the caller already reported the call as failed, so applying it
+# would be a write the agent believes never happened (and may redo).
+# The reply timeout is not the only way a caller goes away: the script can
+# hit its own run timeout or be interrupted first. ``gone`` is a probe the
+# dispatcher supplies for that ("has my script/cell already ended?").
+# Thread-local on purpose: the dispatcher and the tool handler it calls run
+# on the same thread, whatever context the handler is re-bound to.
+_approval_reply_deadline = threading.local()
+
+
+def set_approval_reply_deadline(deadline: Optional[float], gone=None):
+    """Bind the caller's reply window for this thread; return the prior binding.
+
+    ``deadline`` is monotonic seconds (None = unbounded); ``gone`` is an
+    optional zero-argument callable that turns true once the caller has
+    ended. Pass the returned value to :func:`restore_approval_reply_deadline`.
+    """
+    previous = (
+        getattr(_approval_reply_deadline, "value", None),
+        getattr(_approval_reply_deadline, "gone", None),
+    )
+    _approval_reply_deadline.value = deadline
+    _approval_reply_deadline.gone = gone
+    return previous
+
+
+def restore_approval_reply_deadline(previous) -> None:
+    """Undo :func:`set_approval_reply_deadline` / :func:`also_gone_when`."""
+    deadline, gone = previous if previous else (None, None)
+    _approval_reply_deadline.value = deadline
+    _approval_reply_deadline.gone = gone
+
+
+def also_gone_when(probe):
+    """Add another "caller has ended" probe, keeping the current window."""
+    deadline = getattr(_approval_reply_deadline, "value", None)
+    current = getattr(_approval_reply_deadline, "gone", None)
+
+    def gone() -> bool:
+        return bool(probe()) or bool(current and current())
+
+    return set_approval_reply_deadline(deadline, gone)
+
+
+def approval_reply_window_remaining() -> Optional[float]:
+    """Seconds left before the caller stops waiting, or None when unbounded."""
+    deadline = getattr(_approval_reply_deadline, "value", None)
+    if deadline is None:
+        return None
+    return deadline - time.monotonic()
+
+
+def approval_arrived_too_late() -> bool:
+    """True when the caller of the current tool call has stopped waiting."""
+    gone = getattr(_approval_reply_deadline, "gone", None)
+    if gone is not None:
+        try:
+            if gone():
+                return True
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+    remaining = approval_reply_window_remaining()
+    return remaining is not None and remaining <= 0
+
+
+# Approvals that could not be put in front of a human because the run has
+# no interactive channel (single-query ``chat -Q`` stage runs, scripts).
+# The single-query CLI reports them on stderr as ``approval_required:``
+# lines so the coordinating process gets a machine-readable outcome
+# instead of inferring one from prose. Bounded: long-lived processes that
+# never drain it must not grow without limit.
+_human_approval_required: list[dict] = []
+_HUMAN_APPROVAL_REQUIRED_MAX = 50
+_human_approval_required_lock = threading.Lock()
+
+
+def note_human_approval_required(kind: str, targets: list[str], reason: str) -> dict:
+    """Record an approval the run could not present to a human.
+
+    Captures the active session/tool-call identity so the coordinator can
+    tie the outcome to the exact job and resume the same session.
+    """
+    record = {
+        "kind": kind,
+        "targets": list(dict.fromkeys(str(t) for t in targets)),
+        "reason": reason,
+        "request_id": uuid.uuid4().hex,
+        "tool_call_id": _approval_tool_call_id.get() or "",
+        "session_id": _approval_session_id.get() or os.getenv("HERMES_SESSION_ID", ""),
+        "applied": False,
+    }
+    with _human_approval_required_lock:
+        _human_approval_required.append(record)
+        del _human_approval_required[:-_HUMAN_APPROVAL_REQUIRED_MAX]
+    return dict(record)
+
+
+def drain_human_approval_required() -> list[dict]:
+    """Return and clear the recorded approval-required outcomes."""
+    with _human_approval_required_lock:
+        records = list(_human_approval_required)
+        _human_approval_required.clear()
+    return records
+
+
 def set_hermes_interactive_context(interactive: bool) -> contextvars.Token:
    """Bind interactive mode for the current context (thread or asyncio task).

@@ -716,6 +716,36 @@ def _call(tool_name, args):
 # RPC server (runs in a thread inside the parent process)
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

+# How long the generated sandbox client waits for one tool-call reply
+# (``_sock.settimeout(300)`` / the file transport's 300s poll deadline).
+_RPC_REPLY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 300
+
+
+def _bind_rpc_reply_deadline(call_start: float, stop_event=None):
+    """Tell the approval gates when this call's requester stops waiting.
+
+    The requester is gone at the reply timeout, or earlier when the script
+    itself ended (run timeout, interrupt): ``stop_event`` is set then.
+    """
+    try:
+        from tools.approval import set_approval_reply_deadline
+        gone = stop_event.is_set if stop_event is not None else None
+        return (True, set_approval_reply_deadline(
+            call_start + _RPC_REPLY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, gone))
+    except Exception:
+        return (False, None)
+
+
+def _restore_rpc_reply_deadline(previous) -> None:
+    if not previous or not previous[0]:
+        return
+    try:
+        from tools.approval import restore_approval_reply_deadline
+        restore_approval_reply_deadline(previous[1])
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+
+
 # Terminal parameters that must not be used from ephemeral sandbox scripts
 _TERMINAL_BLOCKED_PARAMS = {"background", "pty", "notify", "notify_on_complete", "watch_patterns"}

@@ -826,12 +856,18 @@ def _rpc_server_loop(
                # Dispatch through the standard tool handler.
                # Suppress stdout/stderr from internal tool handlers so
                # their status prints don't leak into the CLI spinner.
+                # The sandbox client stops waiting for this reply after
+                # _RPC_REPLY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS; an approval granted later
+                # must not apply a write the script already saw fail.
+                _prev_deadline = _bind_rpc_reply_deadline(call_start, stop_event)
                try:
                    with thread_scoped_silence():
                        result = dispatch(tool_name, tool_args)
                except Exception as exc:
                    logger.error("Tool call failed in sandbox: %s", exc, exc_info=True)
                    result = tool_error(str(exc))
+                finally:
+                    _restore_rpc_reply_deadline(_prev_deadline)

                tool_call_counter[0] += 1
                call_duration = time.monotonic() - call_start
@@ -1101,6 +1137,7 @@ def _rpc_poll_loop(
                            tool_args.pop(param, None)

                    # Dispatch through the standard tool handler
+                    _prev_deadline = _bind_rpc_reply_deadline(call_start, stop_event)
                    try:
                        with thread_scoped_silence():
                            tool_result = handle_function_call(
@@ -1110,6 +1147,8 @@ def _rpc_poll_loop(
                        logger.error("Tool call failed in remote sandbox: %s",
                                     exc, exc_info=True)
                        tool_result = tool_error(str(exc))
+                    finally:
+                        _restore_rpc_reply_deadline(_prev_deadline)

                    tool_call_counter[0] += 1
                    call_duration = time.monotonic() - call_start
@@ -322,9 +322,25 @@ class CellAuthority:
                set_sudo(self._sudo_cb)
            except Exception:
                previous = None
+        # A cell that settled (timeout, interrupt, error) no longer waits for
+        # this call: an approval granted afterwards must not be applied.
+        reply_window = None
+        try:
+            from tools.approval import also_gone_when
+
+            reply_window = (also_gone_when(lambda: not self.active),)
+        except Exception:
+            reply_window = None
        try:
            return handle_function_call(tool_name, tool_args, task_id=self.task_id)
        finally:
+            if reply_window is not None:
+                try:
+                    from tools.approval import restore_approval_reply_deadline
+
+                    restore_approval_reply_deadline(reply_window[0])
+                except Exception:
+                    pass
            if previous is not None and self._callback_setters is not None:
                set_approval, set_sudo = self._callback_setters
                try:
@@ -613,6 +613,22 @@ def _request_approval(action: str, args: Dict[str, Any],
        # No CLI approval wired — default allow. Gateway approval is handled
        # one layer out via the normal tool-approval infra.
        return None
+    try:
+        from tools.approval import _is_single_query_approval_context
+        unattended = _is_single_query_approval_context()
+    except Exception:
+        unattended = False
+    if unattended:
+        # One-shot run: the prompt callback is installed but its panel is
+        # never shown, so asking would only wait out approvals.timeout.
+        return json.dumps({
+            "error": (
+                "approval required but this is a one-shot run with no "
+                "interactive user to approve it. Silence is not consent; "
+                "do not retry without the user."
+            ),
+            "action": action,
+        })
    summary = _summarize_action(action, args)
    try:
        verdict = cb(action, args, summary)
@@ -102,6 +102,11 @@ def _subagent_auto_approve(command: str, description: str, **kwargs) -> str:
    return "once"


+# Not a person: gates that require real human consent every time (protected
+# instruction files) must not accept this callback's answer.
+_subagent_auto_approve.unattended = True
+
+
 def _get_subagent_approval_callback():
    """Return the callback to install into subagent worker threads.

@@ -1546,6 +1546,10 @@ def _make_run_env(env: dict) -> dict:
            run_env[real_key] = v
        elif _is_hermes_internal_secret(k):
            continue
+        elif k == "HERMES_SINGLE_QUERY_SESSION":
+            # Describes this process only. A child (an interactive hermes
+            # started from a one-shot run's terminal) sets its own.
+            continue
        else:
            first_party = _is_terminal_first_party_env(k)
            passthrough = _is_passthrough(k)
@@ -861,12 +861,18 @@ def _request_protected_instruction_approval(
        "required (not bypassed by auto-approve)."
    )
    display = f"<write to {targets}>"
-    blocked = (
-        f"BLOCKED: write to protected agent-instruction file(s) ({targets}) "
-        "{why} The user has NOT consented to this write. Do NOT retry it or "
-        "attempt the same edit via another path (terminal, execute_code, "
-        "etc.)."
-    )
+    class _Blocked:
+        # Not str.format: a target path may itself contain braces.
+        @staticmethod
+        def format(why: str) -> str:
+            return (
+                "BLOCKED: write to protected agent-instruction file(s) "
+                f"({targets}) {why} The user has NOT consented to this "
+                "write. Do NOT retry it or attempt the same edit via "
+                "another path (terminal, execute_code, etc.)."
+            )
+
+    blocked = _Blocked

    try:
        import tools.approval as _approval
@@ -874,6 +880,41 @@ def _request_protected_instruction_approval(
        return blocked.format(why="requires approval but the approval "
                                  "subsystem is unavailable.")

+    def _needs_human(reason: str, why: str) -> str:
+        # No human could be shown this request. Record it so a one-shot
+        # run can hand its coordinator a machine-readable outcome, and tell
+        # the agent where a human CAN approve it instead of waiting on a
+        # prompt nobody sees.
+        try:
+            _approval.note_human_approval_required(
+                "protected_instruction_file", list(reasons), reason)
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        return blocked.format(
+            why=why + " APPROVAL REQUIRED: a human must approve this from "
+                      "an interactive session (resume this same session in "
+                      "the desktop app or an interactive terminal and "
+                      "request the write again there).")
+
+    def _too_late() -> str | None:
+        # The approval came back after whoever issued this call stopped
+        # waiting (execute_code RPC reply timeout). The caller already saw
+        # a failure, so applying the write now would be an edit the agent
+        # believes never happened.
+        try:
+            late = _approval.approval_arrived_too_late()
+        except Exception:
+            late = False
+        if not late:
+            return None
+        logger.warning(
+            "Approval for protected instruction file(s) %s arrived after "
+            "the caller stopped waiting; write not applied.", targets)
+        return blocked.format(
+            why="was approved only after the calling script had stopped "
+                "waiting for the result, so the write was NOT applied. "
+                "The approval is spent; a new request needs a new approval.")
+
    # Gateway surface: block on the button round-trip when a notify callback
    # is registered for this session (Telegram/Discord/Slack). One-operation
    # only — no session/permanent buttons are offered.
@@ -898,14 +939,15 @@ def _request_protected_instruction_approval(
            session_key, notify_cb, approval_data, surface="gateway",
        )
        if decision.get("notify_failed"):
-            return blocked.format(
-                why="requires approval but the approval request could not "
-                    "be delivered.")
+            return _needs_human(
+                "approval_not_delivered",
+                "requires approval but the approval request could not "
+                "be delivered.")
        choice = decision.get("choice")
        if decision.get("resolved") and choice in {"once", "session", "always"}:
            # One-operation grant regardless of the tapped scope — nothing
            # is persisted for this gate.
-            return None
+            return _too_late()
        if not decision.get("resolved"):
            return blocked.format(
                why="approval prompt timed out without a user response. "
@@ -921,6 +963,28 @@ def _request_protected_instruction_approval(
        callback = None

    if callback is not None:
+        # A one-shot run (``chat -q`` / ``--query-file``) installs the
+        # prompt callback but never starts the prompt UI: the panel would
+        # be painted nowhere and the wait would last the whole
+        # approvals.timeout with nobody able to answer. A registered
+        # callback is not a reachable human. Fail closed NOW;
+        # approvals.single_query_mode does not apply to this gate.
+        try:
+            unattended = _approval._is_single_query_approval_context()
+        except Exception:
+            unattended = False
+        if unattended:
+            return _needs_human(
+                "no_interactive_user",
+                "requires approval but this is a one-shot run with no "
+                "interactive user to approve it.")
+        if getattr(callback, "unattended", False):
+            # An auto-answering callback (subagent auto-approve) is not a
+            # person; this gate takes consent from a human only.
+            return _needs_human(
+                "no_interactive_user",
+                "requires approval but only an automatic approver is "
+                "attached to this run, not a person.")
        choice = _approval.prompt_dangerous_approval(
            display, description,
            allow_permanent=False,
@@ -929,7 +993,7 @@ def _request_protected_instruction_approval(
        )
        if choice in {"once", "session", "always"}:
            # One-operation grant; never persisted (see docstring).
-            return None
+            return _too_late()
        if choice == "timeout":
            return blocked.format(
                why="approval prompt timed out without a user response. "
@@ -938,9 +1002,10 @@ def _request_protected_instruction_approval(

    # No human channel at all (script, cron, background thread): fail
    # closed. Auto-approving here would recreate the persistence vector.
-    return blocked.format(
-        why="requires approval but no interactive user or gateway is "
-            "present to approve it.")
+    return _needs_human(
+        "no_approval_channel",
+        "requires approval but no interactive user or gateway is "
+        "present to approve it.")


 def _check_protected_instruction_write(paths: list[str],
@@ -327,6 +327,14 @@ def _interactive_approval_available() -> bool:
      review affordance (``/memory pending``) instead.
    * Scripts, cron, and background threads — no user present.
    """
+    try:
+        from tools.approval import _is_single_query_approval_context
+        if _is_single_query_approval_context():
+            # One-shot run: the callback exists but its panel is never
+            # shown, so an inline prompt would wait with nobody to answer.
+            return False
+    except Exception:
+        pass
    try:
        from tools.terminal_tool import _get_approval_callback
        return _get_approval_callback() is not None
@@ -3572,14 +3572,53 @@ def _(rid, params: dict) -> dict:
    return _ok(rid, {"paused": set_spawn_paused(paused)})


+@method("subagent.list")
+def _(rid, params: dict) -> dict:
+    from tui_gateway.mobile_subagents import owned_records, roster
+    _, err = _sess_nowait(params, rid)
+    if err:
+        return err
+    session_id = str(params.get("session_id") or "").strip()
+    transport, session = _current_session_steer_authority(session_id)
+    if transport is None or session is None:
+        return _err(rid, 4001, "session not found or not owned by this transport")
+    return _ok(rid, roster(owned_records(session_id, transport, session, include_lineage=True)))
+
+
+@method("subagent.tail")
+def _(rid, params: dict) -> dict:
+    from tui_gateway.mobile_subagents import owned_records, transcript_tail
+    _, err = _sess_nowait(params, rid)
+    if err:
+        return err
+    subagent_id = str(params.get("subagent_id") or "").strip()
+    if not subagent_id:
+        return _err(rid, 4000, "subagent_id required")
+    session_id = str(params.get("session_id") or "").strip()
+    transport, session = _current_session_steer_authority(session_id)
+    if transport is None or session is None:
+        return _err(rid, 4001, "session not found or not owned by this transport")
+    with _session_home_scope(session):
+        result = transcript_tail(owned_records(session_id, transport, session), subagent_id)
+    return _ok(rid, result)
+
+
@method("subagent.interrupt")
 def _(rid, params: dict) -> dict:
-    from tools.delegate_tool import interrupt_subagent
+    from tui_gateway.mobile_subagents import owned_records
+    from agent.interrupt_compat import request_hard_interrupt

    subagent_id = str(params.get("subagent_id") or "").strip()
    if not subagent_id:
        return _err(rid, 4000, "subagent_id required")
-    ok = interrupt_subagent(subagent_id)
+    session_id = str(params.get("session_id") or "").strip()
+    transport, session = _current_session_steer_authority(session_id)
+    if transport is None or session is None:
+        return _err(rid, 4001, "session not found or not owned by this transport")
+    record = next((r for r in owned_records(session_id, transport, session)
+                   if r.get("subagent_id") == subagent_id), None)
+    child = record.get("agent") if record else None
+    ok = bool(request_hard_interrupt(child, "Interrupted via mobile")) if child is not None else False
    return _ok(rid, {"found": ok, "subagent_id": subagent_id})


@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+"""Read-only mobile subagent views, scoped to the invoking live session."""
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def owned_records(session_id, transport, session, *, include_lineage=False):
+    from tools.delegate_tool import _active_subagents, _active_subagents_lock, _owns_subagent_record
+    if transport is None or session is None:
+        return []
+    with _active_subagents_lock:
+        records = [dict(row) for row in _active_subagents.values()]
+    return [row for row in records
+            if (row.get("owner_session_id") == session_id
+                and row.get("owner_transport") is transport
+                and row.get("owner_session_record") is session)
+            or (include_lineage and _owns_subagent_record(row, session.get("agent")))]
+
+
+def roster(records):
+    fields = ("subagent_id", "parent_id", "depth", "goal", "delegation_id", "model",
+              "started_at", "status", "tool_count", "last_tool", "accepting_steer")
+    rows = []
+    for record in records:
+        row = {key: record[key] for key in fields if key in record}
+        started = record.get("started_at")
+        if isinstance(started, (int, float)):
+            row["elapsed_seconds"] = max(0, time.time() - started)
+        rows.append(row)
+    return {"subagents": rows, "delegations": []}
+
+
+def transcript_tail(records, subagent_id):
+    result = {"subagent_id": subagent_id, "available": False, "text": "", "bytes_read": 0, "truncated": False}
+    record = next((r for r in records if r.get("subagent_id") == subagent_id), None)
+    if record is None:
+        return result
+    path = getattr(record.get("agent"), "_live_transcript_path", None)
+    if not isinstance(path, (str, Path)):
+        return result
+    try:
+        # Only the registry's own file is read; no client-supplied path is accepted.
+        from tools.delegation_live_log import live_transcript_root
+        path = Path(path)
+        root = live_transcript_root().resolve()
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.resolve().is_relative_to(root):
+            return result
+        with path.open("rb") as stream:
+            size = stream.seek(0, 2)
+            stream.seek(max(0, size - 16384))
+            raw = stream.read(16384)
+        result.update(available=True, text=raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace"),
+                      bytes_read=len(raw), truncated=size > len(raw))
+    except OSError:
+        pass  # A just-completed child's temporary transcript may already be gone.
+    return result
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
yilsem	1acb5dd90f	fix(mobile): wire plugin catalog and session-scoped subagent controls	2026-10-07 22:37:49 +03:00
yilsem	61d765e2df	fix(mobile): route phone APIs to selected profile and unblock runtime readiness	2026-10-07 20:10:36 +03:00
yilsemandClaude Opus 5.5	b1db2870c1	ci(gitea): run the approval-gate tests on the Windows runner This fork had no CI on Gitea (Actions was off; the upstream .github workflows do not run here). Add one job that runs the protected instruction-file gate tests and the file-write safety tests on the Windows runner. Seven upstream tests that cannot pass on Windows (POSIX paths, symlink privilege, POSIX stat) are deselected by name and listed in the job log. Kart: turkservis-20261007-1421-2 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwSpve9HuXMy7dHf4RDMzX	2026-10-07 18:12:14 +03:00
yilsemandClaude Opus 5.5	7e4cc0915c	AITURK IDE 1.0.0-beta.18: gorunmeyen onay beklemesi yerine aninda "onay gerekli" A one-shot run (hermes chat --query-file ... -Q, stdin closed, no window) still installs the prompt_toolkit approval callback but never starts the prompt UI. The protected instruction-file gate (AGENTS.md / CLAUDE.md / SOUL.md ...) took the registered callback for a reachable human and waited out approvals.timeout on a panel painted nowhere. With the profile value of 300000 s the stage job hung for good. - Gate: in a one-shot run, or when only an automatic approver (subagent_auto_approve) is attached, return BLOCKED / APPROVAL REQUIRED immediately instead of prompting. Human consent is still required every time; yolo and approvals.single_query_mode still do not open this gate. - One-shot exit prints an "approval_required: {json}" line on stderr (session_id, tool_call_id, request_id, targets, reason, applied=false) so the launcher can tell "blocked, needs a human" from "still working". - execute_code: an approval that arrives after the calling script stopped waiting (300 s reply timeout, script run timeout, retired kernel cell) is not applied. - Same invisible wait removed from the computer_use and memory-write prompts in a one-shot run. The one-shot marker is no longer inherited by child processes. - BLOCKED text no longer breaks on a target path containing braces. Long-running tools are untouched: no general tool timeout was shortened. Kart: turkservis-20261007-1421-2 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwSpve9HuXMy7dHf4RDMzX	2026-10-07 17:17:05 +03:00
yilsemandClaude Opus 5.5	58dbb4523b	AITURK IDE 1.0.0-beta.17: telefon kodu yayini yeniden denenir Uzun sure acik kalan IDE'de "Telefon ekle" ilk istegi olu bir keep-alive baglantisinda kaybedebiliyordu; bulusma kaydi yayinlanamayinca kod yolu bes dakika boyunca "Kodla baglanma su an kullanilamiyor" kaliyordu (QR calisiyordu). - publishPairOffer: en cok 4 deneme (0,5 / 1,5 / 3 sn); ag hatasi, 5xx ve 429 yeniden denenir, 422 kalicidir; yaniti kaybolan denemeden sonraki 409 kaydin yerinde oldugu anlamina gelir (iptal jetonu yoktur, kayit kendiliginden biter). - Pencerede "Yeniden dene": ayni kod ve QR ile kaydi yeniden yayinlar. - Role oturumu kaydi ve "Giris yap" baslangici icin tek ek deneme (zaman asimi yeniden denenmez). - Gunluge yalniz "pair offer published / failed after N tries" duser; kod, lookup ve jeton yazilmaz. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8ppceaR5s6cvMnm7uGRnf	2026-10-05 14:27:59 +03:00
yilsemandClaude Opus 5.5	2ed9a6b2de	feat(aiturk): phone link works from any network through an end-to-end encrypted tunnel (1.0.0-beta.16) The phone link no longer depends on the local network. The IDE dials out to turkservis.online and bridges tunnel streams to its own TLS proxy on loopback; the phone runs TLS to the pinned IDE certificate inside the tunnel, so the relay only carries ciphertext. The proxy binds to 127.0.0.1 by default and enabling the feature never asks for a firewall rule; direct same-network access is an explicit option. The window shows the real relay, listener and firewall state, and pairing no longer needs local addresses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8ppceaR5s6cvMnm7uGRnf	2026-10-05 04:22:51 +03:00